



PSYCHOLOGY OF CROWDS

Gustave Le Bon



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2.3

Note to the Sparkling Books edition

La Psychologie des foules was first published in 1895 and translated anonymously into English, possibly by a group of students. A revised French edition, edited by Félix Alcan, was published in 1905 as *Psychologie des foules* by Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière & Cie. We have corrected some grammar errors and anomalies in the original translation by reference to the Alcan edition. We have shortened a few passages but maintained the original footnotes with some additional footnotes of our own. We have also used the full title *Psychology of Crowds* rather than the abbreviation *The Crowd* used in earlier editions.

The Editors

To TH. RIBOT

Director of *Revue philosophique*

Professor of Psychology at the Collège de France

With my great respects.

Foreword

The following work is devoted to an account of the characteristics of crowds.

The whole of the common characteristics with which heredity endows the individuals of a race constitute the genius of the race. When, however, a certain number of these individuals are gathered together in a crowd, for purposes of action, observation proves that, from the mere fact of their being assembled, certain new psychological characteristics result. These characteristics are added to the racial characteristics and, at times, differ from them to a very considerable degree.

Organised crowds have always played an important part in the life of peoples, but this has never been so true as at present. The substitution of the unconscious action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal characteristics of the present age.

I have endeavoured to examine the difficult problem presented by crowds in a purely scientific manner – that is, by making an effort to proceed with method, and without being influenced by opinions, theories and doctrines. This, I believe, is the only way to arrive at the discovery of some few particles of truth, especially when dealing, as is the case here, with a question that is the subject of impassioned controversy. A man of science concerned with verifying a phenomenon is not called upon to trouble himself with the interests his verifications may hurt. In a recent publication an eminent thinker, M. Goblet d'Alviela, made the remark that, belonging to none of the contemporary schools, I am occasionally found in opposition to many of the conclusions of all of them. I hope this new work will merit a similar observation. To belong to a school is

necessarily to espouse its prejudices and preconceived opinions.

Still I should explain to readers why they will find me drawing conclusions from my investigations which might be thought, at first sight, do not ring true. Why, for instance, after noting the extreme mental inferiority of crowds, elected assemblies included, I still affirm it would be dangerous to meddle with their organisation, notwithstanding this inferiority.

The reason is, that the most attentive observation of the facts of history has invariably demonstrated to me that social organisms, being every bit as complicated as those of all beings, should not be forced to undergo a sudden far-reaching transformation. Nature has recourse at times to radical measures, but never after our fashion, which explains how it is that nothing is more fatal to a people than the mania for great reforms, however excellent these reforms may appear theoretically. They would only be useful were it possible to change instantaneously the genius of nations. This power, however, is only possessed by time.

People are ruled by ideas, sentiments, and customs – matters which are the essence of ourselves. Institutions and laws are the outward manifestation of our character: the expression of its needs. Given its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change this character. The study of social phenomena cannot be separated from that of the peoples among whom they have come into existence.

From the philosophical point of view, these phenomena may have an absolute value; in practice they have only a relative value. It is necessary, in consequence, when studying a social phenomenon, to consider it successively under two very different aspects. It will then be seen that the teachings of pure logic are very often contrary to those of practical reason. There

are scarcely any data, even physical, to which this distinction is not applicable. From the point of view of absolute truth, a cube or a circle are invariable geometrical figures rigorously defined by certain formulae. From the point of view of the impression they make on our eye, these geometrical figures may assume very varied shapes. By perspective the cube may be transformed into a pyramid or a square, the circle into an ellipse or a straight line. Moreover, the consideration of these fictitious shapes is far more important than that of the real shapes, for it is they, and they alone, that we see and that can be reproduced by photography or in pictures. In certain cases, there is more truth in the unreal than in the real.

To present objects with their exact geometrical forms would be to distort nature and render it unrecognisable. If we imagine a world whose inhabitants could only copy or photograph objects, but were unable to touch them, it would be very difficult for such persons to attain to an exact idea of their form. Moreover, the knowledge of this form, accessible only to a small number of learned people, would present a very minor interest.

Philosophers who study social phenomena should bear in mind that, side by side with their theoretical value, these phenomena possess a practical value and that this latter, so far as the evolution of civilisation is concerned, is alone of importance. The recognition of this fact should render very circumspect with regard to the conclusions that logic would seem at first to enforce upon them.

There are other motives that dictate to philosophers a like reserve. The complexity of social facts is such, that it is impossible to grasp them as a whole and to foresee the effects of their reciprocal influence. It seems, too, that at times behind visible facts, thousands of invisible causes are hidden. Visible social phenomena appear to be the result of an immense unconscious working, that as a rule is beyond the reach of our analysis. Perceptible phenomena may be compared to waves,

which are the expression on the surface of deep-lying disturbances in an ocean of which we know nothing. So far as the majority of their acts are considered, crowds display a singularly inferior mentality; yet there are other acts in which they appear to be guided by those mysterious forces which the ancients described as destiny, nature, or providence, which we call voices from beyond the grave, and whose power it is impossible to overlook, although we ignore their essence. It would seem, at times, as if there were latent forces in the inner being of nations which serve to guide them. What, for instance, can be more complicated, more logical, more marvellous than a language?

Yet, where can this admirably organised production have arisen from, except as the outcome of the unconscious genius of crowds? The most learned academics, the most esteemed grammarians can do no more than note down the laws that govern languages; they would be utterly incapable of creating them. Even with respect to the ideas of great people, are we certain that they are exclusively the creation of their brains? No doubt such ideas are always created by solitary minds, but is it not the genius of crowds that has furnished the thousands of grains of dust forming the soil in which they have sprung up?

Crowds, doubtless, are always unconscious, but this very unconsciousness is perhaps one of the secrets of their strength. In the natural world, beings exclusively governed by instinct, accomplish acts whose marvellous complexity astounds us. Reason is an attribute of humanity of too recent date and still too imperfect to reveal to us the laws of the unconscious, and still more to take its place. The part played by the unconscious in all our acts is immense, and that played by reason very small. The unconscious acts like a force still unknown.

If we wish, then, to remain within the narrow but safe limits within which science can attain to knowledge, and not to wander in the domain of vague conjecture and vain hypothesis,

all we must do is simply to take note of such phenomena as are accessible to us, and confine ourselves to their consideration. Every conclusion drawn from our observation is, as a rule, premature, for behind the phenomena which we see clearly are other phenomena that we see indistinctly, and perhaps behind these latter, yet others which we do not see at all.

INTRODUCTION

THE ERA OF CROWDS

The evolution of the present age.

The great changes in civilisation are the consequence of changes in national thought.

Modern belief in the power of crowds.

It transforms the traditional policy of the European states.

How the rise of the popular classes comes about, and the manner in which they exercise their power.

The necessary consequences of the power of crowds.

Crowds unable to play a part other than a destructive one.

The dissolution of worn-out civilisations is the work of crowds.

General ignorance of the psychology of crowds.

Importance of the study of crowds for legislators and statesmen.

The great upheavals which precede changes of civilisations such as the fall of the Roman Empire and the foundation of the Arabian Empire, seem at first sight determined more especially by political transformations, foreign invasion, or the overthrow of dynasties. But a more attentive study of these events shows that behind their apparent causes, the real cause is generally seen to be a profound modification in the ideas of the peoples. The true historical upheavals are not those which astonish us by their grandeur and violence. The only important changes from which the renewal of civilisations results affect ideas,

concepts, and beliefs. The memorable events of history are the visible effects of the invisible changes of human thought.

The reason these great events are so rare is that there is nothing so stable in a race as the inherited groundwork of its thoughts. The present epoch is one of these critical moments in which the thought of humankind is undergoing a process of transformation.

Two fundamental factors are at the base of this transformation. The first is the destruction of those religious, political, and social beliefs in which all the elements of our civilisation are rooted. The second is the creation of entirely new conditions of existence and thought as the result of modern scientific and industrial discoveries.

The ideas of the past, although half destroyed, are still very powerful, and the ideas which will replace them are still in the process of formation. The modern age represents a period of transition and anarchy. It is not easy to say as yet what will one day evolve from this necessarily somewhat chaotic period. On what fundamental ideas will the societies which succeed our own be built on? At present, we do not know. Still, it is already clear that on whatever lines the societies of the future are organised, they will have to confront a new power, that of the last surviving sovereign force of modern times: the power of crowds. On the ruins of so many ideas formerly considered beyond discussion, and today decayed or decaying, of so many sources of authority that successive revolutions have destroyed, this power, which alone has arisen in their stead, seems soon destined to absorb the others. While all our ancient beliefs are tottering and disappearing, while the old pillars of society are giving way one by one, the power of crowds is the only force that nothing menaces, and of which the prestige is continually on the increase.

The age we are about to enter will in truth be the era of crowds.

Scarcely a century ago the traditional policy of European states and the rivalries of sovereigns were the principal factors that shaped events. The opinion of the masses scarcely counted and, most frequently indeed, did not count at all. Today it is the old traditions of politics, and the individual tendencies and rivalries of rulers which do not count; while, on the contrary, the voice of the masses has become preponderant.

It is this voice that dictates their conduct to rulers, whose endeavour is to take note of its utterances. The destinies of nations are elaborated at present in the heart of the masses, and no longer in the councils of princes. The entry of the popular classes into political life – that is to say, in reality, their progressive transformation into governing classes – is one of the most striking characteristics of our age of transition. The introduction of universal suffrage, which exercised for a long time but of little influence, is not, as might be thought, the distinguishing feature of this transference of political power.

The progressive growth of the power of the masses took place at first by the propagation of certain ideas, which have slowly implanted themselves in people's minds, and afterwards by the gradual association of individuals determined to bring about the realisation of theoretical concepts. It is by association that crowds have come to procure ideas, with respect to their interests, which are very clearly defined, if not particularly just, and have thus gained strength. The masses are founding syndicates before which the authorities capitulate one after the other; they are also founding labour unions, which in spite of all economic laws tend to regulate the conditions of labour and wages. They return to assemblies in which the Government is vested, with representatives utterly lacking initiative and independence, and reduced almost always to nothing other than the mouthpieces of the committees that have chosen them.

Today the claims of the masses are becoming more and more sharply defined, and amount to nothing less than the determination of utterly destroying society as it now exists, with a view to making it hark back to that primitive communism which was the normal condition of all human groups before the dawn of civilisation. Limitations of the hours of labour, the nationalisation of mines, railways, factories, and the soil, the equal distribution of all products, the elimination of all the upper classes for the benefit of the popular classes, etc., such are these claims.

Little adapted to reasoning, crowds, on the contrary, are quick to act. As the result of their present organisation, their strength has become immense. The dogmas whose birth we are witnessing will soon have the force of the old dogmas; that is to say, the tyrannical and sovereign force of being above discussion. The divine right of the masses is about to replace the divine right of kings.

Writers who enjoy the favour of our middle classes, those who best represent their rather narrow ideas, their somewhat prescribed views, their rather superficial scepticism and, at times, their somewhat excessive egoism, display profound alarm at this new power which they see growing; and to combat the disorder in those people's minds they are addressing despairing appeals to those moral forces of the Church for which they formerly professed so much disdain. They talk to us of the bankruptcy of science, go back in penitence to Rome, and remind us of the teachings of revealed truth. These new converts forget that it is too late.

If they were true believers, they would not be concerned with the preoccupations which beset these recent adherents to religion. The masses repudiate today the gods which their critics repudiated yesterday and helped to destroy. There is no power, divine or human, that can oblige a stream to flow back to its source.

There has been no bankruptcy of science, and science has had no share in the present intellectual anarchy, nor in the making of the new power which is springing up in the midst of this anarchy. Science promised us truth, or at least a knowledge of such relations as our intelligence can seize: it never promised us peace or happiness. Sovereignly indifferent to our feelings, it is deaf to our lamentations. It is for us to endeavour to live with science since nothing can bring back the illusions it has destroyed.

Universal symptoms, visible in all nations, show us the rapid growth of the power of crowds, and do not admit of our supposing that it is destined to cease growing in the near future. Whatever fate it may reserve for us, we shall have to submit to it. All reasoning against it is a mere vain war of words. Certainly, it is possible that the advent to power of the masses marks one of the last stages of Western civilisation, a complete return to those periods of confused anarchy which seem always destined to precede the birth of every new society. But can this result be prevented?

Up to now these thoroughgoing destructions of a worn-out civilisation have constituted the most obvious task of the masses. It is not merely today that this can be traced.

History tells us that from the moment when the moral forces, on which a civilisation rests, have lost their strength, its final dissolution is brought about by those unconscious and brutal crowds known, justifiably enough, as barbarians. Civilisations as yet have only been created and directed by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful for destruction. Their rule is always tantamount to a barbarian phase. A civilisation involves fixed rules, discipline, a passing from the instinctive to the rational state, forethought for the future, and an elevated degree of culture – all of them conditions that crowds, left to themselves, have invariably shown are incapable of realising. In consequence of the purely

destructive nature of their power, crowds act like those microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled or dead bodies. When the structure of a civilisation is rotten, it is always the masses that bring about its downfall. It is at such a juncture that their chief mission is plainly visible and that, for a while, the philosophy of numbers seems the only philosophy of history.

Is the same fate in store for our civilisation? There are grounds to fear that this is the case, but we are not as yet in a position to be certain of it. However this may be, we are bound to resign ourselves to the reign of the masses, since want of foresight has in succession overthrown all the barriers that might have kept the crowd in check.

We have a very slight knowledge of these crowds which are beginning to be the object of so much discussion. Professional students of psychology, having lived far from them, have always ignored them and when, as of late, they have turned their attention in this direction, it has only been to consider the crimes crowds are capable of committing. Without a doubt criminal crowds exist, but virtuous and heroic crowds, and crowds of many other kinds, are also to be met with. The crimes of crowds only constitute a particular phase of their psychology. The mental constitution of crowds is not to be learnt merely by a study of their crimes any more than that of individuals by a mere description of their vices.

However, in point of fact, all the world's masters, all the founders of religions or empires, the apostles of all beliefs, eminent politicians, and, in a more modest sphere, the mere chiefs of small groups of people have always been unconscious psychologists, possessed with an instinctive and often very sure knowledge of the character of crowds, and it is their accurate knowledge of this character that has enabled them to so easily establish their mastery. Napoleon had a marvellous insight into the psychology of the masses of the country over which he

reigned but he, at times, completely misunderstood the psychology of crowds belonging to other races; [1] and it is because he misunderstood it that he engaged in conflicts in Spain, and notably in Russia, in which his power received blows which were destined within a brief space of time to ruin it. A knowledge of the psychology of crowds is today the last resource of the politician who wishes, not to govern them, but, at any rate, not to be too much governed by them. The latter is becoming a very difficult matter indeed.

It is only by obtaining some sort of insight into the psychology of crowds that it can be understood how slight is the action upon them of laws and institutions, how powerless they are to hold any opinions other than those which are imposed upon them, and that it is not with rules based on theories of pure equity that they are to be led, but by seeking what produces an impression on them and what seduces them. For instance, should a legislator, wishing to impose a new tax, choose that which would be theoretically the most just? By no means. In practice, the most unjust option may be the best for the masses. At the same time, if it is the least obvious and, apparently, the least burdensome, it will be the most easily tolerated. It is for this reason that an indirect tax, however exorbitant it may be, will always be accepted by the crowd, because, being paid daily in fractions of a penny on objects of consumption, it will not interfere with the habits of the crowd and will pass unperceived. Replace it by a proportional tax on wages or income of any other kind, to be paid in a lump sum and, were this new imposition theoretically ten times less burdensome than the other, it would give rise to unanimous protest. This arises from the fact that a relatively high sum, which will appear immense, and will in consequence strike the imagination, has been substituted for the unperceived fractions of a farthing. The new tax would only appear light had it been saved farthing by farthing, but this economic method involves an amount of foresight of which the masses are incapable.

The preceding example is simple. Its appositeness will be easily perceived. It did not escape the attention of such a psychologist as Napoleon, but our modern legislators, ignorant as they are of the characteristics of crowds, are unable to appreciate it. Experience has not taught them as yet to a sufficient degree that people never shape their conduct upon the teaching of pure reason.

Many other practical applications might be made of the psychology of crowds. A knowledge of this science throws the most vivid light on a great number of historical and economic phenomena totally incomprehensible without it. I shall have occasion to show that the reason why the most remarkable of modern historians, Taine, has at times so imperfectly understood the events of the great French Revolution is that it never occurred to him to study the genius of crowds. He took as his guide, in the study of this complicated period, the descriptive method resorted to by naturalists; but the moral forces are almost absent in the case of the phenomena which naturalists have to study. Yet it is precisely these forces that constitute the true mainsprings of history.

In consequence, merely looked at from its practical side, the study of the psychology of crowds deserved to be attempted. Were its interest that of resulting from pure curiosity alone, it would still merit attention. It is as interesting to decipher the motives of the actions of individuals as to determine the characteristics of a mineral or a plant. Our study of the genius of crowds can merely be a brief synthesis, a simple summary of our investigations. Nothing more must be demanded of it than a few suggestive views. Others will work the ground more thoroughly. Today, we only touch the surface of a still almost virgin soil. [2]

BOOK I – THE MIND OF CROWDS

CHAPTER I

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CROWDS: PSYCHOLOGICAL LAW OF THEIR MENTAL UNITY

What constitutes a crowd from the psychological point of view. A numerically strong agglomeration of individuals does not suffice to form a crowd.

Special characteristics of psychological crowds.

The turning in a fixed direction of the ideas and sentiments of individuals composing such a crowd, and the disappearance of their personality.

The crowd is always dominated by unconscious thoughts.

The disappearance of brain activity and the predominance of reflex activity.

The lowering of the intelligence and the complete transformation of the sentiments.

The transformed sentiments may be better or worse than those of the individuals of which the crowd is composed.

A crowd is as easily heroic as criminal.

In its ordinary sense the word “crowd” means a gathering of individuals of whatever nationality, profession, or sex, and chance that may have brought them together. From the psychological point of view, the expression “crowd” assumes quite a different significance. Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of individuals presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The

sentiments and ideas of all the people in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an organised crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of crowds.

It is evident that it is not the mere fact of a number of individuals finding themselves accidentally side by side that makes them acquire the character of an organised crowd. A thousand individuals who accidentally gather in a public place without any determined reason in no way constitute a crowd from the psychological point of view. To acquire the special characteristics of such a crowd, the influence is necessary of certain predisposing causes of which we shall have to determine the nature.

The disappearance of conscious personality and the turning of feelings and thoughts in a definite direction, which are the primary characteristics of a crowd about to become organised, do not always involve the simultaneous presence of a number of individuals on one spot. Thousands of isolated individuals may acquire at certain moments, and under the influence of certain violent emotions, such as, for example, a great national event, the characteristics of a psychological crowd. It is sufficient in that case that a mere chance should bring them together for their acts to assume immediately the characteristics peculiar to the acts of a crowd. At times, half a dozen individuals might constitute a psychological crowd, which may not happen in the case of hundreds of individuals gathered together by chance. On the other hand, an entire nation, though there may be no visible agglomeration, may become a crowd under the action of certain influences.

Once formed, a psychological crowd acquires certain provisional, but determinable, general characteristics. To these general characteristics, there are adjoined particular characteristics which vary according to the elements of which the crowd is composed, and may modify its mental constitution. Psychological crowds, then, are amenable to classification; and when we come to occupy ourselves with this matter, we shall see that a heterogeneous crowd, that is to say a crowd composed of dissimilar elements, presents certain characteristics in common with homogeneous crowds. That is to say, crowds composed of elements more or less akin (sects, castes, and classes), and with common characteristics permit differentiation between the two types of crowds.

But, before occupying ourselves with the different categories of crowds, we must first of all examine the characteristics common to them all. We shall set to work like a naturalist, who begins by describing the general characteristics common to all the members of a family before considering the particular characteristics which allow the differentiation of the type and species that the given family has.

It is not easy to describe the mind of any crowd with certainty, because its organisation varies not only according to race and composition, but also according to the nature and intensity of the rousing causes to which crowds are subjected. The same difficulty, however, presents itself in the psychological study of an individual. It is only in novels that individuals can be found who traverse their whole life with an unvarying character.

It is only the uniformity of the environment that creates the apparent uniformity of characters. I have shown elsewhere that all mental constitutions contain possibilities of character which may be manifested in consequence of a sudden change of

environment. This explains how it was that among the most savage members of the French Convention were to be found inoffensive citizens who, under ordinary circumstances, would have been peaceable notaries or virtuous magistrates. The storm passed, they resumed their normal character of quiet, lawabiding citizens.

Napoleon found amongst them his most docile servants. It being impossible to study here all the successive degrees of organisation of crowds, we shall concern ourselves more especially with such crowds as have reached the phase of complete organisation. In this way, we shall see what crowds may become, but not what they invariably are. It is only in this advanced phase of organisation that certain new and special characteristics are superimposed on the unvarying and dominant character of the race; then, the turning of feelings and thoughts of the collectivity takes place in one identical direction. It is only under such circumstances, too, that what I have called above the psychological law of the mental unity of crowds comes into play.

Among the psychological characteristics of crowds are some that may be present in common with isolated individuals, and others, on the contrary, which are absolutely specific to them and are only to be met with in collectivities. First of all, it is these special characteristics that we shall study in order to show their importance.

The most striking peculiarity presented by a psychological crowd is the following: whoever the individuals who compose the crowd are, however like or unlike their mode of life is, whatever their occupations, their characters, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite differently from that in which each individual would feel, think, and act were that person in a state of isolation. There are

certain ideas and feelings which neither come into being, nor transform themselves into acts, except in the case of individuals forming a crowd. The psychological crowd is a provisional being, formed of heterogeneous elements which for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion, a new being which displays characteristics very different from those possessed by each of the cells singularly.

Contrary to an opinion which one is astonished to find coming from the pen of so acute a philosopher as Herbert Spencer, in the aggregate constituting a crowd there is no sort of a summing-up, or an average struck between, its elements. What really takes place is a combination followed by the creation of new characteristics, just as in chemistry certain elements, when brought into contact (bases and acids, for example) combine to form a new body possessing properties quite different from those of the bodies that have served to form it.

It is easy to prove how much the individual forming part of a crowd differs from the isolated individual, but it is not as easy to discover the causes of this difference.

At any rate, to obtain a glimpse of them, it is necessary, in the first place, to call to mind the truth established by modern psychology that unconscious phenomena play an altogether dominant part, not only in organic life, but also in the operations of the intelligence. The conscious life of the mind is of small importance in comparison with its unconscious life. The most subtle analysts, the most acute observers, are scarcely successful in discovering more than a very small number of the unconscious motives that determine their conduct. Our conscious acts are the outcome of an unconscious substratum created in the mind mainly by hereditary influences. This substratum consists of the innumerable common characteristics handed down from generation to generation, which constitute

the genius of a race. Behind the avowed causes of our acts, there undoubtedly lie secret causes that we do not avow. But behind these secret causes there are many others, more secret still, which we ourselves ignore. The greater part of our daily actions are the result of hidden motives which escape our observation.

It is more especially with respect to those unconscious elements, which constitute the genius of a race, that all the individuals belonging to it resemble each other, while it is principally in respect to the conscious elements of their character, the fruit of education, and even more to exceptional hereditary conditions, that they differ from each other. Humans the most unlike in the matter of their intelligence possess instincts, passions, and feelings that are very similar. In the case of everything that belongs to the realm of sentiment: religion, politics, morality, the affections and antipathies, etc., the most eminent people seldom surpass the standard of the most ordinary individuals. From the intellectual point of view, an abyss may exist between a great mathematician and a manual worker but, from the point of view of character, the difference is most often slight or non-existent.

It is precisely these general qualities of character, governed by forces of which we are unconscious and possessed by the majority of the normal individuals of a race in much the same degree, it is precisely these qualities, I say, that in crowds become common property. In the collective mind, the intellectual aptitudes of individuals and, in consequence, their individuality, are weakened. The heterogeneous is swamped by the homogeneous, and the unconscious qualities obtain the upper hand.

This very fact that crowds possess in common ordinary qualities explains why they can never accomplish acts demanding a high degree of intelligence. The decisions affecting matters of general interest taken by an assembly of people of

distinction, but specialists in different walks of life, are not sensibly superior to the decisions that would be adopted by a gathering of imbeciles. The truth is, they can only bring to bear in common on the work in hand those mediocre qualities which are the birthright of every average individual. In crowds, it is stupidity and not motherwit that is accumulated. It is not all the world, as is so often repeated, that has more wit than Voltaire but, assuredly, Voltaire that has more wit than all the world, if by 'all the world' it is taken to mean 'crowds.'

If the individuals of a crowd confined themselves in putting together their ordinary qualities, and each of them has a share, the result would merely be the striking of an average, and not, as we have said, the creation of new characteristics. How is it that these new characteristics are created? This is what we are about to investigate.

Different causes determine the appearance of these characteristics peculiar to crowds, and not possessed by isolated individuals. The first is that the individual forming part of a crowd acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows that individual to yield to instincts which, had the person been alone, would have been kept under restraint. People are less likely to check themselves because a crowd is anonymous and, as a consequence, irresponsible. The sentiment of responsibility which controls individuals disappears entirely.

The second cause, which is contagion, also intervenes to determine the manifestation in crowds of their special characteristics and, at the same time, the trend they are to take. Contagion is a phenomenon which is easy to establish the presence of, but which is not as easy to explain. It must be classed among those phenomena of a hypnotic order, which we shall shortly study. In a crowd, every sentiment and act is

contagious, and contagious to such a degree that individuals readily sacrifice their personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to the person's nature, and of which an individual would be scarcely capable, except when forming part of a crowd.

A third cause, and by far the most important, determines, in the individuals of a crowd, special characteristics which are at times quite contrary to those presented by the isolated individual. I allude to that suggestibility of which, moreover, the contagion mentioned above is neither more nor less than an effect. To understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to bear in mind certain recent physiological discoveries. Today, we know that by various processes individuals can be brought into such a condition that, having entirely lost their conscious personality, they obey all the suggestions of the operator who has deprived them of it, and these individuals commit acts in utter contradiction with their character and habits. The most careful observations seem to prove that individuals immersed for some length of time in a crowd in action soon find themselves, either as a consequence of the magnetic influence given out by the crowd, or from some other cause of which we are ignorant, in a special state. This state resembles the state of fascination in which hypnotised individuals find themselves when in the hands of a hypnotist. The activity of the brain is paralysed in the case of the hypnotised subjects, therefore the latter become the slaves of all the unconscious activities of their spinal cord, which the hypnotist directs at will. The conscious personality has entirely vanished; will and discernment are lost. All feelings and thoughts are bent in the direction determined by the hypnotist.

Such also is approximately the state of individuals forming part of a psychological crowd. These individuals are no longer conscious of their acts. In this case, as in the case of the hypnotised subject, at the same time that certain faculties are

destroyed, others may be brought to a high degree of exaltation. Under the influence of a suggestion, the person will undertake the accomplishment of certain acts with irresistible impetuosity. This impetuosity is more irresistible in the case of crowds, than in that of the hypnotised subject, because the suggestion is the same for all the individuals of the crowd so it gains in strength by reciprocity. The individuals in the crowd who might possess a personality sufficiently strong enough to resist the suggestion are too few in number to struggle against the current. At the utmost, they may be able to attempt a diversion by means of different suggestions. It is in this way, for instance, that a fortunate expression or an image opportunely evoked, have occasionally deterred crowds from the most bloodthirsty acts.

Therefore, we see that the disappearance of the conscious personality, the predominance of the unconscious personality, the turning, by means of suggestion and contagion of feelings and ideas, in an identical direction, the tendency to immediately transform the suggested ideas into acts; these, we see, are the principal characteristics of the individuals forming part of a crowd. Individuals are no longer themselves but become automated and cease to be guided by their will.

Moreover, by the mere fact that individuals form part of an organised crowd, a person descends several rungs down the ladder of civilisation. When isolated, that person may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, the same person is a barbarian. That is to say, a creature acting by instinct. Individuals possess the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings, whom they further tend to resemble by the facility with which they allow themselves to be impressed by words and images (which would be entirely without action on each of the isolated individuals composing the crowd) and to be induced to commit acts contrary to their most obvious interests and best-known

habits. An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will.

It is for these reasons that juries are seen to deliver verdicts of which each individual juror would disapprove and that parliamentary assemblies adopt laws and measures which each of their members would disapprove if taken singularly. Taken separately, the men of the Convention were enlightened citizens of peaceful habits. United in a crowd, they did not hesitate to give their adhesion to the most savage proposals, to guillotine individuals most clearly innocent, and, contrary to their interests, to renounce their inviolability and to decimate themselves.

It is not only by their acts that individuals in a crowd differ essentially from themselves. Even before they have entirely lost their independence, their ideas and feelings have undergone transformation. This transformation is so profound as to change the miser into a spendthrift, the sceptic into a believer, the honest man into a criminal, and the coward into a hero. The renunciation of all its privileges which the nobility voted for, in a moment of enthusiasm during the celebrated night of August 4th, 1789, would certainly never have been consented to by any of its members if taken singularly.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual. But, from the point of view of feelings and of the acts these feelings provoke, the crowd may, according to circumstances, be better or worse than the individual. It all depends on the nature of the suggestion to which the crowd is exposed. This is the point that has been completely misunderstood by writers who have only studied crowds from the criminal point of view. Doubtless a crowd is often criminal, but also it is often heroic. It is crowds rather than isolated individuals that may be induced to run the risk of death to secure the triumph of a creed or an idea, that may be fired with enthusiasm for glory and honour, that are led

on – almost without bread and without arms, as in the age of the Crusades – to deliver the tomb of Christ from the infidel, or, as in '93, to defend the fatherland. Such heroism is without doubt somewhat unconscious, but it is of such heroism that history is made. Were peoples only to be credited with the great actions performed in cold blood, the annals of the world would register but few of them.

CHAPTER II

THE SENTIMENTS AND MORALITY OF CROWDS

1. IMPULSIVENESS, MOBILITY, AND IRRITABILITY OF CROWDS

The crowd is at the mercy of all exterior exciting causes, and reflects their incessant variations.

The impulses which the crowd obeys are so imperious as to annihilate the feeling of personal interest.

Premeditation is absent from crowds – National influence.

2. THE SUGGESTIBILITY AND CREDULITY OF CROWDS

The obedience of crowds to suggestions.

The images evoked in the mind of crowds are accepted by them as realities.

Why these images are identical for all the individuals composing a crowd.

The equality of the educated and the ignorant man in a crowd.

Various examples of the illusions to which the individuals in a crowd are subject.

The impossibility of according belief to the testimony of crowds.

The unanimity of numerous witnesses as one of the worst proofs that can be invoked to establish a fact.

The slight value of works of history.

3. THE EXAGGERATION AND SIMPLICITY OF THE SENTIMENTS OF CROWDS

Crowds do not admit doubt or uncertainty and always go to extremes. Their sentiments are always excessive.

4. THE INTOLERANCE, DICTATORIALNESS, AND CONSERVATISM OF CROWDS

The reasons for these sentiments.

The servility of crowds in the face of a strong authority.

The momentary revolutionary instincts of crowds do not prevent them from being extremely conservative.

Crowds are instinctively hostile to change and progress.

5. THE MORALITY OF CROWDS

The morality of crowds, according to the suggestions under which they act, may be much lower or much higher than that of the individuals composing them.

Explanation and examples.

Crowds are rarely guided by those considerations of interest which are most often the exclusive motives of the isolated individual.

The moralising role of crowds.

I now proceed to the successive consideration of the different characteristics that may be observed in the majority of crowds. [...]

1. IMPULSIVENESS, MOBILITY, AND IRRITABILITY OF CROWDS

When studying the fundamental characteristics of a crowd, we stated that it is guided almost exclusively by unconscious motives. Its acts are far more under the influence of the spinal

cord than of the brain. In this respect, a crowd is closely akin to quite primitive beings. The acts performed may be perfect so far as their execution is concerned. But, as they are not directed by the brain, individuals may allow the exciting causes to which they are exposed to decide for them. A crowd is at the mercy of all external exciting causes and reflects their incessant variations. It is the slave of the impulses it receives. Isolated individuals may be submitted to the same exciting causes as individuals forming part of a crowd. However, when individuals think in isolation, rather than part of a collectivity, their brains show them the inadvisability of yielding, but when part of a crowd individuals refrain from yielding. This truth may be physiologically expressed by saying that isolated individuals possess the capacity of dominating their reflex actions, while a crowd is devoid of this capacity.

The varying impulses to which crowds obey may be, according to their exciting causes, generous or cruel, heroic or cowardly, but they will always be so imperious that the interest of individuals, even the interest of self-preservation, will not dominate them. Because the exciting causes that may act on crowds are so varied (and crowds always obey them) as a consequence crowds are extremely mobile. This explains how it is that we see them pass in a moment from the most bloodthirsty ferocity to the most extreme generosity and heroism. A crowd may easily enact the part of an executioner and, not less easily, that of a martyr. Crowds have furnished the torrents of blood requisite for the triumph of every belief. It is not necessary to go back to the heroic ages to see what crowds are capable of in this latter direction. They are never sparing of their life in an insurrection and, not long since, a general becoming suddenly popular, might easily have found a hundred thousand men ready to sacrifice their lives for his cause had he demanded it. Any display of premeditation by crowds is in consequence out of the question.

They may be animated in succession by the most contrary sentiments, but they will always be under the influence of the exciting causes of the moment. They are like the leaves which a tempest whirls up and scatters in every direction and then allows to fall. When later studying certain revolutionary crowds, we shall give some examples of the variability of their sentiments.

This mobility of crowds renders them very difficult to govern, especially when a measure of public authority has fallen into their hands. If the necessities of everyday life did not constitute a sort of invisible regulator of existence, it would scarcely be possible for democracies to last. Still, though the wishes of crowds are frenzied, they are not durable. Crowds are as incapable of willing as of thinking for any length of time. A crowd is not merely impulsive and mobile, it is also not prepared to admit that anything can come between its desire and the realisation of its desire. It is the less capable of understanding such an intervention, in consequence of the feeling of irresistible power arising from sheer numbers. The notion of impossibility disappears for the individual when forming part of a crowd. Isolated individuals know well enough that on their own, they cannot set fire to a palace or loot a shop and, should they be tempted to do so, they would easily resist the temptation. As part of a crowd, individuals become conscious of the power given to them by numbers. It is sufficient to suggest to crowds ideas of murder or pillage, for them to yield immediately to temptation. An unexpected obstacle will be destroyed with frenzied rage. If the human organism allowed the perpetuity of furious passion, it might be said that the normal condition of a crowd frustrated in its wishes is just a state of furious passion.

The fundamental characteristics of the nation, which constitute the unvarying source from which all our sentiments spring, always exert an influence on the irritability of crowds,

their impulsiveness and their mobility, as on all the popular sentiments we shall study. All crowds are doubtless always irritable and impulsive but with great variations of degree. For instance, the difference between a Latin and an Anglo-Saxon crowd is striking. The most recent facts in French history throw a vivid light on this point. The mere publication, in 1870, of a telegram, relating an insult supposed to have been offered an ambassador, was sufficient to determine an explosion of fury, from which a terrible war stemmed immediately. Some years later the telegraphic announcement of an insignificant reverse at Langson provoked a fresh explosion which brought about the instantaneous overthrow of the government. In the same period, a much more serious reverse, undergone by the English expedition to Khartoum, produced only a slight emotion in England and no ministry was overturned. [...]

2. THE SUGGESTIBILITY AND CREDULITY OF CROWDS

When defining crowds, we said that one of their general characteristics was an excessive suggestibility, and we have shown to what an extent suggestions are contagious in every human agglomeration; a fact which explains the rapid turning of the sentiments of a crowd in a definite direction. However indifferent it may be supposed, a crowd, as a rule, is in a state of expectant attention, which renders suggestion easy. The first suggestion formulated which arises, implants itself immediately by a process of contagion in the brains of all assembled, then the identical bend of sentiments in the crowd is immediately an accomplished fact.

As is the case with all persons under the influence of suggestion, the idea which has entered the brain tends to transform itself into an act. Whether the act is that of setting fire to a palace or whether it involves self-sacrifice, a crowd lends itself to it with equal facility. It will all depend on the

nature of the exciting cause, and no longer, as in the case of isolated individuals, on the relations existing between the act suggested and the sum total of the reasons which may be urged against its realisation.

In consequence, a crowd which perpetually hovers on the borderland of unconsciousness, which readily yields to any suggestion, which has all the violence of feelings (peculiar to beings who cannot appeal to the influence of reason) are deprived of all critical faculty and cannot be otherwise than excessively credulous. The improbable does not exist for a crowd, and it is necessary to bear this circumstance well in mind to understand the facility with which the most improbable legends and stories are created and propagated. [3]

The creation of the legends which so easily obtain circulation in crowds is not solely the consequence of their extreme credulity. It is also the result of the prodigious perversions that events undergo in the imagination of a throng. The simplest event that comes under the observation of a crowd is soon totally transformed. A crowd thinks in images, and the image itself immediately calls up a series of other images, which have no logical connection with the first image. We can easily conceive this state by thinking of the fantastic succession of ideas to which we are sometimes led by calling up in our minds any fact. Our reason shows us the incoherence there is in these images. But a crowd is almost blind to this truth, and confuses the deforming action its imagination has superimposed with the real event. A crowd scarcely distinguishes between the subjective and the objective. It accepts as real the images evoked in its mind, though they most often have only a very distant relation with the observed fact.

The way in which a crowd distorts any event of which it is a witness ought, it would seem, to be innumerable and different from each other, since the individuals composing the gathering are of very different temperaments. But this is not the case. Like

the result of contagion, the distortions are of the same kind, and take the same shape in the mind of all the assembled individuals.

The first distortion of the truth effected by one of the individuals of a gathering is the starting-point of a contagious suggestion. Before St. George appeared on the walls of Jerusalem to all the Crusaders, he was certainly perceived in the first instance by one of those present. By dint of suggestion and contagion, the miracle noticed by a single person was immediately accepted by all.

Such is always the mechanism of the collective hallucinations so frequent in history. Hallucinations which seem to have all the recognised characteristics of authenticity, since they are phenomena observed by thousands of persons.

To combat what precedes, the mental quality of the individuals composing a crowd must not be brought into consideration. This quality is without importance. From the moment that they form part of a crowd, no matter what the intellectual capacity of an individual, every person composing the crowd is equally incapable of observation.

This thesis may seem paradoxical. To demonstrate it beyond doubt, it would be necessary to investigate a great number of historical facts, and several volumes would be insufficient for the purpose.

Still, as I do not wish to leave readers under the impression of unproven assertions, I shall give you some examples taken at random from the immense number of those that might be quoted.

The following fact is one of the most typical because chosen from among collective hallucinations of which the crowd is victim. In this crowd are found individuals of every kind, from the most highly educated downwards. It is related incidentally

by Julian Felix, a naval lieutenant, in his book on sea currents, and has been previously cited by the *Revue Scientifique*.

The frigate, the *Belle Poule*, was cruising in the open sea for the purpose of finding the cruiser *Le Berceau*, from which she had been separated by a violent storm. It was broad daylight and in full sunshine. Suddenly the watch signalled a disabled vessel; the crew looked in the direction signalled, and every one, officers and sailors, clearly perceived a raft covered with men towed by boats which were displaying signals of distress. Yet this was nothing more than a collective hallucination. Admiral Desfosses lowered a boat to go to the rescue of the wrecked sailors. On nearing the sighted object, the sailors and officers on board the boat saw “masses of men in motion, stretching out their hands, and heard the dull and confused noise of a great number of voices.” When the object was reached those in the boat found themselves simply and solely in the presence of a few branches of trees covered with leaves that had been swept out from the neighbouring coast. Before evidence so palpable the hallucination vanished.

The mechanism of a collective hallucination of the kind we have explained is clearly seen at work in this example. On the one hand, we have a crowd in a state of expectant attention, on the other a suggestion made by the watch sighting a disabled vessel at sea, a suggestion which, by a process of contagion, was accepted by all those present, both officers and sailors.

It is not necessary that a crowd should be numerous for the faculty of seeing what is taking place before its eyes to be destroyed and for the real facts to be replaced by hallucinations unrelated to them. As soon as a few individuals are gathered together they constitute a crowd and, though they may be distinguished people, they assume all the characteristics of crowds with regard to matters outside their speciality. The faculty of observation and the critical spirit possessed by each of them individually disappears at once. An ingenious

psychologist, M. Davey, supplies us with a very curious example in point, recently cited in the *Annales des Sciences Psychiques*, and deserves inclusion here. M. Davey, having called a gathering of distinguished observers, among them one of the most prominent of English scientific men, Mr. Wallace, executed in their presence, and after having allowed them to examine the objects and to place seals where they wished, all the regulation spiritualistic phenomena, the materialisation of spirits, writing on slates, etc.

Having subsequently obtained from these distinguished observers written reports admitting that the phenomena observed could only have been obtained by supernatural means, he revealed to them that they were the result of very simple tricks. "The most astonishing feature of M. Davey's investigation," writes the author of this account, "is not how marvellous the tricks themselves are, but the extreme weakness of the reports made with respect to them by the non-initiated witnesses. It is clear, then," he says, "that witnesses even in number may give circumstantial relations which are completely erroneous, but the result is that, if their descriptions are accepted as exact, the phenomena they describe are inexplicable by trickery. The methods invented by M. Davey were so simple that some were astonished that he had the boldness to employ them; but he had such a power over the mind of a crowd that he could persuade it that it saw what it did not see." Here, as always, we have the power of a hypnotist over the hypnotised. Moreover, when this power is seen in action on the mind of an intelligent being, who was previously invited to be suspicious, it is understandable how easy it is to deceive ordinary crowds.

Analogous examples are innumerable. As I write these lines, the papers are full of the story of two little girls found drowned in the Seine. These children, to begin with, were recognised in the most unmistakable manner by half a dozen witnesses. All

the affirmations were in such entire agreement that no doubt remained in the mind of the examining magistrate. He had the death certificate drawn up, but just as the burial of the children was to have been proceeded with, a mere chance brought about the discovery that the supposed victims were alive, and had, moreover, a remote resemblance to the drowned girls. As in several of the examples previously noted, the affirmation of the first witness, himself a victim of illusion, had sufficed to influence the other witnesses.

In parallel cases, the starting-point of the suggestion is always the illusion produced in an individual, by more or less vague reminiscences. Contagion follows as a result of the affirmation of this initial illusion. If the first observers are very impressionable, it will often be sufficient that the corpse they believe they recognise should present (apart from all real resemblance) some peculiarity, a scar, or some other detail, which may evoke the idea of another person. The idea evoked may then become the nucleus of a sort of crystallisation which invades the understanding and paralyses all critical faculty. What the observers then see is no longer the object itself, but the image evoked in their minds. Erroneous recognitions of the dead bodies of children by their own mother can be explained in this way, as occurred in the following case. Two kinds of suggestions, of which I have just pointed out the mechanism, can be traced in the episode.

“The child was recognised by another child, who was mistaken. The series of unwarranted recognitions then began.

“An extraordinary thing occurred. The day after a schoolboy had recognised the corpse a woman exclaimed, ‘Good Heavens, it is my child!’

“She was taken up to the corpse; she examined the clothing, and noted a scar on the forehead. ‘It is certainly,’ she said, ‘my

son who disappeared last July. He was stolen from me and murdered.'

"The woman was concierge in the Rue du Four; her name was Chavandret. Her brother-in-law was summoned and when questioned he said, 'That is the little Filibert.' Several persons living in the street recognised the child found at La Villette as Filibert Chavandret, among them was the boy's schoolmaster, who based his opinion on a medal worn by the lad.

"Nevertheless, the neighbours, the brother-in-law, the schoolmaster, and the mother were mistaken. Six weeks later the identity of the child was established. The boy, belonging to Bordeaux, had been murdered there and brought by a haulage company to Paris." [4] [...]

To return to the faculty of observation possessed by crowds, our conclusion is that their collective observations are as erroneous as possible, and that most often they merely represent the illusion of an individual who, by a process of contagion, has influenced others. Facts proving that the most utter mistrust of the evidence of crowds is advisable might be multiplied to any extent. Thousands of men were present twenty-five years ago at the celebrated cavalry charge during the battle of Sedan. Yet it is impossible, in the face of the most contradictory ocular testimony, to decide by whom it was commanded. The English general, Lord Wolseley, has proved in a recent book that up to now the gravest errors of fact have been committed with regard to the most important incidents of the battle of Waterloo – facts that hundreds of witnesses had nevertheless attested. [5]

Such facts show us what the value of the testimony of crowds is. Treatises on logic include the unanimity of numerous witnesses in the category of the strongest proofs that can be invoked in support of the exactness of a fact. Yet what we know of the psychology of crowds shows that treatises on logic need

to be rewritten on this point. The events in regard to which there exists the most doubt are certainly those which have been observed by the greatest number of persons. To say that a fact has been simultaneously verified by thousands of witnesses is to say, as a rule, that the real fact is very different from the accepted account of it.

It follows from this, that works of history must be considered as works of pure imagination. They are fanciful accounts of ill-observed facts, accompanied by explanations written after the event. To write such books is the most absolute waste of time. Had not the past left us its literary, artistic, and monumental works, we should know absolutely nothing in reality with regard to bygone times. Are we in possession of a single word of truth concerning the lives of the great ones who have played significant roles in the history of humanity such as Hercules, Buddha, or Mahomet? In all probability, we are not. Moreover, their real lives are of slight importance to us. Our interest is to know what our great predecessors were as they are presented by popular legend. It is legendary heroes, and not for a moment real heroes, who have impressed the minds of crowds.

Unfortunately, legends (even if they have been definitely put on record by books) have in themselves no stability. The imagination of the crowd continually transforms them as the result of the lapse of time and especially in consequence of racial causes. There is a great gulf fixed between the sanguinary Jehovah of the Old Testament and the God of Love of Saint Therese, and the Buddha worshipped in China has no traits in common with that venerated in India.

It is not even necessary that heroes should be separated from us by centuries for their legend to be transformed by the imagination of the crowd. The transformation occasionally takes place within a few years. In our own day, we have seen the legend of one of the greatest heroes of history modified several times in less than fifty years. Under the Bourbons,

Napoleon became a sort of idyllic and liberal philanthropist, a friend of the humble who, according to the poets, was destined to be long remembered in the cottage. Thirty years afterwards this easy-going hero had become a sanguinary despot, who, after having usurped power and destroyed liberty, caused the slaughter of three million souls simply to satisfy his own ambition. At present, we are witnessing a fresh transformation of the legend. When it has undergone the influence of some dozens of centuries the intellectuals of the future, face to face with these contradictory accounts, will perhaps doubt the very existence of the hero, as some of them now doubt that of Buddha, and will see in him nothing more than a solar myth or a development of the legend of Hercules. They will doubtless console themselves easily for this uncertainty, for, better initiated than we are today in the characteristics and psychology of crowds, they will know that history is scarcely capable of preserving the memory of anything except myths.

3. THE EXAGGERATION AND SIMPLICITY OF THE SENTIMENTS OF CROWDS

Whether the feelings exhibited by a crowd are good or bad, they present the double character of being very simple and very exaggerated. On this point, as on so many others, individuals who form a crowd resemble primitive beings. Inaccessible to fine distinctions, things are not seen as a whole, and their intermediate phases are overlooked. The exaggeration of the sentiments of a crowd is heightened by the fact that when any feeling is exhibited, it spreads very quickly by a process of suggestion and contagion. The evident approbation, of which it is the object, considerably increases its force. The simplicity and exaggeration of the sentiments of crowds have results in a throng which knows neither doubt nor uncertainty. It goes at once to extremes. A suspicion transforms itself, as soon as it is announced, into incontrovertible evidence. A commencement of antipathy or disapprobation, which in the case of an isolated

individual would not gain strength, becomes at once furious hatred in the case of an individual forming part of a crowd.

The violence of the feelings of crowds is also increased, especially in heterogeneous crowds, by the absence of all sense of responsibility. The certainty of impunity, a certainty of being stronger increases as the crowd is more numerous. Added to this, the notion of a considerable momentary force, due to number, make sentiments and acts possible which would be impossible in the case of isolated individuals. In crowds foolish, ignorant, and envious people are freed from the sense of their insignificance and powerlessness and are possessed instead by the notion of brutal and temporary, albeit immense, strength. Unfortunately, this tendency of crowds towards exaggeration is often brought to bear upon bad sentiments. These sentiments are atavistic residuum of the instincts of primitive beings, which the fear of punishment obliges the isolated and responsible individual to curb. Thus it is that crowds are so easily led into the worst excesses.

Still, this does not mean that crowds, skilfully influenced, are not capable of heroism and devotion and of evincing the loftiest virtues; they are even more capable of showing these qualities than isolated individuals. We shall soon have occasion to revert to this point when we come to study the morality of crowds.

Exaggerated in its feelings, a crowd is only roused by excessive emotions. An orator wishing to rouse a crowd must fool it with strong rhetoric. To exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never to attempt to prove anything by reasoning, are methods of argument well-known to speakers at public meetings.

Moreover, a crowd exacts a similar exaggeration in the sentiments to that of its heroes. Their apparent qualities and virtues must always be amplified. It has been justly remarked that on the stage a crowd demands from the hero a degree of

courage, morality, and virtue that is never to be found in real life. Quite rightly, importance has been laid on the special standpoint from which matters are viewed in the theatre. Such a standpoint exists, no doubt, but its rules for the most part have nothing to do with common sense and logic. The art of appealing to crowds is no doubt of an inferior order, but it demands quite special aptitudes. It is often impossible when reading plays to explain their success. Managers of theatres when accepting pieces are themselves, as a rule, very uncertain of their success because, to judge the matter, it would be necessary for them to transform themselves into a crowd. [6]

Here, once more, were we able to embark on more extensive explanations, we would show the dominant influence of geographical considerations. A play which provokes the enthusiasm of the crowd in one country has sometimes no success in another, or has only a partial and conventional success, because it does not put in operation influences capable of working on a different public.

I need not add that the tendency to exaggeration in crowds is only present in the case of sentiments and not at all in the matter of intelligence. I have already shown that, by the mere fact that when individuals are part of a crowd, their intellectual standards are immediately and considerably lowered. A learned magistrate, M. Tarde, has also verified this fact in his researches on the crimes of crowds. It is only, then, with respect to sentiment that crowds can rise to a very high or, on the contrary, descend to a very low level.

4. THE INTOLERANCE, DICTATORIALNESS AND CONSERVATISM OF CROWDS

Crowds are only cognisant of simple and extreme sentiments; the opinions, ideas, and beliefs suggested to them are accepted or rejected as a whole, and considered as absolute truths or as not less absolute errors. This is always the case with beliefs induced by a process of suggestion instead of engendered by reasoning. Everyone is aware of the intolerance that accompanies religious beliefs, and of the despotic empire they exercise on people's minds. Being in doubt as to what constitutes truth or error, and having, on the other hand, a clear notion of its strength, a crowd is as disposed to give authoritative effect to its inspirations as it is intolerant. An individual may accept contradiction and discussion; a crowd will never do so. At public meetings, the slightest contradiction on the part of an orator is immediately received with howls of fury and violent invective, soon followed by blows, and expulsion should the orator stick to his point. Without the restraining presence of the representatives of authority the person who contradicts, indeed, could be done to death. Dictatorialness and intolerance are common to all categories of crowds, but they are met with in a varying degree of intensity. [...]

Authoritativeness and intolerance are sentiments of which crowds have a very clear notion, which they easily conceive and which they entertain as readily as they put them into practice, when once they are imposed upon. Crowds exhibit a docile respect for force, and are only slightly impressed by kindness, which is considered a form of weakness. Their sympathies have never been bestowed on easy-going masters, but on tyrants who vigorously oppressed them. It is to these latter that they always erect the loftiest statues. It is true that they willingly trample on the despot whom they have stripped of power, but it is because, having lost his strength, he has resumed his place among the weak, who are to be despised because they are not to be feared. The type of hero dear to crowds will always have the semblance of a Caesar. His insignia

attracts them, his authority overawes them, and his sword instils them with fear.

A crowd is always ready to revolt against a weak leader and to bow down servilely before a strong authority. Should the strength of an authority be intermittent, the crowd, always obedient to its extreme sentiments, passes alternately from anarchy to servitude, and from servitude to anarchy.

However, to believe in the predominance among crowds of revolutionary instincts would be to entirely misconstrue their psychology. It is merely their tendency to violence that deceives us on this point. Their rebellious and destructive outbursts are always very transitory. Crowds are governed too much by unconscious considerations, and too subject to the consequence of secular hereditary influences not to be extremely conservative. Abandoned to themselves, they soon weary of disorder, and instinctively turn to servitude. It was the proudest and most intractable of the Jacobins who acclaimed Bonaparte with the greatest energy when he suppressed all liberty and made his hand of iron severely felt.

It is difficult to understand history, and popular revolutions in particular, if one does not take sufficiently into account the profoundly conservative instincts of crowds. They may be desirous, it is true, of changing the names of their institutions, and to obtain these changes they sometimes accomplish even violent revolutions, but the essence of these institutions is too much the expression of the hereditary needs of the race for them not invariably to abide by it. Their incessant mobility only exerts its influence on quite superficial matters. In fact, their instincts are conservative and indestructible. Their fetish-like respect for all traditions is absolute; their unconscious horror of all novelty capable of changing the essential conditions of their existence is very deeply rooted. Had democracies possessed the power they wield today at the time of the invention of mechanical looms, or of the introduction of steam-power and of

railways, the realisation of these inventions would have been impossible, or would have been achieved only at the cost of revolutions and repeated massacres. It is fortunate for the progress of civilisation that the power of crowds only began to exist when the great discoveries of science and industry had already been effected.

5. THE MORALITY OF CROWDS

Taking the word 'morality' to mean constant respect for certain social conventions, and the permanent repression of selfish impulses, it is quite evident that crowds are too impulsive and too mobile to be moral. If, however, we include in the term morality the transitory display of certain qualities such as abnegation, self-sacrifice, disinterestedness, devotion, and the need for equity, we may say, on the contrary, that crowds may exhibit at times a very lofty morality. The few psychologists who have studied crowds have only considered them from the point of view of their criminal acts, and noticing how frequent these acts are, they have come to the conclusion that the moral standard of crowds is very low. Doubtless this is often the case; but why? Simply because our savage, destructive instincts are the inheritance left dormant in all of us from the primitive ages. In the life of isolated individuals, it would be dangerous for them to gratify these instincts singularly. On the contrary, when absorbed in an irresponsible crowd, which assures impunity, instincts can be followed freely. Being unable, in the ordinary course of events, to exercise these destructive instincts on other people, we confine ourselves to exercising them on animals. The passion for the chase and the acts of ferocity of crowds proceed from one and the same source. A crowd which slowly slaughters a defenceless victim displays a very cowardly ferocity; but for the philosopher this ferocity is very closely related to that of hunters who gather in dozens for the pleasure of taking part in the pursuit and killing of a luckless stag by their hounds.

A crowd may be guilty of murder, arson, and any kind of crime, but it is also capable of very lofty acts of devotion, sacrifice, and disinterestedness, of acts much loftier indeed than those of which the isolated individual is capable. Appeals to sentiments of glory, honour, and patriotism are particularly likely to influence individuals forming part of a crowd. History is rich with analogous examples as those furnished by the Crusaders and the volunteers of 1793. Crowds alone are capable of great disinterestedness and great devotion.

How numerous are the crowds that have heroically faced death for beliefs, ideas, and phrases that they had scarcely understood. The crowds that go on strike do so far more in obedience to an order than to obtain an increase of the slender salary with which they make shift. Personal interest is very rarely a powerful motive force with crowds, while it is almost the exclusive motive of the conduct of isolated individuals. It is certainly not self-interest that has guided crowds in so many wars, usually incomprehensible to them, in which they allowed themselves to be massacred as easily as the larks hypnotised by the mirror of the hunter. Even in the case of absolute scoundrels, it often happens that the mere fact of their being in a crowd endows them for the moment with very strict principles of morality. Taine calls attention to the fact that the perpetrators of the September massacres deposited on the table of the committees the pocket-books and jewels they had found on their victims, and with which they could easily have been able to make a getaway. The howling, swarming and ragged crowd, which invaded the Tuileries during the revolution of 1848, did not lay hands on any of the objects that excited its astonishment, and one of which would have meant bread for many days. This moralising of the individual by the crowd is not certainly a constant rule, but it is a rule frequently observed. It is even observed in circumstances much less serious than those I have just cited. I have remarked that in the theatre a crowd exacts from the hero of the piece exaggerated virtues, and it is a

commonplace observation that an assembly shows itself as a rule very prudish. The debauched, the pimp, and the coarse often break out into chatter at a slightly risky scene or expression, though they are very harmless compared to customary conversation. If, then, crowds often abandon themselves to low instincts, they may also set the example of acts of lofty morality. If disinterestedness, resignation, and absolute devotion to a real or chimerical ideal are moral virtues, it may be said that crowds often possess these virtues to a degree rarely attained by the wisest philosophers. Doubtless they practise them unconsciously, but that is of small import. We should not complain too much that crowds are more especially guided by unconscious considerations and are not given to reasoning. Had they, in certain cases, reasoned and consulted their immediate interests, it is possible that no civilisation would have grown up on our planet and humanity would have had no history.

CHAPTER III

THE IDEAS, REASONING POWER, AND IMAGINATION OF CROWDS

1. THE IDEAS OF CROWDS

Fundamental and incidental ideas.

How contradictory ideas may exist simultaneously.

The transformation that must be undergone by high ideals before they are accessible to crowds.

The social influence of ideas is independent of the degree of truth they may contain.

2. THE REASONING POWER OF CROWDS

Crowds are not influenced by reasoning.

The reasoning of crowds is always of an inferior order.

There is only the appearance of analogy or succession in the ideas they associate.

3. THE IMAGINATION OF CROWDS

Strength of the imagination of crowds.

Crowds think in images, and these images follow each other without any connecting link.

Crowds are especially impressed by the marvellous.

The real pillars of civilisation are legends and the marvellous.

The popular imagination has always been the basis of the power of statesmen.

The manner in which facts, capable of striking the imagination of crowds, present themselves for observation.

1. THE IDEAS OF CROWDS

When studying in an earlier work the part played by ideas in the evolution of nations, we showed that every civilisation is the outcome of a small number of fundamental ideas that are very rarely renewed. We showed how these ideas are implanted in the minds of crowds, with what difficulty the process is effected, and the power possessed by the ideas in question when once it has been accomplished. Finally, we saw that great historical perturbations are the result, as a rule, of changes in these fundamental ideas. Having treated this subject at sufficient length, I shall not return to it now, but shall confine myself to saying a few words on the subject of such ideas as are accessible to crowds, and of the forms under which they conceive them.

They may be divided into two classes. In one, we shall place accidental and passing ideas created by the influences of the moment: infatuation for an individual or a doctrine, for instance. In the other will be classed the fundamental ideas, to which the environment, the laws of heredity and public opinion give a very great stability; such ideas are the religious beliefs of the past and the social and democratic ideas of today.

These fundamental ideas resemble the volume of the water of a stream slowly following its course; the transitory ideas are like the small waves, forever changing, which disturb its surface, and are more visible than the progress of the stream itself although without real importance.

At the present time, the great fundamental ideas which were the mainstay of our ancestors are tottering more and more. They have lost all solidity and, meanwhile, the institutions resting upon them are severely shaken. Every day a great many of those transitory minor ideas, of which I have just been speaking, are formed; but very few of them seem endowed with vitality and destined to acquire a lasting influence.

Whatever the ideas suggested to crowds, they can only exercise effective influence on the condition that they assume a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape. They present themselves then in the guise of images, and are only accessible to the masses in this form. These image-like ideas are not connected by any logical bond of analogy or succession, and may take each other's place like the slides of a magic-lantern which the operator withdraws from the groove in which they were placed one above the other. This explains how it is that the most contradictory ideas may be seen to be simultaneously present in crowds. According to the chances of the moment, a crowd will come under the influence of one of the various ideas stored up in its understanding, and is capable, in consequence, of committing the most dissimilar acts. Its complete lack of critical spirit does not allow perception of these contradictions.

This phenomenon is not peculiar to crowds. It is to be observed in many isolated individuals, not only among the uneducated. I have observed its presence to a curious extent in the case of educated Hindus brought up at our European universities and having obtained a degree. A number of Western ideas had been superimposed on their unchangeable and fundamental hereditary or social ideas. According to the chances of the moment, the one or the other set of ideas showed themselves each with their special accompaniment of acts or utterances, the same individual presenting in this way the most flagrant contradictions. These contradictions are more apparent than real, for it is only hereditary ideas that have sufficient

influence over the isolated individual to become motives of conduct. It is when, as a result of the intermingling of different races, individuals are placed between different hereditary tendencies that their acts, from one moment to another, may be entirely contradictory. It would be useless to insist here on these phenomena, although their psychological importance is tremendous. I am of opinion that at least ten years of travel and observation would be necessary to arrive at a comprehension of them.

Ideas are only accessible to crowds after having assumed a very simple shape and must, therefore, often undergo the most thorough transformations to become popular. It is especially when we are dealing with somewhat lofty philosophical or scientific ideas that we see how far-reaching are the modifications they require in order to lower them to the level of the intelligence of crowds.

These modifications are dependent on the nature of the crowds, or of the race to which the crowds belong, but their tendency is always belittling and in the direction of simplification. This explains the fact that, from a social point of view, there is in reality scarcely any such thing as a hierarchy of ideas, that is to say, as ideas of greater or less elevation. However great or true an idea may have been to begin with, it is deprived of almost all that which constituted its elevation and its greatness by the mere fact that it has come within the intellectual range of crowds and exerts an influence upon them.

Moreover, from a social point of view, the hierarchical value of an idea, its intrinsic worth, is without importance. The necessary point to consider is the effect it produces. The Christian ideas of the Middle Ages, the democratic ideas of the last century, or the social ideas of today are assuredly not very elevated. Philosophically considered, they can only be regarded as somewhat sorry errors, and yet their power has been and will be immense, and they will count for a long time to come

among the most essential factors that determine the conduct of States.

Even when an idea has undergone the transformations which render it accessible to crowds, it only exerts influence when, by various processes which we shall examine elsewhere, it has entered the domain of the unconscious, when indeed it has become a sentiment, for which much time is required. For it must not be supposed that merely because the justness of an idea has been proved, it can cause effective action even in cultivated minds. This fact may be quickly appreciated by noting how slight the influence of the clearest demonstration on the majority of people is. Evidence, if it is very plain, may be accepted by educated people, but converts will be quickly brought back by their unconscious selves to their original conceptions. See them again after a few days, and they will put forward afresh their old arguments in exactly the same terms. They are in reality under the influence of anterior ideas, that have become sentiments. It is such ideas alone that influence the more recondite motives of our acts and utterances. It cannot be otherwise in the case of crowds. When by various processes an idea has struck home by penetrating into the minds of crowds, it possesses an irresistible power, and brings about a series of effects, opposition to which is useless. The philosophical ideas which resulted in the French Revolution took nearly a century to implant themselves in the mind of the crowd. Their irresistible force, when once they had taken root, is known. The striving of an entire nation towards the conquest of social equality, and the realisation of abstract rights and ideal liberties, caused the tottering of all thrones and profoundly disturbed the Western world. During twenty years the nations were engaged in internecine conflict, and Europe witnessed massacres that would have terrified Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane. The world had never seen on such a large scale what resulted from the promulgation of an idea.

A long time is necessary for ideas to establish themselves in the minds of crowds, but just as long a time is needed for them to be eradicated. For this reason crowds, as far as ideas are concerned, are always several generations behind the cultured and philosophers. All politicians are well aware today of the admixture of error contained in the fundamental ideas I referred to a short while back but, as the influence of these ideas is still very powerful, they are obliged to govern in accordance with principles they themselves no longer believe.

2. THE REASONING POWER OF CROWDS

It cannot absolutely be said that crowds do not reason and are not to be influenced by reasoning. However, the arguments they employ, and those which are capable of influencing them are, from a logical point of view, of such an inferior kind that it is only by way of analogy that they can be described as reasoning.

The inferior reasoning of crowds is based, just as is reasoning of a high order, on the association of ideas, but between the ideas associated by crowds there are only apparent bonds of analogy or succession. The mode of reasoning of crowds resembles that of the Eskimo who, knowing from experience that ice, a transparent body, melts in the mouth, concludes that glass, also a transparent body, should also melt in the mouth; or that of a savage who imagines that by eating the heart of a courageous foe he acquires his bravery; or of workers who, having been exploited by one employer of labour, immediately conclude that all employers exploit their employees.

The characteristics of the reasoning of crowds are the association of dissimilar things possessing a merely apparent connection between each other, and the immediate generalisation of particular cases. It is arguments of this kind that are always presented to crowds by those who know how to manage them. They are the arguments by which crowds are influenced.

A chain of logical argumentation is incomprehensible to crowds. It is for this reason that it is permissible to say that crowds do not reason, or that they reason falsely. Astonishment is felt at times on reading certain speeches because of their weakness, yet they had an enormous influence on the crowds which listened to them. But it is forgotten that these speeches were written with the intent of persuading multitudes and not as reading material for philosophers. Orators in intimate communication with crowds can evoke images by which listeners will be seduced. If orators are successful their object has been attained, and twenty volumes of harangues (always the outcome of reflection) are not worth the few phrases which appealed to the brains they were required to convince.

It would be superfluous to add that the powerlessness of crowds to reason correctly prevents them from displaying any trace of the critical spirit; prevents them, that is, from being capable of discerning truth from error, or of forming a precise judgment on any matter. Judgments accepted by crowds are merely judgments forced upon them and never judgments adopted after discussion.

In regard to this matter, the individuals who do not rise above the level of a crowd are numerous. The ease with which certain opinions obtain general acceptance results more especially from the impossibility experienced by the majority of people of forming an opinion peculiar to themselves and based on reasoning of their own.

3. THE IMAGINATION OF CROWDS

Just as is the case with respect to people in whom reasoning power is absent, the figurative imagination of crowds is very powerful, very active and very susceptible to being keenly impressed. The images evoked in their mind by a prominent person, an event, an accident, are almost as lifelike as reality. Crowds are to some extent in the position of dreamers whose reason, suspended for the time-being, allows the arousing in their minds of images of extreme intensity which could only be dissipated if they could be submitted to the action of reflection. Crowds, being incapable both of reflection and of reasoning, are devoid of the notion of improbability; and it is to be noted that in a general way it is the most improbable things that are the most striking.

This is why it is always the marvellous and legendary side of events that especially strike crowds. When a civilisation is analysed it is seen that, in reality, it is the marvellous and the legendary that are its true supports. Appearances have always played a much more important part than reality in history, where the unreal is always a greater moment than the real. Crowds being only capable of thinking in images are only to be impressed by images. It is only images that terrify or attract them and become motives of action.

For this reason theatrical representations, in which the image is shown in its most clearly visible shape, always have an enormous influence on crowds. Bread and spectacular shows constituted, for the plebeians of ancient Rome, the ideal of happiness, and they asked for nothing more. Throughout the successive ages this ideal has scarcely varied. Nothing has a greater effect on the imagination of crowds of every category than theatrical representations. The entire audience experiences at the same time the same emotions, and if these

emotions are not at once transformed into acts, it is because the most unconscious spectators cannot ignore that they are the victim of illusions, and that they have laughed or wept over imaginary adventures. Sometimes, however, the sentiments suggested by the images are so strong that they tend, like habitual suggestions, to transform themselves into acts. The story has often been told of the manager of a popular theatre who, in consequence of his only playing sombre dramas, was obliged to have the actor who took the part of the traitor protected on his leaving the theatre, to defend him against the violence of the spectators, indignant at the crimes, imaginary though they were, which the traitor had committed. We have here, in my opinion, one of the most remarkable indications of the mental state of crowds, and especially of the facility with which they are influenced by means of suggestion. The unreal has almost as much influence on them as the real. They have an evident tendency not to distinguish between the two.

The power of conquerors and the strength of States is based on the popular imagination. It is more particularly by working upon this imagination that crowds are led. All great historical facts, the rise of Buddhism, of Christianity, of Islam, the Reformation, the French Revolution and, in our own time, Socialism are the direct or indirect consequences of strong impressions produced on the imagination of the crowd.

Moreover, all the great politicians of every age and every country, including the most absolute despots, have regarded the popular imagination as the basis of their power, and they have never attempted to govern in opposition to it. "It was by becoming a Catholic," said Napoleon to the Council of State, "that I terminated the Vendean war. By becoming a Muslim that I obtained a footing in Egypt. By becoming an Ultramontane [7] that I won over the Italian priests and, had I to govern a nation of Jews, I would rebuild Solomon's temple." Never perhaps since Alexander and Caesar has any great man better understood how the imagination of the crowd should be

impressed. His constant preoccupation was to strike it. He bore it in mind in his victories, in his harangues, in his speeches, in all his acts. On his deathbed, it was still in his thoughts.

How is the imagination of crowds to be impressed? We shall soon see. Let us confine ourselves for the moment to saying that the feat is never to be achieved by attempting to work upon the intelligence or reasoning faculty, that is to say, by way of demonstration. It was not by means of cunning rhetoric that Anthony succeeded in making the populace rise against the murderers of Caesar; it was by reading his will to the multitude and pointing to his corpse.

Whatever strikes the imagination of crowds presents itself under the shape of a startling and very clear image, freed from all accessory explanation, or merely having as accompaniment a few marvellous or mysterious facts: examples in point are a great victory, a great miracle, a great crime, or a great hope. Things must be laid before the crowd as a whole, and their genesis must never be indicated. A hundred petty crimes or petty accidents will not strike the imagination of crowds in the least, whereas a single great crime or a single great accident will profoundly impress them, even though the results are infinitely less disastrous than those of the hundred small accidents put together. The epidemic of influenza, which caused the death just a few years ago of five thousand people in Paris alone, made very little impression on the popular imagination. The reason was that this veritable massacre was not embodied in any visible image, but was only learnt from statistical information furnished weekly. An accident which should have caused the death of only five hundred instead of five thousand people, but on the same day and in public, as the outcome of an accident appealing strongly to the eye, by the fall, for instance, of the Eiffel Tower, would have produced, on the contrary, an immense impression on the imagination of the crowd. The probable loss of a transatlantic steamer that was supposed, in the absence of news, to have gone down in mid-ocean

profoundly impressed the imagination of the crowd for a whole week. Yet official statistics show that in the same year about one thousand big sailing vessels were lost. The crowd, however, was never for a moment concerned by these successive losses, much more important though they were, as far as regards the destruction of life and property, than the loss of the Atlantic liner in question could possibly have been.

It is not, then, the facts in themselves that strike the popular imagination, but the way in which they take place and are brought under notice. It is necessary that by their condensation, if I may thus express myself, they should produce a startling image which fills and besets the mind. To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know at the same time the art of governing them.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF CROWD CONVICTIONS

What is meant by the religious sentiment.

It is independent of the worship of a divinity.

Its characteristics.

The strength of convictions assuming a religious form.

Various examples.

Popular gods have never disappeared.

New forms under which they are revived.

Religious forms of atheism.

Importance of these notions from a historical point of view.

The Reformation, Saint Bartholomew, the Terror, and all analogous events, are the result of the religious sentiments of crowds and not of the will of isolated individuals.

We have shown that crowds do not reason, that they accept or reject ideas as a whole, that they tolerate neither discussion nor contradiction, and that the suggestions brought to bear on them invade the entire field of their understanding and tend at once to transform themselves into acts. We have shown that crowds suitably influenced are ready to sacrifice themselves for the ideal with which they have been inspired. We have also seen that they only entertain violent and extreme sentiments, that in their case sympathy quickly becomes adoration, and antipathy

almost as soon as it is aroused is transformed into hatred. These general indications furnish us already with a presentiment of the nature of the convictions of crowds.

When these convictions are closely examined, whether at epochs marked by fervent religious faith, or by great political upheavals such as those of the last century, it is clear that they always assume a peculiar form which I cannot better define than by giving it the name of a religious sentiment.

This sentiment has very simple characteristics, such as worship of a being supposed superior, fear of the power with which the being is credited, blind submission to its commands, inability to discuss its dogmas, the desire to spread them, and a tendency to consider as enemies all those who do not accept the sentiment. Whether such a sentiment applies to an invisible god, to a wooden or stone idol, to a hero or to a political cause, provided that it presents the preceding characteristics, its essence always remains religious. The supernatural and the miraculous are present to the same extent. Crowds unconsciously accord a mysterious power to the political formula or the victorious leader that for the moment arouses their enthusiasm.

People are not religious solely when they worship a divinity, but also when they put all the resources of their minds, the complete submission of their will, and their fervent ardour of fanaticism at the service of a cause which (or an individual who) becomes the goal and guide of their thoughts and actions. Intolerance and fanaticism are the necessary accompaniments of the religious sentiment. They are inevitably displayed by those who believe themselves in the possession of the secret of earthly or eternal happiness. These two characteristics are to be found in all people grouped together when they are inspired by a conviction of any kind. The Jacobins of the Reign of Terror were fundamentally as religious as the Catholics of the

Inquisition, and their cruel ardour stemmed from the same source.

The convictions of crowds assume those characteristics of blind submission, fierce intolerance, and the need for violent propaganda, which are inherent in the religious sentiment, and this is why it may be said that all their beliefs have a religious form. The hero acclaimed by a crowd is a veritable god for that crowd. Napoleon was such a god for fifteen years, and a divinity never had more fervent worshippers or sent men to their death with greater ease. The Christian and Pagan gods never exercised a more absolute empire over the minds that had fallen under their sway.

All founders of religious or political creeds have established them solely because they were successful in inspiring crowds with those fanatical sentiments which have the result that people find their happiness in worship and obedience, and that they are ready to lay down their lives for their idol. This has been the case in all epochs. Fustel de Coulanges, in his excellent work on Roman Gaul, justly remarks that the Roman Empire was in no way maintained by force, but by the religious admiration it inspired. "It would be without a parallel in the history of the world," he observes rightly, "that a form of government held in popular detestation should have lasted for five centuries. ... It would be inexplicable that the thirty legions of the Empire should have constrained a hundred million men to obedience." The reason for their obedience was that the Emperor, who personified the greatness of Rome, was worshipped like a divinity by unanimous consent. There were altars in honour of the Emperor in the smallest townships of his realm. "From one end of the Empire to the other a new religion was seen to arise in those days which had for its divinities the emperors themselves. Some years before the Christian era the whole of Gaul, represented by sixty cities, built in common a temple near the town of Lyons in honour of Augustus. ... Its

priests, elected by the united Gallic cities, were the principal personages in their country. ... It is impossible to attribute all this to fear and servility. Whole nations are not servile, and especially for three centuries. It was not the courtiers who worshipped the prince, it was Rome, and it was not Rome merely, but it was Gaul, it was Spain, it was Greece and Asia.”

Today the majority of the great orators who have swayed people’s minds no longer have altars, but they have statues, or their portraits are in the hands of their admirers, and the cult of which they are the object is not notably different from that accorded to their predecessors. An understanding of the philosophy of history is only to be had by a thorough appreciation of this fundamental point of the psychology of crowds. The crowd demands a god before anything else.

It must not be supposed that these are the superstitions of a bygone age which reason has definitely banished. Sentiment has never been vanquished in its eternal conflict with reason. Crowds will hear no more of the words divinity and religion, in whose name they were so long enslaved; but they have never possessed so many fetishes as in the last hundred years, and the old divinities have never had so many statues and altars raised in their honour. Those who in recent years have studied the popular movement known under the name of Boulangism have been able to see with what ease the religious instincts of crowds are ready to revive. There was not a country inn that did not possess the hero’s portrait. He was credited with the power of remedying all injustices and all evils, and thousands of men would have given their lives for him. Great might have been his place in history had his character been at all on a level with his legendary reputation.

It is thus a very useless commonplace to assert that a religion is necessary for the masses, because all political, divine, and social creeds only take root among them on the condition of always assuming the religious shape – a shape which obviates

the danger of discussion. Were it possible to induce the masses to adopt atheism, this belief would exhibit all the intolerant ardour of a religious sentiment, and in its exterior forms would soon become a cult. The evolution of the small Positivist sect furnishes us a curious example of the point. What happened to the Nihilist, whose story is related by that profound thinker Dostoyevsky, has quickly happened to the Positivists. Illumined one day by the light of reason, he broke the images of divinities and saints that adorned the altar of a chapel, extinguished the candles, and, without losing a moment, replaced the destroyed objects by the works of atheistic philosophers such as Buchner and Moleschott, after which he piously lighted the candles again. The object of his religious beliefs had been transformed, but can it be truthfully said that his religious sentiments had changed?

Again I emphasise that certain historical events (and they are precisely the most important) cannot be understood unless one has attained an appreciation of the religious form which the convictions of crowds always assume in the long run. There are social phenomena that need to be studied far more from the point of view of the psychologist than from that of the naturalist. The great historian Taine has only studied the Revolution as a naturalist, and thus the real origin of events has often escaped him. He has perfectly observed the facts but, from want of having studied the psychology of crowds, he has not always been able to trace their causes. The facts having appalled him by their bloodthirsty, anarchic, and ferocious aspects that he has scarcely seen in the heroes of the great drama anything more than a horde of barbarians abandoning themselves without restraint to their instincts. The violence of the Revolution, its massacres, its need for propaganda, its declarations of war upon everything are only to be properly explained by reflecting that the Revolution was merely the establishment of a new religious belief in the mind of the masses. The Reformation, the massacre of Saint Bartholomew,

the French religious wars, the Inquisition, the Reign of Terror are phenomena of an identical kind, brought about by crowds animated by those religious sentiments which necessarily lead those imbued with them to pitilessly extirpate by fire and sword whosoever is opposed to the establishment of the new faith. The methods of the Inquisition are those of all whose convictions are genuine and sturdy. Their convictions would not deserve these epithets, had they resorted to other methods.

Upheavals analogous to those I have just cited are only possible when it is the soul of the masses that brings them about. The most absolute despots could not cause them. When historians tell us that the massacre of Saint Bartholomew was the work of a king, they show themselves as ignorant of the psychology of crowds as of that of sovereigns. Manifestations of this order can only proceed from the soul of crowds. The most absolute power of the most despotic monarch can scarcely do more than hasten or delay the moment of their apparition. The massacre of Saint Bartholomew or the religious wars were no more the work of kings than the Reign of Terror was the work of Robespierre, Danton, or Saint Just. The root cause of such events is always the working of the soul of the masses and never the power of potentates.

BOOK II – THE OPINIONS AND BELIEFS OF CROWDS

CHAPTER I

INDIRECT FACTORS OF THE OPINIONS AND BELIEFS OF CROWDS

Preparatory factors of the beliefs of crowds.

The origin of the beliefs of crowds is the consequence of a preliminary process of elaboration.

Study of the different factors of these beliefs.

1. NATIONALITY

The predominating influence it exercises.

It represents the suggestions of ancestors.

2. TRADITIONS

They are the synthesis of the soul of the nation.

Social importance of traditions.

How, after having been necessary, they become harmful.

Crowds are the most obstinate maintainers of traditional ideas.

3. TIME

It prepares first the establishment of beliefs, then their destruction. Time enables order to arise from chaos.

4. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Erroneous idea of their role.

Their influence is extremely weak.

They are effects, not causes.

Nations are incapable of choosing what appear to them the best institutions.

Institutions are labels which shelter the most dissimilar things under the same title.

How institutions may come to be created.

Certain institutions such as centralisation are obligatory for certain nations, even though theoretically bad.

5. INSTITUTIONS AND EDUCATION

Falsity of prevalent ideas as to the influence of instruction on crowds.

Statistical indications.

Demoralising effect of Latin system of education.

The part instruction might play.

Examples furnished by various peoples.

Having studied the mental constitution of crowds and become acquainted with their modes of feeling, thinking, and reasoning, we shall now proceed to examine how their opinions and beliefs arise and become established.

The factors which determine these opinions and beliefs are of two kinds: indirect factors and direct factors.

The indirect factors are those which render crowds capable of adopting certain convictions and absolutely incapable of adopting others. These factors prepare the ground in which certain new ideas are suddenly seen to germinate, whose force and consequences are a cause of astonishment, though they are only spontaneous in appearance. The outburst and putting into practice of certain ideas among crowds seem, at times,

startlingly sudden. This is only a superficial effect, behind which must be sought a preliminary and preparatory action of long duration.

The direct factors are those which, coming on the top of this long, preparatory working, in whose absence they would remain without effect, serve as the source of active persuasion on crowds; that is, they are the factors which cause the idea to take shape and set it loose with all its consequences. The resolutions by which multitudes are suddenly carried away, arise out of these immediate factors; it is due to them that a riot breaks out or a strike is decided, and to them that enormous majorities invest someone with power to overthrow a government.

The successive action of these two kinds of factors is to be traced in all great historical events: the French Revolution, to cite but one of the most striking of such examples of the nobility, and the progress of scientific thought. The mind of the masses, thus prepared, was then easily roused by such immediate factors as the speeches of orators, and the resistance of the entourage to insignificant reforms.

Among the indirect factors there are some of a general nature, which are found to underlie all the beliefs and opinions of crowds. They are nationality, traditions, time, institutions, and education.

We now proceed to study the influence of these different factors.

1. NATIONALITY

This factor must be placed in the first rank, for in itself it by far surpasses all the others in importance. We have sufficiently studied it in another work; it is therefore needless to deal with it again. We showed, in a previous volume, what a historical race is, and how, once its character is formed, it possesses, as

the result of the laws of heredity, such power that its beliefs, institutions, and arts (in a word, all the elements of its civilisation) are merely the outward expression of its genius. We showed that the power of the nation is such that no element can pass from one people to another without undergoing the most profound transformations. [8]

Environment, circumstances, and events represent the social suggestions of the moment. They may have a considerable influence, but this influence is always momentary if it is contrary to the suggestions of the nation; that is, to those which are inherited by a nation from the entire series of its ancestors.

We shall have occasion in several of the chapters of this work to touch again upon racial influence, and to show that this influence is so great that it dominates the characteristics peculiar to the genius of crowds. It follows from this fact that the crowds of different countries offer very considerable differences of beliefs and conduct and are not influenced in the same manner.

2. TRADITIONS

Traditions represent the ideas, the needs, and the sentiments of the past. They are the synthesis of the race, and weigh upon us with immense force.

The biological sciences have been transformed since embryology has shown the immense influence of the past on the evolution of living beings; and the historical sciences will not undergo less change when this concept has become more widespread. As yet it is not sufficiently general, and many politicians are still no further advanced than the theorists of the last century, who believed that a society could break off with its past and be entirely recast on lines suggested solely by the light of reason.

A nation is an organism created by the past and, like any other organism, it can only be modified by slow hereditary accumulations.

It is tradition that guides people, and more especially so when they are in a crowd. The changes they can make in their traditions with any ease, merely bear, as I have often repeated, upon names and outward forms. This circumstance is not to be regretted. Neither a national genius nor civilisation would be possible without traditions. Humanity's two great efforts since we have existed have been to create a network of traditions which we afterwards endeavour to destroy when their beneficial effects have worn themselves out. Civilisation is impossible without traditions, and progress impossible without the destruction of those traditions. The difficulty, and it is an immense difficulty, is to find a proper equilibrium between stability and variability. Should a people allow its customs to become too firmly rooted, it can no longer change, and becomes incapable of improvement. Violent revolutions are in this case of no avail; for what happens is that either the broken fragments of a chain are linked together again and the past resumes its empire without change, or the fragments remain apart and decadence soon succeeds anarchy.

The ideal for a people is in consequence to preserve the institutions of the past, merely changing them imperceptibly, little by little. This ideal is difficult to realise. The Romans in ancient times and the English in modern times are almost alone in having realised it.

It is precisely crowds that cling the most tenaciously to traditional ideas and oppose their being changed with the most obstinacy. This is notably the case with the category of crowds constituting castes. I have already insisted upon the conservative spirit of crowds, and shown that the most violent rebellions merely end in a changing of words and terms. At the end of the last century, in the presence of destroyed churches,

of priests expelled from the country or guillotined, it might have been thought that the old religious ideas had lost all their strength. And yet a few years had barely lapsed before the abolished system of public worship had to be re-established in deference to universal demands. [9]

Blotted out for a moment, the old traditions had resumed their sway.

No example could display better the power of tradition on the mind of crowds. The most redoubtable idols do not dwell in temples, nor the most despotic tyrants in palaces; both the one and the other can be broken in an instant. But the invisible impulses that reign in our innermost selves are safe from every effort of revolt and only yield to the slow erosion of centuries.

3. TIME

In social as in biological problems, time is one of the most significant factors. It is the sole real creator and the sole great destroyer. It is time that has turned grains of sand into mountains and raised the obscure amoeba of past eras to human dignity. The action of centuries is sufficient to transform any given phenomenon. It has been justly observed that an ant with enough time at its disposal could level Mont Blanc. If human beings were possessed with the magical force of varying time at their will, they would have the power that believers attribute to God.

Here, however, we have only to concern ourselves with the influence of time on the origin of the opinions of crowds. Its action from this point of view is still immense. Dependent upon it are the great forces such as race, which cannot form themselves without it. It causes the birth, the growth, and the death of all beliefs. It is by the aid of time that they acquire their strength and also by its aid that they lose it.

It is time in particular that prepares the opinions and beliefs of crowds, or at least the soil on which they will germinate. This is why certain ideas are realisable at one epoch and not at another. It is time that accumulates that immense detritus of beliefs and thoughts on which the ideas of a given period spring up. They do not grow haphazardly and by chance; the roots of each of them reach down into a distant past. When they blossom, it is time that has prepared their blooming; and to arrive at a notion of their source, it is always necessary to search back into the past. They are the daughters of the past and the mothers of the future, but throughout the slaves of time. Time, in consequence, is our veritable ruler, and it suffices to leave it free to act to see all things transformed. At present, we are very uneasy as regards to the threatening aspirations of the masses and the destruction and upheaval foreboded thereby. Time, without other aid, will see to the restoration of equilibrium. "No form of government," M. Lavissee very properly writes, "was founded in a day. Political and social organisations are works that demand centuries. The feudal system existed for centuries in a shapeless, chaotic state before it found its laws; absolute monarchy also existed for centuries before arriving at regular methods of government, and these periods of expectancy were extremely troubled."

4. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The idea that institutions can remedy the defects of societies, that national progress is the consequence of the improvement of institutions and governments, and that social changes can be effected by decrees, this idea, I say, is still generally accepted. It was the starting-point of the French Revolution, and the social theories of the present day are based upon it. The most continuous experience has been unsuccessful in shaking this grave delusion. Philosophers and historians have endeavoured in vain to prove its absurdity, yet they have had no difficulty in demonstrating that institutions are the outcome of ideas,

sentiments, and customs, and that ideas, sentiments, and customs are not to be recast by rewriting legislative codes. A nation does not choose its institutions at will any more than it chooses the colour of its eyes. Institutions and governments are the product of ancestry. They are not the creators of an epoch but are created by it. Peoples are not governed in accordance with their caprices of the moment, but as their character determines that they will be governed. Centuries are required to form a political system and centuries needed to change it. Institutions have no intrinsic virtue: in themselves they are neither good nor bad. Those which are good, at a given moment for a given people may be harmful in the extreme for another nation.

Moreover, it is in no way in the power of a people to really change its institutions. Undoubtedly, at the cost of violent revolutions, it can change their name, but in their essence they remain unmodified. The names are mere futile labels with which historians who go to the bottom of things need scarcely concern themselves. It is in this way, for instance, that England, [10] the most democratic country in the world, lives, nevertheless, under a monarchical régime, whereas the countries in which the most oppressive despotism is rampant are the Spanish-American Republics, in spite of their republican constitutions. The destinies of peoples are determined by their character and not by their government. I have endeavoured to establish this view in my previous volume by setting forth categorical examples.

To lose time in the manufacture of cut-and-dried constitutions is, in consequence, a puerile task, the useless labour of an ignorant rhetorician. Necessity and time undertake the charge of elaborating constitutions when we are wise enough to allow these two factors to act. This is the plan the Anglo-Saxons have adopted, as their great historian, Macaulay, teaches us in a passage that the politicians of all Latin countries ought to learn

by heart. After having shown all the good that can be accomplished by laws which logic says are a chaos of absurdities and contradictions, he compares the scores of constitutions that have been engulfed in the convulsions of the Latin peoples with that of England, and points out that the latter has only been very slowly changed part by part, under the influence of immediate necessities and never of speculative reasoning.

“To think nothing of symmetry and much of convenience; never to remove an anomaly merely because it is an anomaly; never to innovate except when some grievance is felt; never to innovate except so far as to get rid of the grievance; never to lay down any proposition of wider extent than the particular case for which it is necessary to provide; these are the rules which have, from the age of John to the age of Victoria, generally guided the deliberations of our two hundred and fifty Parliaments.”

It would be necessary to take one by one the laws and institutions of each people to show to what extent they are the expression of the needs of each race and are incapable, for that reason, of being violently transformed. It is possible, for instance, to indulge in philosophical dissertations on the advantages and disadvantages of centralisation; but when we see a nation composed of very different people devote a thousand years of efforts to attaining to this centralisation; when we observe that a great revolution, having for object the destruction of all the institutions of the past, has been forced to respect this centralisation, and has even strengthened it; under these circumstances we should admit that it is the outcome of imperious needs, that it is a condition of the existence of the nation in question, and we should pity the poor mental range of politicians who talk of destroying it. Could they by chance succeed in this attempt? Their success would at once be the signal for a frightful civil war, [11] which, moreover, would

immediately bring back a new system of centralisation much more oppressive than the old.

The conclusion to be drawn from my argument is that it is not in institutions that the means is to be sought of profoundly influencing the genius of the masses. When we see certain countries, such as the United States, reach a high degree of prosperity under democratic institutions, while others, such as the Spanish-American Republics, are found existing in a pitiable state of anarchy under absolutely similar institutions, we should admit that these institutions are as foreign to the greatness of the one as to the decadence of the others. Peoples are governed by their character, and all institutions which are not intimately modelled on that character merely represent a borrowed garment, a transitory disguise. No doubt sanguinary wars and violent revolutions have been undertaken, and will continue to be undertaken, to impose institutions to which is attributed, as to the relics of saints, the supernatural power of creating welfare. It may be said, then, in one sense, that institutions react on the mind of the crowd inasmuch as they engender such upheavals. But in reality it is not the institutions that react in this manner since we know that, whether triumphant or vanquished, they possess in themselves no virtue. It is illusions and words that have influenced the mind of the crowd, and especially words – words which are as powerful as they are chimerical, and whose astonishing sway we shall shortly demonstrate.

5. INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION

Foremost among the dominant ideas of the present epoch is the notion that instruction is capable of considerably changing people, and has for its unfailing consequence to improve them and even to make them equal. By the mere fact of its being constantly repeated, this assertion has ended by becoming one of the most steadfast democratic dogmas. It would be as difficult

now to attack it as it would have been formerly to have attacked the dogmas of the Church.

On this point, however, as on many others, democratic ideas are in profound disagreement with the results of psychology and experience. Many eminent philosophers, among them Herbert Spencer, have had no difficulty in showing that instruction neither renders people more moral nor happier, that it changes neither their instincts nor their hereditary passions and that at times (for this to happen it only needs to be badly directed) it can be more pernicious than useful. Statisticians have brought confirmation of these views by telling us that criminality increases with the generalisation of instruction, or at any rate of a certain kind of instruction, and that the worst enemies of society, the anarchists, are recruited among the prize-winners of schools; while in a recent work a distinguished magistrate, M. Adolphe Guillot, made the observation that at present 3,000 educated criminals are met with for every 1,000 illiterate delinquents, and that in fifty years the criminal percentage of the population has passed from 227 to 552 for every 100,000 inhabitants, an increase of 133 per cent. He has also noted in common with his colleagues that criminality is particularly on the increase among young persons, for whom, as is known, gratuitous and obligatory schooling has replaced apprenticeship.

It is not to say (and nobody has ever maintained this proposition) that well-directed instruction cannot give very useful practical results, if not in the sense of raising the standard of morality, it can at least in that of developing professional capacity. Unfortunately, the Latin peoples, especially in the last twenty-five years, have based their systems of instruction on erroneous principles, and in spite of the observations of the most eminent minds, such as Breal, Fustel de Coulanges, Taine, and many others, they persist in their lamentable mistakes. I have myself shown, in a work

published some time ago, [12] that the French system of education transforms the majority of those who have undergone it into enemies of society, and recruits numerous disciples for the worst forms of socialism.

The primary danger of this system of education – very properly qualified as Latin – consists in the fact that it is based on the fundamental psychological error that intelligence is developed by learning textbooks by heart. Adopting this view, it has been attempted to force students to learn as many textbooks as possible. From primary school and until students leave university they do nothing but acquire books by heart without their judgment or personal initiative ever being called into play. Education consists in reciting by heart and obeying.

“Learning lessons, knowing by heart a grammar book or a compendium, repeating well and imitating well – that,” writes a former Minister of Public Instruction, M. Jules Simon, “is a ludicrous form of education whose every effort is an act of faith tacitly admitting the infallibility of the master, and whose only results are a belittling of ourselves and a rendering of us impotent.”

Were this education merely useless, one might confine one's self to expressing compassion for the unhappy children who, instead of making needful studies at the primary school, are instructed in the genealogy of the sons of Clotaire, the conflicts between Neustria and Austrasia [13], or zoological classifications. But the system presents a far more serious danger. It gives those who have been submitted to it, a violent dislike of the state of life in which they were born and an intense desire to escape from it. The working class no longer wish to remain a working class, or the peasant to continue being a peasant, while the most humble members of the middle classes admit of no possible career for their children except that of State-paid bureaucrats. Instead of preparing children for life French schools solely prepare them to occupy public functions,

in which success can be attained without any necessity for self-direction or the exhibition of the least glimmer of personal initiative. At the bottom of the social ladder the system creates an army of proletarians discontented with their lot and always ready to revolt, while at the summit it brings into being a frivolous bourgeoisie, at once sceptical and credulous, having a superstitious confidence in the State, whom it regards as a sort of Providence, but without forgetting to display towards it a ceaseless hostility, always laying its own faults at the door of the Government and incapable of the least enterprise without the intervention of the authorities.

The State, which manufactures by dint of textbooks all these persons possessing diplomas, can only utilise a small number of them, and is forced to leave the others without employment. It is obliged in consequence to resign itself to feeding the first mentioned and to having the others as its enemies. From the top to the bottom of the social pyramid, from the humblest clerk to the professor and the mayor, the immense mass of persons boasting diplomas besiege the professions. While a businessman has the greatest difficulty in finding an agent to represent him in the colonies, thousands of candidates solicit the most modest official posts. There are 20,000 school teachers without employment in the department of the Seine alone, all of them persons who, disdaining the fields or the workshops, look to the State for their livelihood. The number of the chosen being restricted, that of the discontented is perforce immense. The latter are ready for any revolution, whoever be its chiefs and whatever the goal they aim at. The acquisition of knowledge for which no use can be found is a sure method of driving a man to revolt. [14]

It is evidently too late to retrace our steps. Experience alone, that supreme educator of peoples, will be at pains to show us our mistake. It alone will be powerful enough to prove the necessity of replacing our odious textbooks and our pitiable examinations by industrial instruction capable of inducing our

young men to return to the fields, to the workshop, and to the colonial enterprise which they avoid today at all costs.

The professional instruction which all enlightened minds are now demanding was the instruction received in the past by our ancestors. It still exists at the present day among the nations who rule the world by their force of will, their initiative, and their spirit of enterprise. In a series of remarkable pages, whose principal passages I reproduce further on, a great thinker, M. Taine, has clearly shown that our former system of education was approximately that in vogue today in England and America, and in a remarkable parallel between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon systems he has plainly pointed out the consequences of the two methods.

One might consent, perhaps, at a pinch, to continue to accept all the disadvantages of our classical education, although it produced nothing but discontent, and people unfit for their station in life. Did the superficial acquisition of so much knowledge, the faultless repetition by heart of so many textbooks, raise the level of intelligence? Alas, no! The conditions for success in life are the possession of judgment, experience, initiative, and character – qualities which are not bestowed by books. Books, like dictionaries, are useful to consult, but it is utterly useless to have lengthy portions of them in one's head.

How is it possible for professional instruction to develop intelligence in a measure quite beyond the reach of classical instruction? This has been well shown by M. Taine.

“Ideas,” he says, “are only formed in their natural and normal surroundings; promotion of their growth is effected by the innumerable impressions appealing to the senses which the young receive daily in the workshop, the mine, the law court, the study, the builder's yard, the hospital; at the sight of tools, materials, and operations; in the presence of customers,

workers, and labour, of work well or ill done, costly or lucrative. In such a way are obtained those trifling perceptions of detail of the eyes, the ear, the hands, and even the sense of smell, which, picked up involuntarily, and silently elaborated, take shape within the learners, and suggest to them sooner or later, this or that new combination, simplification, economy, improvement, or invention. The French are deprived and, precisely at the age when they are most fruitful, of all these precious contacts, of all these indispensable elements of assimilation. For seven or eight years on end, they are shut up in a school and are cut off from that direct personal experience which would give them a keen and exact notion of other people and things, and of the various ways of handling them.

“... At least nine out of ten have wasted their time and effort during several important years of their life, even decisive years. Among such are to be counted, first of all, the half or two-thirds of those who present themselves for examination. I refer to those who are rejected; and then among those who are successful, who obtain a degree, a certificate, a diploma, there is still a half or two-thirds. I refer to the overworked. Too much has been demanded of them by insisting that on a given day, on a chair or before a board, they should, for two hours in succession, and with respect to a group of sciences, demonstrate comprehensive memory of all human knowledge. In point of fact they were that, or nearly so, for two hours on that particular day, but a month later they are so no longer. They could not go through the examination again. Their too numerous and too burdensome acquisitions slip incessantly from their mind and are not replaced. Their mental vigour has declined, their fertile capacity for growth has dried up, the fully-developed adult appears, often a wasted adult. Settled down, married, resigned to turning in a circle, and indefinitely in the same circle, these adults shut themselves up in their confined function, which they fulfil adequately, but nothing more. Such is the average yield: assuredly the receipts do not

balance the expenditure. In England or America, where, as in France prior to 1789, the contrary proceeding is adopted, the outcome obtained is equal or superior.”

The illustrious historian subsequently shows us the difference between our system and that of the Anglo-Saxons. The latter do not possess our innumerable special schools. With them instruction is not based on book-learning, but on practical lessons. Engineers, for example, are trained in workshops, and never at schools; a method which allows individuals to reach the level which their intelligence permits. They become labourers or supervisors if they can get no further, and engineers if their aptitude takes them that far.

This manner of proceeding is much more democratic and of much greater benefit to society than that of making the whole career of an individual depend on an examination, lasting a few hours, and undergone at the age of nineteen or twenty.

“In the hospital, the mine, the factory, in the architect’s or the lawyer’s office, the students, who make a start while very young, go through their apprenticeships, stage by stage, much as do law clerks in their office, or artists in their studio. Previously, and before making a practical beginning, they have had an opportunity to follow some general and short course of instruction, so as to have a framework readily prepared in which to store the observations they are shortly to make. Furthermore they are able, as a rule, to avail themselves of sundry technical courses which they can follow in their leisure hours, so as to co-ordinate step by step the daily experience they gather. Under such a system the practical capabilities increase and develop by themselves in exact proportion to the faculties of students, and in the direction requisite for their future task and the special work for which from now onwards they desire to embark. By this means, in England or the United States the young are quickly in a position to develop their capacity to the utmost. At twenty-five years of age, and much

sooner if the capability is there, the young are not merely useful performers, they are also capable of spontaneous enterprise; they are not only a part of a machine, but also a motor. In France, where the contrary system prevails, each succeeding generation is falling more and more into line with China. The total sum of the wasted forces is enormous.”

The great philosopher arrives at the following conclusion with respect to the growing incongruity between our Latin system of education and the requirements of practical life:

“In the three stages of instruction, those of childhood, adolescence and youth, the theoretical and pedagogic preparation by books on the school benches has lengthened out and become overcharged in view of the examination, the degree, the diploma, and the certificate, and solely in this view, and by the worst methods, by the application of an unnatural and anti-social regime, by the excessive postponement of the practical apprenticeship, by our boarding-school system, by artificial training and mechanical cramming, by overwork, without thought for the time that is to follow, for the adult age and the functions of the young, without regard for the real world on which they will shortly be thrown into, for the society in which we move and to which they must adapt or be taught to resign themselves in advance, for the struggle in which humanity is engaged, and in which to defend themselves and to keep their footing they ought previously to have been equipped, armed, trained, and hardened. This indispensable equipment, this acquisition of more importance than any other, this sturdy common sense and nerve and willpower, our schools do not provide to the French; on the contrary, far from qualifying them for their approaching and definite state, they are disqualified. In consequence, their entry into the world and their first steps in the field of work are most often merely a succession of painful falls, whose effect is that they will remain wounded and bruised for a long time, and sometimes disabled for life. The

test is severe and dangerous. In the course of it the mental and moral equilibrium is affected and runs the risk of not being re-established. Sudden and complete disillusion has arrived. The deceptions have been too great, the disappointments too keen.”
[15]

Have we digressed in what precedes from the psychology of crowds? Assuredly not. If we desire to understand the ideas and beliefs that are germinating today in the masses, and will spring up tomorrow, it is necessary to know how the ground has been prepared. The instruction given to the youth of a country allows knowledge of what that country will be like one day. The education accorded the present generation justifies the most gloomy forecast. It is in part by instruction and education that the mind of the masses is improved or damaged. It was necessary in consequence to show how this mind has been fashioned by the system in vogue, and how the mass of the indifferent and the neutral has become progressively an army of the discontented ready to obey all the suggestions of Utopians and rhetoricians. It is in the schoolroom that harmful political ideas are formed [...].

CHAPTER II

DIRECT FACTORS OF THE OPINIONS OF CROWDS

1. IMAGES, WORDS, AND FORMULAE

The magical power of words and formulae.

The power of words bound up with the images they evoke, and independent of their real sense.

These images vary from age to age and from nation to nation.

The wear and tear of words.

Examples of the considerable variations of meaning of much-used words.

The political utility of baptising old things with new names when the words by which they were designated produced an unfavourable impression on the masses.

Variations of the meaning of words in consequence of national differences.

The different meanings of the word “democracy” in Europe and America.

2. ILLUSIONS

Their importance.

They are to be found at the root of all civilisations.

The social necessity of illusions.

Crowds always prefer them to the truth.

3. EXPERIENCE

Only experience can fix the truth in the mind of crowds and blot out dangerous illusions.

Experience is only effective when it is frequently repeated.

The cost of the experience needed to persuade crowds.

4. REASON

The nullity of its influence on crowds.

Crowds are only influenced by their unconscious sentiments.

The role of logic in history.

The secret causes of improbable events.

We have just investigated the indirect and preliminary factors which give the mind of crowds a special receptivity and, therefore, make the growth of certain sentiments and certain ideas possible. It now remains for us to study the factors capable of acting in a direct manner. We shall see in a forthcoming chapter how these factors should be put into force in order that they produce their full effect.

In the first part of this work, we studied the sentiments, ideas, and methods of reasoning of collective bodies, and from the knowledge acquired it would evidently be possible to deduce in a general way the means of making an impression on their mind. We already know what strikes the imagination of crowds, and are acquainted with the power and contagiousness of suggestions, of those especially that are presented under the form of images. However, as suggestions may proceed from very different sources, the factors capable of acting on the minds of crowds may differ considerably. It is necessary, then,

to study them separately. This is not a useless study. Crowds are somewhat like the sphinx of ancient fable: it is necessary to arrive at a solution of the problems offered by their psychology or to resign ourselves to being devoured by them.

1. IMAGES, WORDS, AND FORMULAE

When studying the imagination of crowds we saw that it is particularly open to the impressions produced by images. These images do not always lie ready to hand, but it is possible to conjure them up by the judicious employment of words and formulae. Handled with skill, they possess in sober truth the mysterious power formerly attributed to them by the tenets of magic. They cause the birth in the minds of crowds of the most formidable tempests, which in turn they are capable of stilling. A pyramid far loftier than that of old Cheops could be raised merely with the bones of listeners who have been victims of the power of words and formulae.

The power of words is bound up with the images they evoke, and is quite independent of their real significance. Words whose sense is the most ill-defined are sometimes those that possess the most influence. Such, for example, are the terms democracy, socialism, equality, liberty, etc., whose meaning is so vague that bulky volumes do not suffice to fix it precisely. Yet it is certain that a truly magical power is attached to those short syllables, as if they contained the solution to all problems. They synthesise the most diverse unconscious aspirations and the hope of their realisation.

Reason and arguments are incapable of combating certain words and formulae. They are uttered with solemnity in the presence of crowds and, as soon as they have been pronounced, an expression of respect is visible on every countenance and all heads bow. By many they are considered as natural forces, as supernatural powers. They evoke grandiose and vague images

in people's minds, but this very vagueness that wraps them in obscurity augments their mysterious power. They are the mysterious divinities hidden behind the tabernacle, which the devout only approach in fear and trembling.

The images evoked by words, independent of their sense, vary from age to age and from people to people, the formulae remain identical. Certain transitory images are attached to certain words: the word is merely as it were the button of an electric bell that calls them up.

Words and all formulae alone do not possess the power of evoking images, while there are some which have once had this power, but lost it in the course of use, and cease to waken any response in the mind. They then become vain sounds, whose principal utility is to relieve the person who employs them of the obligation of thinking. Armed with a small stock of formulae and platitudes learnt while we are young, we possess all that is needed to traverse life without the tiring necessity of having to reflect on anything whatsoever. If any particular language is studied, it is seen that the words of which it is composed change rather slowly in the course of ages, while the images these words evoke or the meaning attached to them changes ceaselessly. This is the reason why, in another work, I have arrived at the conclusion that the absolute translation of a language, especially of a dead language, is totally impossible. What do we do in reality when we substitute a French word for a Latin, Greek, or Sanskrit expression, or even when we endeavour to understand a book written in our own tongue of two or three centuries back? We merely put the images and ideas which modern life has endowed our intelligence with, in the place of absolutely distinct notions and images which ancient life had brought into being in the mind of nations living in conditions completely unlike our own. When Revolutionaries imagined they were copying the Greeks and Romans, what were they doing except giving to ancient words a sense the

latter had never had? What resemblance can possibly exist between the institutions of the Greeks and those designated today by corresponding words? A republic at that epoch was an essentially aristocratic institution, formed by a group of petty despots ruling over a crowd of slaves kept in the most absolute subjection. These communal aristocracies, based on slavery, could not have existed for a moment without it.

The word “liberty,” again, what meaning could it have in any way to that which we attribute to it today, in a period when the possibility of the liberty of thought was not even suspected, and when there was no greater and more exceptional crime than that of discussing the gods, the laws, and the customs of the city? What did such a word as “fatherland” signify to an Athenian or Spartan, unless it was the cult of Athens or Sparta, and not that of Greece, composed of rival cities always at war with each other? What meaning had the same word “fatherland” among the ancient Gauls, divided into rival tribes and races, and possessing different languages and religions, and who were easily vanquished by Caesar because he always found allies among them? It was Rome that made a country of Gaul by endowing it with political and religious unity. Without going back very far, scarcely two centuries ago, is it to be believed that this same notion of a fatherland was conceived to have the same meaning as at present by French princes like the great Conde, who allied themselves with the foreigner against their sovereign? And yet again, the same word had it not a sense very different from the modern for the French royalist emigrants, who thought they obeyed the laws of honour in fighting against France, and who from their point of view did indeed obey them, since the feudal law bound the vassal to the lord and not to the soil, so that where the sovereign was, there was the true fatherland.

Numerous are the words whose meaning has thus profoundly changed from age to age, words which we can only arrive at

understanding in the sense in which they were formerly understood after a long effort. It has been said with truth that much study is necessary merely to arrive at conceiving what was signified to our great grandparents by such words as the “king” and the “royal family.” What, then, is likely to be the case with terms more complex still?

Words, then, have only mobile and transitory significations which change from age to age and people to people; and when we desire to exert an influence by their means on the crowd, it is essential to know the meaning given to them by the crowd at a given moment, and not the meaning which they formerly had or may yet have for individuals of a different mental constitution. Thus, when crowds have come, as the result of political upheavals or changes of belief, to acquire a profound antipathy for the images evoked by certain words, the first duty of the true politician is to change the words without, of course, laying hands on the things themselves, the latter being too intimately bound up with the inherited constitution to be transformed. The judicious Tocqueville long ago made the remark that the work of the consulate and the empire consisted more particularly in the clothing with new words of the greater part of the institutions of the past – that is to say, in replacing words evoking disagreeable images in the imagination of the crowd by other words of which the novelty prevented such evocations. The “taille” or tallage has become the land tax; the “gabelle,” the tax on salt; the “aids,” the indirect contributions and the consolidated duties; the tax on trade companies and guilds, the licence, etc.

One of the most essential functions of politicians consists, then, in baptising with popular or, at any rate, indifferent words, meanings the crowd cannot endure under their old names. The power of words is so great that the most odious thoughts, expressed in well-chosen terms, become acceptable to crowds. Taine justly observes that it was by invoking liberty

and fraternity (words very popular at the time) that the Jacobins were able “to install a despotism worthy of Dahomey, a tribunal similar to that of the Inquisition, and to accomplish human massacres akin to those of ancient Mexico.” The art of those who govern, as is the case with the art of advocates, consists above all in the science of employing words. One of the greatest difficulties of this art is, that in one and the same society the same words most often have very different meanings for the different social classes, who employ in appearance the same words, but do not speak the same language.

In the preceding examples, it is time especially that intervenes as the principal factor in changing the meaning of words. If, however, nationality also intervenes, we shall then see that, at the same period, among peoples equally civilised but of different race, the same words very often correspond to extremely dissimilar ideas. It is impossible to understand these differences without having travelled much, and for this reason I shall not insist upon them. I shall confine myself to observing that it is precisely the words most often employed by the masses which among different peoples possess the most different meanings. Such is the case, for instance, with the words “democracy” and “socialism” in such frequent use nowadays.

In reality, they correspond to quite contrary ideas and images in the Latin and Anglo-Saxon mind. For the Latin peoples, the word “democracy” signifies more especially the subordination of the will and the initiative of the individual to the will, and the initiative of the community represented by the State. It is the State that is charged, to a greater and greater degree, with the direction of everything, the centralisation, the monopolising, and the manufacture of everything. To the State, it is that all parties without exception, radicals, socialists, or monarchists, constantly appeal. Among the Anglo-Saxons and notably in America this same word “democracy” signifies, on the contrary,

the intense development of the will of the individual, and as complete a subordination as possible of the State, which, with the exception of the police, the army, and diplomatic relations, is not allowed the direction of anything, not even of public instruction. Thus the same word which signifies for one people the subordination of the will and initiative of the individual to State domination, signifies for another the excessive development of the will and the initiative of the individual and the complete subordination of the State. [16]

2. ILLUSIONS

From the dawn of civilisation onwards, crowds have always been influenced by illusions. It is to the creators of illusions that crowds have raised more temples, statues, and altars than to any other class of people. Whether it is the religious illusions of the past or the philosophical and social illusions of the present, these formidable sovereign powers are always found at the head of all the civilisations that have successively flourished on our planet. It is in their name that the temples of Chaldea, and Egypt and the religious edifices of the Middle Ages were built, and that a vast upheaval shook the whole of Europe a century ago. There is not one of our political, artistic, or social conceptions that is free from their powerful impress. Occasionally, at the cost of terrible disturbances, the population overthrow them, but the same population seems condemned to always set them up again. Without them populations would never have emerged from their primitive barbarian state, and without them again they would soon decline. Doubtless they are futile shadows; but these children of our dreams have forced the nations to create whatever the arts may boast of splendour or civilisation of greatness.

“If one destroyed in museums and libraries, if one hurled down on the flagstones before the churches all the works and all the monuments of art that religions have inspired, what would remain of the great dreams of humanity? To give to

people that portion of hope and illusion without which they cannot live, this is the reason for the existence of gods, heroes, and poets. For fifty years, science appeared to undertake this task. But science has been compromised in hearts hungering after the ideal because it does not dare to be lavish enough of promises, and because it cannot lie.” [17]

The philosophers of the last century devoted themselves with fervour to the destruction of the religious, political, and social illusions on which our ancestors had lived for centuries. By destroying these, philosophers have dried up the springs of hope and resignation. Behind the immolated chimeras, they came face to face with the blind and silent forces of nature, which ignore pity and are inexorable to weakness.

Notwithstanding all its progress, philosophy has been unable as yet to offer the masses any ideal that can charm them; but, as they must have their illusions at all costs, they turn instinctively, as the insect seeks the light, to the rhetoricians who accord them what they want. Not truth, but error has always been the chief factor in the evolution of nations, and the reason why socialism is so powerful today is that it constitutes the last illusion that is still vital. In spite of all scientific demonstrations, it continues on the increase. Its principal strength lies in the fact that it is championed by minds sufficiently ignorant of things as they are in reality to venture boldly to promise human beings happiness. The social illusion reigns today upon all the heaped-up ruins of the past, and the future belongs to it. The masses have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their taste, preferring to deify error, if error seduces them. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their ruler; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim.

3. EXPERIENCE

Experience constitutes almost the only effective process by which truth may be solidly established in the mind of the

masses, and dangerous illusions destroyed. To this end, however, it is necessary that the experience should take place on a very large scale and be repeated very frequently. The experiences undergone by one generation are useless, as a rule, for the generation that follows. This is the reason why historical facts, cited with a view to demonstration, serve no purpose. Their only utility is to prove to what an extent experiences need to be repeated from age to age to exert any influence, or to be successful in merely shaking an erroneous opinion when it is solidly implanted in the mind of the masses.

Our century, and that which preceded it, will doubtless be alluded to by historians as an era of curious experiments, which in no other age have been tried in such number.

The most gigantic of these experiments was the French Revolution. To find out that a society is not to be refashioned from top to bottom in accordance with the dictates of pure reason, it was necessary to massacre several million people and to profoundly destabilise Europe for a period of twenty years. To prove to us experimentally that dictators cost the nations who acclaim them dear, two ruinous experiences have been required in fifty years, and in spite of their clarity they do not seem to have been sufficiently convincing. The first, nevertheless, cost three million lives and an invasion; the second involved a loss of territory, and carried in its wake the necessity for permanent armies. A third was almost attempted not long ago, and will certainly be attempted again one day. To bring an entire nation to admit that the huge German army was not, as was currently alleged thirty years ago, a sort of harmless national guard, [18] the terrible war which cost us so dear had to take place. To bring about the recognition that Protection ruins the nations who adopt it, at least twenty years of disastrous experience will be needed. These examples might be indefinitely multiplied.

4. REASON

In enumerating the factors capable of making an impression on the minds of crowds all mention of reason might be dispensed with, were it not necessary to point out the negative value of its influence.

We have already shown that crowds are not to be influenced by reasoning, and can only comprehend rough-and-ready associations of ideas. The orators who know how to make an impression upon them always appeal in consequence to their sentiments and never to their reason. The laws of logic have no action on crowds. [19] To bring home conviction to crowds, it is necessary first of all to thoroughly comprehend the sentiments by which they are animated, to pretend to share these sentiments, then to endeavour to modify them by calling up, by means of rudimentary associations, certain eminently suggestive notions, to be capable, if need be, of going back to the point of view from which a start was made, and, above all, to divide from instant to instant the sentiments to which one's discourse is giving birth. Language must be ceaselessly varied according to the effect a speech causes, so a prepared and studied harangue cannot be effective. In such a speech, orators follow their own line of thought, not that of their listeners, and therefore the orators' influence is nullified.

Logical minds, accustomed to being convinced by a chain of somewhat close reasoning, cannot avoid having recourse to this mode of persuasion when addressing crowds, and the inability of their arguments always surprises them. "The usual mathematical consequences based on the syllogism, that is, on associations of identities, are imperative..." writes a logician. "This imperativeness would enforce the assent even of an inorganic mass were it capable of following associations of identities." This is doubtless true, but a crowd is no more capable than an inorganic mass of following such associations, nor even of understanding them in the same way as if it were attempted to convince these minds by reasoning.

To obtain an insight into the utter powerlessness of reasoning when it has to fight against sentiment, it is not even necessary to descend to very simple minds. Let us merely remember how tenacious, for centuries long, religious superstitions have been, in contradiction with the simplest logic. For nearly two thousand years, the most luminous geniuses have bowed before their laws, and modern times have to be reached for their veracity to be merely contested. The Middle Ages and the Renaissance possessed many enlightened intellects, but not one of them was able to attain by reasoning the banishment of the childish side of one's superstitions, or who promulgated even a slight doubt as to the misdeeds of the devil or the necessity of burning sorcerers.

Should it be regretted that crowds are never guided by reason? We would not venture to affirm it. Without a doubt human reason would not have managed to spur humanity along the path of civilisation with the ardour and hardihood its illusions have done. These illusions, the offspring of those unconscious forces by which we are led, were doubtless necessary. Every nation carries in its mental constitution the laws of its destiny, and it is, perhaps, these laws that it obeys with an irresistible impulse, even in the case of those of its impulses which apparently are the most unreasoned. It seems at times as if nations were submitted to secret forces analogous to those which compel the acorn to transform itself into an oak, or a comet to follow its orbit. What little insight we can get, these forces must be sought for in the general course of the evolution of a people, and not in the isolated facts from which this evolution appears at times to proceed. Were these facts alone to be taken into consideration, history would seem to be the result of a series of improbable chances. It was improbable that a Galilean carpenter should become for two thousand years an all-powerful God in whose name the most important civilisations were founded; improbable, too, that a few bands of Arabs, emerging from their deserts, should conquer the greater

part of the old Graeco-Roman world, and establish an empire greater than that of Alexander; improbable, again, that in Europe, at an advanced period of its development, and when authority throughout it had been systematically made hierarchical, an obscure lieutenant of artillery should have succeeded in reigning over a multitude of peoples and kings.

Let us leave reason, then, to philosophers, and not insist too strongly on its intervention in the governing of people. It is not by reason, but most often in spite of it, that those sentiments that are the mainsprings of all civilisation are created, sentiments such as honour, self-sacrifice, religious faith, patriotism, and the love of glory.

CHAPTER III

THE LEADERS OF CROWDS AND THEIR MEANS OF PERSUASION

1. THE LEADERS OF CROWDS

The instinctive need of all beings forming a crowd to obey a leader.

The psychology of the leaders of crowds.

They alone can endow crowds with faith and organise them.

Forcibly despotic leaders.

Classification of leaders.

The part played by the will.

2. THE MEANS OF ACTION OF THE LEADERS

Affirmation, repetition, and contagion.

The respective part of these different factors.

The way in which contagion may spread from the lower to the upper classes in a society.

A popular opinion soon becomes a general opinion.

3. PRESTIGE

Definition of prestige and classification of its different kinds.

Acquired prestige and personal prestige.

Various examples.

The way in which prestige is destroyed.

We are now acquainted with the mental constitution of crowds, and we also know what the motives capable of making an impression on their mind are. It remains to investigate how these motives may be set in action, and by whom they may usefully be turned to practical account.

1. THE LEADERS OF CROWDS

As soon as a certain number of living beings are gathered together, whether they are animals or people, they place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief.

In the case of human crowds, the chief is often nothing more than a ringleader or agitator; but as such a considerable part is played. The chief's will is the nucleus around which the opinions of the crowd are grouped and formed. The chief constitutes the first element towards the organisation of heterogeneous crowds, and paves the way for their organisation in sects; in the meantime the chief directs them. A crowd is a service flock that is incapable of ever doing without leaders.

Leaders most often start out as followers. Leaders have themselves been hypnotised by an idea, whose apostles they have since become. It has taken possession to such a degree that everything outside it vanishes, and that every contrary opinion appears to be an error or superstition. An example in point is Robespierre, hypnotised by the philosophical ideas of Rousseau, and employing the methods of the Inquisition to propagate them.

The leaders we speak of are more frequently men of action than thinkers. They are not gifted with keen foresight, nor could they be, as this quality generally encourages doubt and inactivity. They are especially recruited from the ranks of those morbidly nervous, excitable, half-deranged persons who are bordering on madness. However absurd may be the idea they

uphold, or the goal they pursue, their convictions are so strong that all reasoning is lost on them. Contempt and persecution do not affect them, or only serve to excite them the more. They sacrifice their personal interest, their family – everything. The very instinct of self-preservation is entirely obliterated in them, and so much so, that often the only recompense they solicit is that of martyrdom. The intensity of their faith gives great power of suggestion to their words. The multitude is always ready to listen to the strong-willed man, who knows how to impose himself upon it. Men gathered in a crowd lose all force of will, and turn instinctively to the person who possesses the quality they lack.

Nations have never lacked leaders, but all of the latter have by no means been animated by those strong convictions proper to apostles. These leaders are often subtle rhetoricians, seeking only their own personal interest, and endeavouring to persuade by flattering base instincts. The influence they can assert in this manner may be very great, but it is always ephemeral. The men of ardent convictions who have stirred the soul of crowds, the Peter, the Hermits, the Luthers, the Savonarolas, those involved in the French Revolution, have only exercised their fascination after having been themselves fascinated first of all by a creed. They are then able to call up in the souls of their fellows that formidable force known as faith, which renders believers the absolute slaves of their dream.

The arousing of faith (whether religious, political, or social, whether faith in work, in a person, or an idea) has always been the function of the great leaders of crowds, and it is on this account that their influence is always very great. Of all the forces at the disposal of humanity, faith has always been one of the most tremendous, and the gospel rightly attributes to it the power of moving mountains. To endow people with faith is to multiply their strength tenfold. The great events of history have been brought about by obscure believers, who have had little

beyond their faith in their favour. It is not by the aid of the learned or of philosophers, and still less of sceptics, that the great religions which have swayed the world have been built up, or the spread of vast empires from one hemisphere to the other.

In the cases just cited, however, we are dealing with great leaders, and they are so few in number that history can easily count them. They form the summit of a continuous series, which extends from these powerful rulers down to the labourer who can slowly fascinate listeners by ceaselessly drumming into their ears a few set phrases, whose purport the speaker scarcely comprehends, but the application of which, according to that speaker, must surely bring about the realisation of all dreams and of every hope.

In every social sphere, from the highest to the lowest, as soon as people cease to be isolated they speedily fall under the influence of a leader. The majority of people, especially among the masses, do not possess clear and reasoned ideas on any subject whatever outside their own speciality. The leader serves them as guide. It is just possible that the leader may be replaced, though very inefficiently, by the periodical publications which manufacture opinions for their readers and supply them with ready-made phrases which free them from the trouble of reasoning.

The leaders of crowds wield a very despotic authority, and this despotism indeed is a condition of their obtaining a following. It has often been remarked how easily they extort obedience, although without any means of backing up their authority, from the most turbulent section of the working classes. They fix the hours of labour and the rate of wages, and they decree strikes, which are begun and ended at the hour they ordain.

In the present day, these leaders and agitators tend more and more to usurp the place of the public authorities in proportion as the latter allow themselves to be called in question and shorn of their strength. The tyranny of these new masters causes crowds to obey them much more docilely than they have obeyed any government. If in consequence of some accident or other, the leaders should be removed from the scene, the crowd returns to its original state of a collectivity without cohesion or force of resistance. During the last strike of the Parisian bus employees, the arrest of the two leaders who were directing it was at once sufficient to bring it to an end. It is the need not of liberty but of servitude that is predominant in the soul of crowds. They are so obsessed with obedience, that they instinctively submit to whomever declares themselves as rulers.

These ringleaders and agitators may be divided into two clearly defined classes. One includes people who are energetic and possess, but only intermittently, a strong strength of will. The other category, far rarer than the first, has enduring strength of will. The first mentioned are violent, brave, and audacious. They are more especially useful to direct a violent enterprise suddenly decided on, to carry the masses with them in spite of danger, and to transform into heroes the men who only yesterday were recruits. People of this kind were Ney and Murat under the First Empire, and such a man in our own time was Garibaldi, a talentless but energetic adventurer who succeeded with a handful of men in laying hands on the ancient kingdom of Naples, defended though it was by a disciplined army.

Still, though the energy of leaders of this class is a force to be reckoned with, it is transitory, and scarcely outlasts the exciting cause that has brought it into play. When they have returned to their ordinary course of life, the heroes animated by energy of this description often evince, as was the case with those I have just cited, the most astonishing weakness of character. They

seem incapable of reflection and of conducting themselves under the simplest circumstances, although they had been able to lead others. These are leaders who cannot exercise their function except on the condition that they be led themselves and continually stimulated, that they have always as their beacon a person or an idea, that they follow a clearly traced line of conduct. The second category of leaders, that made up of people with enduring strength of will, have, in spite of a less brilliant aspect, a much more considerable influence. In this category are to be found the true founders of religions and great undertakings: St. Paul, Mahomet, Christopher Columbus, and de Lesseps, for example. Whether they be intelligent or narrow-minded is of no importance: the world belongs to them. The persistent will and force they possess is an immensely rare and immensely powerful faculty to which everything yields. What a strong and continuous will is capable of is not always properly appreciated. Nothing resists it; neither nature, gods, nor humans.

The most recent example of what can be effected by a strong and continuous will is afforded us by the illustrious man who separated the Eastern and Western worlds, and accomplished a task that during three thousand years had been attempted in vain by the greatest sovereigns. He failed later in an identical enterprise but by then old age had intervened, to which everything, even the will, succumbs.

When it is desired to show what may be done by mere strength of will, all that is necessary is to relate in detail the history of the difficulties that had to be surmounted in connection with the cutting of the Suez Canal. An ocular witness, Dr. Cazalis, has summed up in a few striking lines the entire story of this great work, recounted by its immortal author.

“From day to day, episode by episode, he told the stupendous story of the canal. He told of all he had had to vanquish, of the

impossible he had made possible, of all the opposition he encountered, of the coalition against him, and the disappointments, the reverses, the defeats which had been unavailing to discourage or depress him. He recalled how England's combat against him, attacking him without cessation, how Egypt and France had hesitated, how the French Consul had been foremost in his opposition to the early stages of the work, and the nature of the opposition he had met with, the attempt to force his workmen to desert from thirst by refusing them fresh water; how the Minister of Marine and the engineers, all responsible men of experienced and scientific training, had naturally all been hostile, were all certain on scientific grounds that disaster was at hand, had calculated its coming, foretelling it for such a day and hour as an eclipse is foretold."

The book which relates the lives of all these great leaders would not contain many names, but these names have been bound up with the most important events in the history of civilisation.

2. THE MEANS OF ACTION OF THE LEADERS: AFFIRMATION, REPETITION, AND CONTAGION

When it is wanted to stir up a crowd for a short space of time, to induce it to commit an act of any nature, for instance to pillage a palace, or to die in defence of a stronghold or a barricade, the crowd must be directed by rapid suggestion, which has the most powerful effect. To attain this end, however, it is necessary that the crowd should have previously been prepared by certain circumstances and, above all, that those who wish to work upon it, should possess the quality to be studied later, to which I give the name of prestige.

When, however, it is proposed to imbue the mind of a crowd with ideas and beliefs (with modern social theories, for instance) the leaders have recourse to different expedients. The

principal of them are three in number and clearly defined: affirmation, repetition, and contagion. Their action is somewhat slow but its effects, once produced, are very lasting.

Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and all proof, is one of the surest means of making an idea enter the mind of crowds. The simpler an affirmation is, the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it carries. The religious books and the legal codes of all ages have always resorted to simple affirmation. Politicians called upon to defend a political cause, and those in business pushing the sale of their products by means of advertising, are acquainted with the value of affirmation.

Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it be constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I believe, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, namely repetition. The thing affirmed comes by repetition to fix itself in the mind in such a way that it is accepted in the end as a demonstrated truth.

The influence of repetition on crowds is comprehensible when the power is seen which it exercises on the most enlightened minds. This power is due to the fact that the repeated statement is embedded in the long run in those profound regions of our unconscious selves in which the motives of our actions are forged. At the end of a certain time we have forgotten who is the author of the repeated assertion, and we finish by believing it. The astonishing power of advertisements is due to this technique. When we have read a hundred, a thousand, times that X's chocolate is the best, we imagine we have heard it said in many places, and we end by acquiring the certitude that this is a fact. When we have read a thousand times that Y's powder has cured the most illustrious persons of the most obstinate illnesses, we are tempted to try it if suffering from an illness of a similar kind. If we always read in the same papers that A is a thorough rogue and B a most

honest individual, we finish by being convinced that this is the truth, unless, indeed, we are given to reading another paper of the contrary opinion, in which the two qualifications are reversed. Affirmation and repetition are alone powerful enough to combat each other.

When an affirmation has been sufficiently repeated, and there is unanimity in this repetition (as occurred in the case of certain famous financial undertakings rich enough to purchase every assistance) what is called a current of opinion is formed and the powerful mechanism of contagion intervenes. Ideas, sentiments, emotions and beliefs invest crowds with a contagious power as intense as that of microbes. This phenomenon is very natural, since it is observed even in animals when they are together in number. Should a horse in a stable take to biting its owner, the other horses in the stable will imitate it. A panic that has seized on a few sheep will soon extend to the whole flock. In the case of people collected in a crowd all emotions are very rapidly contagious, which explains the suddenness of panics. [...]

For individuals to succumb to contagion their simultaneous presence on the same spot is not essential. The action of contagion may be felt from a distance, under the influence of events, which give all minds the same trend. This is especially the case when people's minds have been prepared to undergo the influence in question by those indirect factors of which I have referred to in a study above. An example in point is the revolutionary movement of 1848, which, after breaking out in Paris, spread rapidly over a great part of Europe and shook a number of thrones.

Imitation, to which so much influence is attributed in social phenomena, is in reality a mere effect of contagion. Having shown its influence elsewhere, I shall confine myself to

reproducing what I said on the subject fifteen years ago. My remarks have since been developed by other writers in recent publications.

“Humans, like animals, have a natural tendency to imitation. Imitation is necessary for us, provided always that the imitation is quite easy. It is this necessity that makes the influence of what is called fashion so powerful. Whether in the matter of opinions, ideas, literary manifestations, or merely of dress, how many persons are bold enough to run counter to the fashion? It is by examples not by arguments that crowds are guided. At every period there exists a small number of individuals, who make an impact upon the others, and are imitated by the unconscious masses. It is necessary however, that these individuals should not be too pronounced in disagreeing with received ideas. If they are, it would make it too difficult to imitate them and their influence would be nil. For this very reason, people who are very superior in their era are generally without influence upon it. The line of separation is too strongly marked. For the same reason, Europeans, in spite of all the advantages of their civilisation, have so insignificant an influence on Eastern people; they differ from them to too great an extent.

“The dual action of the past and of reciprocal imitation renders, in the long run, all the people of the same country and the same period so alike that even in the case of individuals who would seem destined to escape this double influence, such as philosophers, literary people and other intellectuals of thought and style, have a familiar air which enables the age to which they belong to be recognised immediately. It is not necessary to talk for long with individuals to attain to a thorough knowledge of what they read, of their habitual occupations, and of the surroundings amid which they live.”

[20]

Contagion is so powerful that it forces upon individuals not only certain opinions, but certain modes of feeling as well. Contagion is the cause of the contempt in which, at a given period, certain works are held (the example of *Tannhauser* may be cited) which, a few years later, for the same reason are admired by those who were foremost in criticising them.

The opinions and beliefs of crowds are specially propagated by contagion, but never by reasoning. Conceptions are acquired as the result of affirmation, repetition, and contagion. Voltaire had already observed in connection with the Christian religion that “for more than a hundred years it was only embraced by the vilest riff-raff.”

It will be noted that contagion, after having been at work among the popular classes, has spread to the higher classes of society. This is what we see happening in the present day with regard to the socialist doctrines which are beginning to be held by those who will yet be their first victims. Contagion is so powerful a force that even the sentiment of personal interest disappears under its action.

This is the explanation of the fact that every opinion adopted by the populace always ends in implanting itself with great vigour in the highest social strata, however obvious be the absurdity of the triumphant opinion. This reaction of the lower upon the higher social classes is the more curious, owing to the circumstance that the beliefs of the crowd always have their origin to a greater or less extent in some higher idea, which has often remained without influence in the sphere in which it was evolved. Leaders and agitators, subjugated by this higher idea, take hold of it, distort it and create a sect, which distorts it afresh, and then propagates it amongst the masses, who carry the process of deformation still further. When it has become a popular truth the idea returns, as it were, to its source and exerts an influence on the upper classes of a nation. In the long run, it is intelligence that shapes the destiny of the world, but

very indirectly. The philosophers who evolved ideas have long since returned to dust, when, as the result of the process I have just described, the fruit of their reflection ends by triumphing.

3. PRESTIGE

Great power is given to ideas propagated by affirmation, repetition, and contagion; and by the circumstance that they acquire in time. That mysterious force is known as prestige.

Whatever a ruling power has been in the world, whether ideas or particular politicians, it has mainly enforced its authority by means of that irresistible force expressed by the word 'prestige.' The term is one whose meaning is grasped by everybody, but the word is employed in ways too different for it to be easy to define it. Prestige may involve such sentiments as admiration or fear. Occasionally, even these sentiments are its basis, but it can perfectly well exist without them. The greatest measure of prestige is possessed by the dead, by beings, that is, of whom we do not stand in fear – by Alexander, Caesar, Mahomet, and Buddha, for example. On the other hand, there are fictional beings who we do not admire (the monstrous divinities of the subterranean temples of India, for instance) but who strike us nevertheless as endowed with great prestige.

Prestige in reality is a sort of domination exercised on our mind by an individual, a work, or an idea. This domination entirely paralyses our critical faculty and fills our soul with astonishment and respect. The sentiment provoked is inexplicable, like all sentiments, but it would appear to be of the same kind as the fascination to which a magnetised person is subjected. Prestige is the mainspring of all authority. Neither gods, kings, nor others, have ever reigned without it.

The various kinds of prestige may be grouped under two principal headings: acquired prestige and personal prestige. Acquired prestige is that resulting from name, fortune, and

reputation. It may be independent of personal prestige. Personal prestige, on the contrary, is something essentially peculiar to the individual; it may coexist with reputation, glory, and fortune, or be strengthened by them, but it is perfectly capable of existing in their absence.

Acquired, or artificial prestige, is by far the most common. The mere fact that individuals occupy a certain position, possess a certain fortune, or bear certain titles, endows them with prestige, however slight their own personal worth. Soldiers in uniform and judges in robes enjoy prestige. Pascal has very properly noted the necessity for judges to wear robes and wigs. Without them, they would be stripped of half their authority. The most unbending socialist is always somewhat impressed by the sight of a prince or a marquis; and the assumption of such titles makes stealing from lower orders an easy matter. [21]

The prestige of which I have just spoken is exercised by persons; side by side with this can be placed that exercised by opinions, literary and artistic works, etc. Prestige of the latter kind is most often merely the result of accumulated repetitions. History, literary and artistic history especially, being nothing more than the repetition of identical judgments, which nobody endeavours to verify, everyone ends by repeating what they learnt at school, till there come to be names and things which nobody would venture to meddle with. For a modern reader, studying Homer results incontestably in immense boredom; but who would venture to say so? The Parthenon, in its present state, is a wretched ruin, utterly destitute of interest, but it is endowed with such prestige that it does not appear to us as it really is but with all its accompaniment of historic memories. The special characteristic of prestige is to prevent us seeing things as they are and to entirely paralyse our judgment. Crowds always, and individuals as a rule, stand in need of ready-made opinions on all subjects. The popularity of these

opinions is independent from the measure of truth or error they contain and is solely regulated by their prestige.

I now come to personal prestige. Its nature is very different from that of artificial or acquired prestige with which I have just been concerned. It is a faculty independent of all titles, of all authority, and possessed by a small number of persons whom it enables to exercise a very magnetic fascination on those around them, although they are socially their equals, and lack all ordinary means of domination. They force the acceptance of their ideas and sentiments on those about them, and they are obeyed, as is the tamest of wild beasts, by the animal that could easily devour it.

The great leaders of crowds, such as Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Joan of Arc, and Napoleon, have possessed this form of prestige in a high degree, and to this endowment is especially due the position they attained. Gods, heroes, and dogmas win their way in the world of their own inward strength. They are not to be talked about: if they are, they disappear.

The great personages I have just cited were in possession of their power of fascination long before they became illustrious, and would never have become so without it. It is evident, for instance, that Napoleon at the zenith of his glory enjoyed an immense prestige by the mere fact of his power, but he was already endowed in part with this prestige when he was without power and completely unknown. When he was still an obscure general, he was sent, thanks to influential protection, to command the army of Italy. He found himself among rough generals who were of a mind to give a hostile reception to the young intruder dispatched to them by the Directory [22]. From the very beginning, from the first interview, without the aid of speeches, gestures, or threats, at the first sight of the man who was to become great they were vanquished. Taine furnishes a curious account of this interview taken from contemporary memoirs.

“The generals of division, amongst others Augereau, a sort of swashbuckler, uncouth and heroic, proud of his height and his bravery, arrive at the staff quarters very badly disposed towards the little upstart dispatched to them from Paris. On the strength of the description of him, that has been given to them, Augereau is inclined to be insolent and insubordinate; a favourite of Barras, a general who owes his rank to the events of Vendemiaire who has won his grade by street-fighting, who is looked upon as bearish, because he is always thinking in solitude, of poor aspect, and with the reputation of a mathematician and dreamer. They are introduced, and Bonaparte keeps them waiting. At last he appears, wearing his sword at his waist; he puts on his hat, explains the measures he has taken, gives his orders and dismisses them. Augereau has remained silent; it is only when he is outside that he regains his self-possession and is able to deliver himself of his customary oaths. He admits with Massena that this little devil of a general has inspired him with awe; he cannot understand the ascendancy by which from the very first he has felt himself overwhelmed.”

Become a great man, his prestige increased in proportion as his glory grew, and came to be at least equal to that of a divinity in the eyes of those devoted to him. General Vandamme, a rough, typical soldier of the Revolution, even more brutal and energetic than Augereau, said of him to Marshal d’Arnano in 1815, as on one occasion they mounted together the stairs of the Tuileries:

“That devil of a man exercises a fascination on me that I cannot explain even to myself, and in such a degree that, though I fear neither God nor devil, when I am in his presence I am ready to tremble like a child, and he could make me go through the eye of a needle to throw myself into the fire.”

Napoleon exercised a like fascination on all who came into contact with him. [23]

Davoust used to say, talking of Maret's devotion and of his own: "Had the Emperor said to us, 'It is important in the interest of my policy that Paris should be destroyed without a single person leaving it or escaping,' Maret I am sure would have kept the secret, but he could not have abstained from compromising himself by seeing that his family got clear of the city. On the other hand, for fear of letting the truth leak out, I would have let my wife and children stay."

It is necessary to bear in mind the astounding power exerted by fascination of this order to understand that marvellous return from the Isle of Elba, that lightning-like conquest of France by an isolated man confronted by all the organised forces of a great country that might have been supposed weary of his tyranny. He had merely to cast a look at the generals sent to lay hands on him, and who had sworn to accomplish their mission. All of them submitted without discussion.

"Napoleon," writes the English General Wolseley, "lands in France almost alone, a fugitive from the small island of Elba which was his kingdom, and succeeded in a few weeks, without bloodshed, in upsetting all organised authority in France under its legitimate king. Is it possible for the personal ascendancy of a man to affirm itself in a more astonishing manner? But from the beginning to the end of this campaign, which was his last, how remarkable too is the ascendancy he exercised over the Allies, obliging them to follow his initiative, and how near he came to crushing them!"

His prestige outlived him and continued to grow. It is his prestige that made an emperor of his obscure nephew. How powerful his memory is can be seen in the resurrection of his legend in progress in the present day. Mistreat people as you wish, massacre them by millions, be the cause of invasion upon invasion, all is permitted you if you possess prestige in a sufficient degree and the talent necessary to uphold it.

I have invoked, no doubt, in this case quite an exceptional example of prestige, but one that was useful to cite to make clear the genesis of great religions, great doctrines and great empires. Were it not for the power exerted on the crowd by prestige, such growths would be incomprehensible.

Prestige, however, is not based solely on personal ascendancy, military glory and religious terror; it may have a more modest origin and still be considerable. Our century furnishes several examples. One of the most striking ones that posterity will recall from age to age will be supplied by the history of the illustrious man who modified the face of the globe and the commercial relations of the nations by separating two continents. He succeeded in his enterprise owing to his immense strength of will, but also owing to the fascination he exercised on those surrounding him. To overcome the unanimous opposition he met with, he had only to show himself. He would speak briefly, and in face of the charm he exerted, his opponents became his friends. The English in particular strenuously opposed his scheme; he had only to put in an appearance in England to rally all suffrages. In later years, when he passed Southampton, the bells were rung during his passing; and in the present day a movement has been founded in England to raise a statue in his honour.

Having vanquished whatever there is to vanquish, men and things, marshes, rocks, and sandy wastes, he had ceased to believe in obstacles, and wished to begin Suez over again at Panama. He began again with the same methods as of old; but he had aged, and, besides, the faith that moves mountains does not move them if they are too lofty. The mountains resisted and the catastrophe that ensued destroyed the glittering aura of glory that enveloped the hero. His life teaches how prestige can grow and how it can vanish. After rivalling in greatness the most famous heroes of history, he was lowered by the magistrates of his country to the ranks of the vilest criminals.

When he died his coffin, unattended, traversed an indifferent crowd. Foreign sovereigns are alone in rendering homage to his memory as to that of one of the greatest men that history has ever known. [24]

Still, the various examples that have just been cited represent extreme cases. To fix in detail the psychology of prestige, it would be necessary to place them at the extremity of a series, which would range from the founders of religions and empires to private individuals who endeavour to dazzle their neighbours by a new coat or a decoration.

Between the extreme limits of this series would find a place all the forms of prestige resulting from the different elements composing a civilisation (sciences, arts, literature, etc.) and it would be apparent that prestige constitutes the fundamental element of persuasion. Consciously or not, the being, the idea, or the thing possessing prestige is immediately imitated in consequence of contagion, and forces an entire generation to adopt certain modes of feeling and of giving expression to its thought. Moreover, as a rule, this imitation is unconscious which accounts for the fact that it is perfect. The modern painters who copy the pale colouring and the stiff attitudes of some of the Primitives are scarcely alive to the source of their inspiration. They believe in their own sincerity, whereas, if an eminent master had not revived this form of art, people would have continued blind to all but its naive and inferior sides. Those artists who, after the manner of another illustrious master, inundate their canvasses with violet shades do not see in nature more violet than was detected there fifty years ago; but they are influenced by the personal and special impressions of a painter who, in spite of this eccentricity, was successful in acquiring great prestige. Similar examples might be brought forward in connection with all the elements of civilisation.

It is seen from the foregoing, that a number of factors may be concerned in the genesis of prestige; among them success was

always one of the most important. Every successful man, every idea that forces itself into recognition, ceases, ipso facto, to be called in question. The proof that success is one of the principal stepping-stones to prestige is that the disappearance of the one is almost always followed by the disappearance of the other. The hero who the crowd acclaimed yesterday would be insulted today, if he is overtaken by failure. The reaction, indeed, will be stronger in proportion as the prestige has been great. The crowd, in this case, considers the fallen hero as an equal, and takes its revenge for having bowed to a superiority whose existence it no longer admits. While Robespierre was causing the execution of his colleagues and of a great number of his contemporaries, he possessed an immense prestige. When the transposition of a few votes deprived him of power, he immediately lost his prestige, and the crowd followed him to the guillotine with the very same imprecations with which shortly before it had pursued his victims. Believers always break the statues of their former gods with every symptom of fury.

Prestige lost by want of success disappears in a brief space of time. It can also be worn away, but more slowly by being subjected to discussion. This latter power, however, is exceedingly sure. From the moment prestige is called in question, it ceases to be prestige. The gods and men who have kept their prestige for long have never tolerated discussion. For the crowd to admire, it must be kept at a distance.

CHAPTER IV

FIXED BELIEFS AND CHANGEABLE OPINIONS OF CROWDS

1. FIXED BELIEFS

The invariability of certain general beliefs.

They shape the course of a civilisation.

The difficulty of uprooting them.

How intolerance is a virtue in a people.

The philosophical absurdity of a belief cannot interfere with its spreading.

2. THE CHANGEABLE OPINIONS OF CROWDS

The extreme mobility of opinions which do not arise from general beliefs.

Apparent variations of ideas and beliefs in less than a century.

The real limits of these variations.

The matters effected by the variation.

The disappearance at present in progress of general beliefs, and the extreme diffusion of the newspaper press, cause opinions nowadays to be more and more changeable.

Why the opinions of crowds tend on the majority of subjects towards indifference.

Governments are now powerless to direct opinion as they formerly did.

Opinions prevented today from being tyrannical on account of their exceeding variety.

1. FIXED BELIEFS

A close parallel exists between the anatomical and psychological characteristics of living beings. In these anatomical characteristics, certain invariable, or slightly variable, elements are met with. Changing these takes an eternity. [25] Side by side, with these fixed indestructible features, are to be found others which are extremely changeable and which the art of the breeder or horticulturist may easily modify and, at times to such an extent, as to conceal the fundamental characteristics from an inattentive observer.

The same phenomenon is observed in the case of moral characteristics. Alongside the unalterable psychological elements of a nation, mobile and changeable elements are to be encountered. For this reason, in studying the beliefs and opinions of a people, the presence is always detected of a fixed groundwork on which are engraved opinions as changing as the surface sand on a rock.

The opinions and beliefs of crowds may be divided, then, into two very distinct classes. On the one hand, we have great permanent beliefs, which endure for several centuries, and on which an entire civilisation may rest. Such, for instance, in the past were feudalism, Christianity, and Protestantism; and such, in our own time, are the nationalist principle and contemporary democratic and social ideas. In the second place, there are the transitory changing opinions, the outcome, as a rule, of general conceptions, of which every age sees the birth and disappearance; examples in point are the theories which mould literature and the arts – those, for instance, which produced romanticism, naturalism, mysticism, etc. Opinions of

this order are as superficial, as a rule, as fashion, and as changeable. They may be compared to the ripples which ceaselessly arise and vanish on the surface of a deep lake.

The great generalised beliefs are very restricted in number. Their rise and fall form the culminating points of the history of every nation. They constitute the real framework of civilisation.

It is easy to imbue the mind of crowds with a passing opinion, but very difficult to implant therein a lasting belief. However, once established, a belief of this latter description is equally as difficult to uproot. It is usually only changed at the cost of violent revolutions. Even revolutions can only succeed when the belief has almost entirely lost its sway over men's minds. In that case revolutions serve to finally sweep away what had already been almost cast aside, though the force of habit prevented its complete abandonment. The beginning of a revolution is in reality the end of a belief.

The precise moment at which a great belief is doomed is easily recognisable; it is the moment at which its value begins to be called into question. Every general belief, being little else than a fiction, can only survive on the condition that it is not subjected to examination.

But even when a belief is severely shaken, the institutions to which it has given rise retain their strength and disappear but slowly. Finally, when the belief has completely lost its force, all that rested upon it is soon involved in ruin. As yet a nation has never been able to change its beliefs without being condemned at the same time to transform all the elements of its civilisation. The nation continues this process of transformation until it has alighted on and accepted a new general belief: until this juncture it is forced into a state of anarchy. General beliefs are the indispensable pillars of civilisations; they determine the trend of ideas. They alone are capable of inspiring faith and creating a sense of duty.

Nations have always been conscious of the utility of acquiring general beliefs, and have instinctively understood that their disappearance would be the signal for their own decline. In the case of the Romans, the fanatical cult of Rome was the belief that made them masters of the world, and when the belief died out Rome was doomed to die. As for the barbarians who destroyed the Roman civilisation, it was only when they had acquired certain commonly accepted beliefs that they attained a measure of cohesion and emerged from anarchy.

Plainly it is not for nothing that nations have always displayed intolerance in the defence of their opinions. This intolerance, open as it is to criticism from the philosophical standpoint, represents in the life of a people the most necessary of virtues. It was to found or uphold general beliefs that so many victims were sent to the stake in the Middle Ages and that so many inventors and innovators have died in despair even if they have escaped martyrdom. It is in defence, too, of such beliefs that the world has been so often the scene of the direst disorder, and that so many millions of men have died on the battlefield, and will yet die there.

There are great difficulties in the way of establishing a general belief, but when it is definitely implanted, its power is for a long time to come invincible and however false it is philosophically, it imposes itself upon the most luminous intelligence. Have not the European peoples regarded as incontrovertible for more than fifteen centuries religious legends which, closely examined, are as barbarous [26] as those of Moloch? The frightful absurdity of the legend of a God who revenges himself for the disobedience of one of his creatures by inflicting horrible tortures on his son has remained unperceived for many centuries. Such potent geniuses as a Galileo, a Newton, and a Leibnitz never supposed for an instant that the truth of such dogmas could be called in question.

Nothing can be more typical than this fact of the hypnotising effect of general beliefs but, at the same time, nothing can mark more decisively the humiliating limitations of our intelligence.

As soon as a new dogma is implanted in the mind of crowds, it becomes the source of inspiration from which its institutions, arts, and mode of existence evolve. The sway it exerts over people's minds, under these circumstances, is absolute. Men of action have no thought beyond realising the accepted belief, legislators beyond applying it, while philosophers, artists, and people of letters are solely preoccupied with its expression under various guises.

From the fundamental belief, transient accessory ideas may arise. But they always bear the impress of the belief from which they have sprung. The Egyptian civilisation, the European civilisation of the Middle Ages, the Muslim civilisation of the Arabs are all the outcome of a small number of religious beliefs which have left their mark on the least important elements of these civilisations and allow their immediate recognition.

Thus it is that, thanks to general beliefs, people of every age are enveloped in a network of traditions, opinions, and customs which render them all alike, and from whose yoke they cannot extricate themselves. People are guided in their conduct above all by their beliefs and by the customs that are the consequence of those beliefs. These beliefs and customs regulate the smallest acts of our existence, and the most independent spirit cannot escape their influence. The tyranny exercised unconsciously on men's minds is the only real tyranny, because it cannot be fought against. Tiberius, Ghengis Khan, and Napoleon were assuredly redoubtable tyrants, but from the depth of their graves Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Mahomet have exerted on the human soul a far profounder despotism. A conspiracy may overthrow a tyrant, but what can it avail against a firmly established belief? In its violent struggle with Roman Catholicism it is the French Revolution that has been

vanquished, and this in spite of the fact that the sympathy of the crowd was apparently on its side, and in spite of recourse to destructive measures as pitiless as those of the Inquisition. The only real tyrants that humanity has known have always been the memories of its dead or the illusions it has forged itself.

The philosophical absurdity that often marks general beliefs has never been an obstacle to their triumph. Indeed the triumph of such beliefs would seem impossible unless on the condition that they offer some mysterious absurdity. As a consequence, the evident weakness of the socialist beliefs of today will not prevent them triumphing among the masses. Their real inferiority to all religious beliefs is solely the result of this consideration: that the ideal of happiness offered by the latter being realisable only in a future life, it was beyond the power of anybody to contest it. The socialist ideal of happiness being intended to be realised on earth, the vanity of its promises will at once appear as soon as the first efforts towards their realisation are made, and simultaneously the new belief will entirely lose its prestige. Its strength, in consequence, will only increase until the day when, having triumphed, its practical realisation will commence. For this reason, while the new religion exerts to begin with, like all those that have preceded it, a destructive influence, it will be unable, in the future, to play a creative part.

2. THE CHANGEABLE OPINIONS OF CROWDS

Above the substratum of fixed beliefs, whose power we have just demonstrated, is found a stratum of opinions, ideas, and thoughts, which are incessantly springing up and dying out. Some of them exist only for a day, and the more important scarcely outlive a generation. We have already noted that unexpected changes in these opinions are at times far more superficial than real, and that they are always affected by racial considerations. When examining, for instance, the political institutions of France, we showed that parties to all appearance

utterly distinct (royalists, radicals, imperialists, socialists, etc.) have an absolutely identical ideal, and that this ideal is solely dependent on the mental structure of the French race, since a quite contrary ideal is found under analogous names among other races. Neither the name given to opinions, nor deceptive adaptations, alter the essence of things. The men of the Great Revolution, saturated with Latin literature, who (their eyes fixed on the Roman Republic), adopted its laws, its symbols, and its togas, did not become Romans because they were under the empire of a powerful historical suggestion. The task of the philosopher is to investigate what it is which subsists of ancient beliefs underneath their apparent changes and to identify, amid the moving flux of opinions, the part determined by general beliefs and the genius of the race.

In the absence of this philosophic test, it might be supposed that crowds change their political or religious beliefs frequently and at will. All history, whether political, religious, artistic, or literary, seems to prove that such is the case.

As an example, let us take a very short period of French history, merely that from 1790 to 1820, a period of thirty years' duration, that of a generation. In the course of it, we see the crowd, at first monarchical, become very revolutionary then very imperialist, and then very monarchical again. In the matter of religion, it gravitates in the same lapse of time from Catholicism to atheism, then towards deism, and then returns to the most pronounced forms of Catholicism. These changes take place not only amongst the masses, but also amongst those who direct them. We observe with astonishment the prominent men of the Convention, the sworn enemies of kings, men who would have neither gods nor masters, become the humble servants of Napoleon, and afterwards, under Louis XVIII, piously carry candles in religious processions.

Numerous, too, are the changes in the opinions of the crowd in the course of the following seventy years. The "Perfidious

Albion” of the opening of the century is the ally of France under Napoleon’s heir; Russia, twice invaded by France, which looked on with satisfaction at French reverses, becomes its friend.

In literature, art, and philosophy, the successive evolutions of opinion are more rapid still. Romanticism, naturalism, mysticism, etc., spring up and die out in turn. The artist and the writer applauded yesterday are treated on the morrow with profound contempt.

When, however, we analyse all these changes in appearance so far reaching, what do we find? All those that are in opposition with the general beliefs and sentiments of the nation are of transient duration, and the diverted stream soon resumes its course. The opinions which are not linked to any general belief or sentiment of the nation and which, in consequence, cannot possess stability, are at the mercy of every chance, or, if the expression is preferred, of every change in the surrounding circumstances. Formed by suggestion and contagion, they are always momentary; they crop up and disappear as rapidly on occasion as the sandhills formed by the wind on a sea-coast.

In the present day, the changeable opinions of crowds are greater in number than they ever were, and for three different reasons.

The first is that as old beliefs are losing their influence to a greater and greater extent, they are ceasing to shape the ephemeral opinions of the moment, as they did in the past. The weakening of general beliefs clears the ground for a crop of haphazard opinions without a past or a future.

The second reason is that the power of crowds is on the increase, and this power is less and less counterbalanced. Therefore, the extreme mobility of ideas, which we have seen to be a peculiarity of crowds, can manifest itself without hindrance.

Finally, the third reason is the recent development of the newspaper press, by whose agency the most contrary opinions are being continually brought before the attention of crowds. The suggestions that might result from each individual opinion are soon destroyed by suggestions of an opposite nature. The consequence is that no opinion succeeds in becoming widespread, and that the existence of all of them is ephemeral. An opinion nowadays dies out before it has found a sufficiently wide acceptance in becoming general.

This phenomenon is quite new in the world's history, and most characteristic of the present age, has resulted from these different causes; I allude to the powerlessness of governments to direct opinion.

In the past, and not a very distant past, the action of governments together with the influence of a few writers and a very small number of newspapers constituted the real reflectors of public opinion. Today writers have lost a lot of influence, and newspapers only reflect opinion. As for politicians, far from directing opinion, their only endeavour is to follow it. They have a dread of opinion, which amounts at times to terror, that causes them to adopt an utterly unstable line of conduct.

The opinion of crowds tends, then, more and more, to become the supreme guiding principle in politics. It goes so far today as to force on alliances, as has been seen recently in the case of the Franco-Russian alliance, which is solely the outcome of a popular movement. A curious symptom of the present time is to observe popes, kings, and emperors consent to being interviewed as a means of submitting their views on a given subject to the judgment of crowds. Formerly, it might have been correct to say that politics were not a matter of sentiment. Can the same be said today, when politics are more and more swayed by the impulse of changeable crowds, who are uninfluenced by reason and can only be guided by sentiment?

As for the press, which formerly directed opinion, it has had, like governments, to humble itself before the power of crowds. It wields, no doubt, a considerable influence, but only because it is exclusively the reflection of the opinions of crowds and of their incessant variations. The press has become a mere agency for supplying information and has renounced all endeavour to enforce an idea or a doctrine. It follows all the changes of public thought, obliged to do so by the necessities of competition under pain of losing its readers. The old staid and influential organs of the past, such as the *Constitutionnel*, the *Débats*, or the *Siècle*, which were accepted as oracles by the preceding generation, have disappeared or have become typical modern papers, in which a few pages of news are sandwiched in between light articles, society gossip, and financial puffs. There can be no question today of a paper rich enough to allow its contributors to air their personal opinions, and such opinions would be of slight weight with readers who only ask to be kept informed or to be amused, and who suspect that every affirmation is prompted by motives of speculation. Even the critics have ceased to assure the success of a book or a play. They are capable of doing harm but not of doing a service. The papers are so conscious of the uselessness of anything in the shape of criticism or personal opinion, that they have reached the point of suppressing literary criticism, confining themselves to citing the title of a book, and appending a “puff” of two or three lines. [27] In twenty years’ time, the same fate will probably have overtaken theatrical criticism.

The close watching of the course of opinion has now become the principal preoccupation of the press and of governments. The effect produced by an event, a legislative proposal or a speech is without intermission, for nothing is more mobile and changeable than the thought of crowds, and it is frequent to see them execrate today what they applauded yesterday.

This total absence of any sort of direction of opinion and, at the same time, the destruction of general beliefs have had as final result an extreme divergence of convictions of every order, and a growing indifference on behalf of crowds to anything that does not plainly touch their immediate interests. Questions of doctrine, such as socialism, recruit champions boasting genuine convictions among the quite illiterate. Members of the lower middle class, and workers possessing some degree of instruction, have either become utterly sceptical or extremely unstable in their opinions.

The evolution which has been effected in this direction in the last twenty-five years is striking. During the preceding period, comparatively near us though it is, opinions still had a certain general trend; they had their origin in the acceptance of some fundamental belief. By the mere fact that some individuals were monarchists, they possessed inevitably certain clearly defined ideas in history as well as in science, while by the mere fact that they were republican, their ideas were quite contrary. Monarchists were well aware that people did not descend from monkeys, and republicans were not less well aware that such is in truth their descent. It was the duty of the monarchist to speak with horror, and of the republican to speak with veneration, of the great Revolution. There were certain names, such as those of Robespierre and Marat, that had to be uttered with an air of religious devotion, and other names, such as those of Caesar, Augustus, or Napoleon, that ought never to be mentioned unaccompanied by a torrent of invective. Even in the French Sorbonne, this unsophisticated fashion of understanding history was general. [\[28\]](#)

At the present day, as the result of discussion and analysis, all opinions are losing their prestige; their distinctive features are rapidly worn away, and few survive who are capable of

arousing our enthusiasm. People of modern times are more and more preys of indifference.

The general wearing away of opinions should not be too greatly deplored. That it is a symptom of decadence in the life of a people cannot be contested. It is certain for people of immense, and of almost supernatural insight, that apostles, leaders of crowds (people, in short, of genuine and strong convictions) exert a far greater force than those who deny, who criticise, or who are indifferent, but it must not be forgotten that, given the power possessed at present by crowds, if a single opinion were to acquire sufficient prestige to enforce its general acceptance, it would soon be endowed with such a tyrannical strength that everything would have to bend before it, and the era of free discussion would be closed for a long time. Crowds are occasionally easy-going rulers, as were Heliogabalus and Tiberius, but they are also violently capricious. A civilisation, when the moment has come for crowds to acquire power over it, is at the mercy of too many chances to endure for long. If anything could postpone for a while the hour of its ruin, it would be precisely the extreme instability of the opinions of crowds and their growing indifference with respect to all general beliefs.

**BOOK III – THE CLASSIFICATION AND
DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF
CROWDS**

CHAPTER I

THE CLASSIFICATION OF CROWDS

The general divisions of crowds.

Their classification.

1. HETEROGENEOUS CROWDS

Different varieties of crowds.

The influence of nationality.

The spirit of the crowd is weak in proportion as the spirit of the nation is strong.

The spirit of the nation represents the civilised state, and the spirit of the crowd the barbarian state.

2. HOMOGENEOUS CROWDS

Their different varieties.

Sects, castes and classes.

We have sketched in this work the general characteristics common to psychological crowds. It remains to point out the particular characteristics which accompany those of a general order in the different categories of collectivities, when they are transformed into a crowd under the influence of exciting causes. First of all, we will briefly set forth a classification of crowds.

Our starting-point will be the simple multitude. Its most inferior form is met with when the multitude is composed of individuals belonging to different races. In this case, its only

common bond of union is the iron will of a respected chief. The barbarians of very diverse origin, who during several centuries invaded the Roman Empire, may be cited as a specimen of multitudes of this kind.

On a higher level, than these multitudes composed of different races, are those which under certain influences have acquired common characteristics and have ended by forming a single nation. At times, they present characteristics peculiar to crowds, but these characteristics are overruled to a greater or lesser extent by racial considerations.

These two kinds of multitudes may, under certain influences investigated in this work, be transformed into organised or psychological crowds. We shall break up these organised crowds into the following divisions:

1. Heterogeneous crowds:

- (a) Anonymous crowds (street crowds, for example)
- (b) Identifiable crowds (juries, parliamentary assemblies, etc.)

2. Homogeneous crowds (the priestly caste, the working caste, etc.):

- (a) Sects (political sects, religious sects, etc.)
- (b) Castes (the military caste)
- (c) Classes (the middle classes, peasant classes, etc.)

We will point out briefly the distinguishing characteristics of these different categories of crowds.

1. HETEROGENEOUS CROWDS

It is these collectivities whose characteristics have been studied in this volume. They are composed of individuals of any description, of any profession and of any degree of intelligence.

We are now aware that by the mere fact that people form part of a crowd engaged in action, their collective psychology differs essentially from their individual psychology, and their intelligence is affected by this differentiation. We have seen that intelligence is without influence in collectivities, they being solely under the sway of unconscious sentiments.

A fundamental factor, that of race, allows a tolerably thorough differentiation of the various heterogeneous crowds.

We have often referred already to the part played by race, and we have shown it to be the most powerful of the factors capable of determining people's actions. Its action is also to be traced in the character of crowds. A crowd composed of individuals assembled haphazardly, but all of them English or Chinese, will differ widely from another crowd also composed of individuals of any and every description, but of other races: Russians, the French, or Spaniards, for example.

The wide divergences which their inherited mental constitution creates in people's modes of feeling and thinking come into prominence at once when circumstances which gather together in the same crowd, and in fairly equal proportions, individuals of different nationalities. This occurs notwithstanding how identical in appearance the interests which initiated the gathering are. The efforts made by the socialists to assemble the representatives of the working-class populations of different countries in great congresses, have always ended in the most pronounced discord. A Latin crowd, however revolutionary or however conservative it is thought to be, will invariably appeal to the intervention of the State to realise its demands. It is always distinguished by a marked tendency towards centralisation and by a leaning, more or less pronounced, in favour of a dictatorship. An English or an American crowd, on the contrary, sets no store on the State, and only appeals to private initiative. A French crowd lays particular weight on equality and an English crowd on liberty.

These differences of race explain how it is that there are almost as many different forms of socialism and democracy as there are nations.

The genius of the nation, then, exerts a paramount influence upon the dispositions of a crowd. It is the powerful underlying force that limits its changes of humour. It should be considered as an essential law that the inferior characteristics of crowds are less accentuated in proportion as the spirit of the race is strong. The state of the crowd and the domination of crowds is equivalent to the barbarian state, or to a return to it. It is by the acquisition of a solidly constituted collective spirit that the race frees itself to a greater and greater extent by not reflecting itself in the power of crowds and emerges from a barbarian state. The only important classification to be made of heterogeneous crowds, apart from that based on racial considerations, is to separate them into anonymous crowds, such as street crowds, and crowds not anonymous, deliberative assemblies and juries, for example. The sentiment of responsibility absent from crowds of the first description and developed in those of the second, often gives a very different tendency to their respective acts.

2. HOMOGENEOUS CROWDS

Homogeneous crowds include: 1. sects; 2. castes; 3. classes.

Sects represent the first step in the process of organisation of homogeneous crowds. A sect includes individuals differing greatly in their education, their profession, bound only by their common beliefs. Religious and political sects are examples.

Castes represent the highest degree of organisation of which the crowd is susceptible. While the sect includes individuals of very different professions, degrees of education and social surrounding, who are only linked together by the beliefs they hold in common, the caste is composed of individuals of the

same profession and, in consequence, similarly educated and of much the same social status. Examples in point are the military and priestly castes.

Classes are formed of individuals of diverse origin, linked together not by a community of beliefs, as are the members of a sect, or by common professional occupations, as are the members of a caste, but by certain interests and certain habits of life and education which are almost identical. The middle class and the agricultural class are examples.

Being only concerned in this work with heterogeneous crowds, and reserving the study of homogeneous crowds (sects, castes, and classes) for another volume, I shall not insist here on the characteristics of crowds of this latter kind. I shall conclude this study of heterogeneous crowds by the examination of a few typical and distinct categories of crowds.

CHAPTER II

CROWDS COMMITTING CRIMES

Criminal crowds.

A crowd may be legally yet not psychologically criminal.

The absolute unconsciousness of the acts of crowds.

Various examples.

Psychology of the authors of the September massacres.

Their reasoning, their sensibility, their ferocity, and their morality.

Owing to the fact that crowds, after a period of excitement, enter into a purely automatic and unconscious state, in which they are guided by suggestion, it seems difficult to qualify them in any way as criminal. I only retain this erroneous qualification because it has been definitely brought into vogue by recent psychological investigations. Certain acts of crowds are assuredly criminal, if considered merely in themselves, but criminal in the same way as the act of a tiger devouring a man, after allowing its young to maul him for their amusement.

The usual motive for the crimes of crowds is a powerful suggestion, and the individuals who take part in such crimes are afterwards convinced that they have acted in obedience to duty, which is far from being the case with the ordinary criminal.

The history of the crimes committed by crowds illustrates this.

The murder of M. de Launay, the governor of the Bastille, may be cited as a typical example. After the taking of the fortress the governor, surrounded by a very excited crowd, was dealt blows from every direction. It was proposed to hang him, to cut off his head, to tie him to a horse's tail. While struggling, he accidentally kicked one of those present. Someone proposed that the individual who had been kicked should cut the governor's throat. His suggestion was at once received with acclamation by the crowd:

“The individual in question, an unemployed cook, whose chief reason for being at the Bastille was idle curiosity as to what was going on, thinks, that since such is the general opinion, the action is patriotic and even believes he deserves a medal for having destroyed a monster. With a sword that is lent to him he strikes the bared neck, but the weapon being somewhat blunt and not cutting, he takes from his pocket a small black-handled knife and (in his capacity of cook he would be experienced in cutting up meat) successfully effects the operation.”

The working of the process indicated above is clearly seen in this example. We have obedience to a suggestion, which is all the stronger because of its collective origin, and the murderer's conviction that he has committed a very meritorious act, a conviction which seems more natural given that he receives the unanimous approval of his fellow-citizens. An act of this kind may be considered a crime in the legal sense but not in the psychological one.

The general characteristics of criminal crowds are precisely the same as those we have met with in all crowds: openness to suggestion, credulity, mobility, the exaggeration of good or bad sentiments, the manifestation of certain forms of morality, etc.

We shall find all these characteristics present in a crowd which has left behind it in French history the most sinister

memories – the crowd which perpetrated the September massacres. In point of fact, it offers much similarity with the crowd that committed the Saint Bartholomew massacres. I borrow the details from the narrative of M. Taine, who took them from contemporary sources.

It is not known exactly who gave the order or made the suggestion to empty the prisons by massacring the prisoners. Whether it was Danton, as is probable, or someone else, does not matter; the one interesting fact for us is the powerful suggestion received by the crowd charged with the massacre.

The crowd of murderers numbered some three hundred persons and was a perfectly typical heterogeneous crowd. With the exception of a very small number of professional scoundrels, it consisted mainly of shopkeepers and artisans of every trade: shoemakers, locksmiths, hairdressers, masons, clerks, messengers, etc. Under the influence of the suggestion received, they are perfectly convinced (as was the cook referred to above) that they are accomplishing a patriotic duty. They fill a dual role by being judge and executioner at the same time, but they do not for a moment regard themselves as criminals.

Deeply conscious of the importance of their duty, they begin by forming a sort of tribunal, and immediately their simplistic mind and rudimentary concept of justice appear. In consideration of the large number of the accused, it is decided that, to begin with, the nobles, priests, officers, and members of the king's household (in other words, all the individuals whose mere profession is proof of their guilt in the eyes of a good patriot) will be slaughtered, there being no need for a special decision in their case. The remainder will be judged on their personal appearance and their reputation. In this way, the rudimentary conscience of the crowd is satisfied. It will now be able to proceed legally with the massacre, and to give free scope to those instincts of ferocity whose origin I have set forth elsewhere, they being instincts which collectivities always have

in them and which escalate to a high degree. These instincts, however, as is regularly the case in crowds, will not prevent the manifestation of other and contrary sentiments, such as kindness which can often be as extreme as the ferocity.

“They have the expansive sympathy and prompt sensibility of the Parisian working man. At the Abbaye, one of the federates, learning that the prisoners had been left without water for twenty-six hours, decided to put the jailer to death, and would have done so, if it had not been for pleading of the prisoners themselves. When a prisoner is acquitted (by the improvised tribunal) every one, guards and slaughterers included, embraces him with transports of joy and applauds frantically,” after which the wholesale massacre is recommenced. During its progress a pleasant gaiety never ceases to reign. There is dancing and singing around the corpses, and benches are arranged “for the ladies,” delighted to witness the killing of aristocrats. The exhibition continues, moreover, with a special description of justice.

A slaughterer at the Abbaye having complained that the ladies placed at a little distance saw badly, and that only a few of those present had the pleasure of striking the aristocrats, the justice of the observation is admitted, and it is decided that the victims would be made to pass slowly between two rows of slaughterers, who would be under the obligation to strike with the back of the sword only so as to prolong the agony. At the prison de la Force, the victims are stripped stark naked and literally “carved” for half an hour, after which, when everyone has had a good view, they are finished off by a blow that lays bare their entrails.

The slaughterers, too, have their scruples and exhibit that moral sense whose existence in crowds we have already pointed out. They refuse to appropriate the money and jewels of the victims, taking them to the table of the committees.

Those rudimentary forms of reasoning, characteristic of the mind of crowds, can always be traced in their acts. Thus, after the slaughter of the 1,200 or 1,500 enemies of the nation, someone makes the remark, and this suggestion is at once adopted, that the other prisons, those containing aged beggars, vagabonds, and young prisoners, hold in reality useless mouths, which the assemblage would be well rid of. Besides, among them there should certainly be enemies of the people, a woman of the name of Delarue, for instance, the widow of a poisoner: "She must be furious at being in prison, if she could she would set fire to Paris: she must have said so, she has said so. Another good riddance." The demonstration appears convincing, and the prisoners are massacred without exception, included in the number are some fifty children from twelve to seventeen years of age, who, of course, might themselves have become enemies of the nation, and of whom in consequence it was clearly well to be rid of.

At the end of a week's work, all these operations are brought to an end and the slaughterers can think of resting themselves. Profoundly convinced that they have deserved well of their country, they went to the authorities and demanded a recompense. The most zealous went so far as to claim a medal.

The history of the Commune of 1871 contains several facts analogous to these. Given the growing influence of crowds, and the successive capitulations to them of those in authority, we are destined to witness many other similar episodes.

CHAPTER III

CRIMINAL JURIES

Criminal juries.

General characteristics of juries – statistics show that their decisions are independent of their composition.

The manner in which an impression can be made on juries.

The style and influence of argument.

The methods of persuasion used by celebrated counsel.

The nature of those crimes for which juries are respectively indulgent or severe.

The value of the jury as an institution, and the danger that would result from its place being taken by magistrates.

As I am unable to study every category of jury here, I shall only examine the most important – that of the juries of the Court of Assize. These juries provide an excellent example of the heterogeneous crowd that is not anonymous. We shall find them display suggestibility and a slight capacity for reasoning, while they are open to the influence of the leaders of crowds and are guided mainly by unconscious sentiments. In the course of this investigation, we shall have occasion to observe some interesting examples of the errors that may be made by persons not versed in the psychology of crowds.

Juries, in the first place, furnish us a good example of the slight importance of the mental level of the different elements composing a crowd, as far as the decisions it comes to are

concerned. We have seen that when a deliberative assembly is called upon to give its opinion on a question of a character not entirely technical, intelligence counts for nothing. For instance, a gathering of scientific men or of artists, owing to the mere fact that they form an assembly, will not deliver judgments on general subjects sensibly different from those rendered by a gathering of masons or grocers. At various periods, and in particular previous to 1848, the French administration instituted a careful choice among the persons summoned to form a jury, picking the jurors from among the enlightened classes; choosing professors, civil servants, men of letters, etc. In the present day, jurors are recruited for the most part from among small tradesmen, petty capitalists, and employees. Yet, to the great astonishment of specialist writers, whatever the composition of the jury has been, its decisions have been identical. Even the magistrates, hostile as they are to the institution of the jury, have had to recognise the exactness of the assertion. M. Bérard des Glajeux, a former President of the Court of Assizes, expresses himself on the subject in his *Memoirs* in the following terms:

“The selection of jurymen is today in reality in the hands of the municipal councillors, who put people down on the list or eliminate them from it, in accordance with the political and electoral preoccupations inherent in their situation... The majority of the jurors chosen are people engaged in trade, people of less importance than formerly, and employees belonging to certain branches of the administration. Both opinions and professions counting for nothing, once the role of judge is assumed many of the components of the jury will have the ardour of neophytes. People of the best intentions, who normally engage in humble situations, will not change the spirit of the jury: its verdicts will remain the same.”

Of the passage just cited the conclusions, which are just, are to be borne in mind and not the explanations, which are weak.

Too much astonishment should not be felt at this weakness, for, as a rule, both counsel and magistrates seem to be ignorant of the psychology of crowds and, in consequence, of juries. I find proof of this statement in a fact related by the author just quoted. He remarks that Lachaud, one of the most illustrious barristers practising in the Court of Assize, made systematic use of his right to object to a juror in the case of all individuals of intelligence on the list. Yet experience, and experience alone, has ended by acquainting us with the utter uselessness of these objections. This is proved by the fact that in the present day public prosecutors and barristers, at any rate those belonging to the Parisian bar, have entirely renounced their right to object to a juror; still, as M. des Glajeux remarks, the verdicts have not changed, "they are neither better nor worse."

Like all crowds, juries are very strongly impressed by sentimental considerations, and very slightly by argument. "They cannot resist the sight," writes a barrister, "of a mother giving its child the breast, or of orphans." "It is sufficient that a woman should be of agreeable appearance," says M. des Glajeux, "to win the sympathy of the jury."

Without pity for crimes of which it appears possible they might themselves be the victims (such crimes, moreover, are the most dangerous for society) juries, on the contrary, are very indulgent in the case of breaches of the law whose motive is passion. They are rarely severe on infanticide by teenage mothers, or hard on the young woman who throws vitriol at the man who has seduced and deserted her, for the reason that they feel instinctively that society runs but slight danger from such crimes, and that in a country in which the law does not protect deserted young women the crime of the latter who avenges herself is more useful than harmful, inasmuch as it frightens future seducers in advance. [29]

Juries, like all crowds, are profoundly impressed by prestige, and President des Glajeux very properly remarks that, very

democratic as juries are in their composition, they are very aristocratic in their likes and dislikes: "Name, birth, great wealth, celebrity, the assistance of an illustrious counsel, everything in the nature of distinction or that lends brilliancy to the accused, stands in extremely good stead."

The chief concern of a good counsel should be to work upon the feelings of the jury, and, as with all crowds, to argue but little, or only to employ rudimentary modes of reasoning. An English barrister, famous for his successes in the assize courts, explained well the line of action to be followed:

"While pleading he would attentively observe the jury. The most favourable opportunity has been reached. By dint of insight and experience the counsel reads the effect of each phrase on the faces of the members of the jury, and draws his conclusions in consequence. His first step is to be sure which members of the jury are already favourable to his cause. It is short work to definitely gain their adhesion, and having done so he turns his attention to the members who seem, on the contrary, ill-disposed, and endeavours to discover why they are hostile to the accused. This is the delicate part of his task, for there may be an infinity of reasons for condemning someone, apart from the sentiment of justice."

These few lines resume the entire mechanism of the art of oratory, and we see why the speech prepared in advance has so slight an effect, it being necessary to be able to modify the terms employed from moment to moment in accordance with the impression produced.

The orator does not require to convert all the members of a jury to his views, but only the leading spirits among it who will determine the general opinion. As in all crowds, so in juries, there are a small number of individuals who serve as guides to the rest. "I have found by experience," says the counsel cited above, "that one or two energetic members suffice to carry the

rest of the jury with them.” It is those two or three who it is necessary to convince by skilful suggestions. First of all, and above all, it is necessary to please them. The person forming part of a crowd, who one has succeeded in pleasing, will be on the point of being convinced, and will subsequently be quite disposed to accept as excellent any arguments that may be offered.

I take the following anecdote from an interesting account by M. Lachaud, alluded to above:

“It is well known that during all the speeches he would deliver in the course of an assize sessions, Lachaud never lost sight of the two or three members of the jury who he knew or felt to be influential but obstinate. As a rule he was successful in winning over these reluctant jurors. On one occasion, however, in the provinces, he had to deal with a jurymen who he plied in vain for three-quarters of an hour with his most cunning arguments; the man was the seventh member of the jury, the first on the second bench. The case was desperate. Suddenly, in the middle of a passionate demonstration, Lachaud stopped short, and addressing the President of the court said: ‘Would you give instructions for the curtain to be drawn over there? The seventh member of the jury is blinded by the sun.’ The jurymen in question reddened, smiled, and expressed his thanks. He was won over for the defence.”

Many writers, some of them most distinguished, have started of late a strong campaign against the institution of the jury, although it is the only protection we have against the errors, really very frequent, of a caste that is under no control. [30] A portion of these writers advocate a jury recruited solely from the ranks of the enlightened classes; but we have already proved that even in this case the verdicts would be identical with those returned under the present system. Other writers, taking their stand on the errors committed by juries, would abolish the jury and replace it by judges. It is difficult to see

how these would-be reformers can forget that the errors for which the jury is blamed were committed in the first instance by judges, and that when the accused person comes before a jury he has already been held to be guilty by several magistrates: by the examining magistrate, by the public prosecutor, and the Court of Arraignment. It should thus be clear that were the accused to be definitely judged by magistrates instead of by members of a jury, accused people would lose their only chance of being pronounced innocent. The errors of juries have always been first of all the errors of magistrates. It is solely the magistrates, then, who should be blamed when particularly monstrous judicial errors crop up, such as, for instance, as the quite recent condemnation of Dr. L... who, prosecuted by an examining magistrate of excessive stupidity, on the strength of the denunciation of a girl, who accused the doctor of having performed an illegal operation upon her for thirty francs, would have been sent to penal servitude but for an explosion of public indignation. The result was that he was immediately set at liberty by the Chief of the State. The honourable character given to the condemned man by all his fellow-citizens made the grossness of the blunder self-evident. The magistrates themselves admitted it, and yet out of caste considerations they did all they could to prevent the pardon being signed. In all similar affairs the jury, confronted with technical details it is unable to understand, naturally harkens to the public prosecutor, arguing that, after all, the affair has been investigated by magistrates trained to unravel the most intricate situations. Who, then, are the real authors of the error? The members of the jury or the magistrates? We should cling vigorously to the jury. It constitutes, perhaps, the only category of crowds that cannot be replaced by any individuality. It alone can temper the severity of the law, which, equal for all, ought in principle to be blind and to take no cognisance of particular cases. Inaccessible to pity, and heeding nothing but the text of the law, judges in their professional severity would visit with the same penalty the burglar guilty of

murder and the wretched girl who poverty and her abandonment by her seducer have driven to infanticide. The jury, on the other hand, instinctively feels that the seduced girl is much less guilty than the seducer, who, however, is not touched by the law, and that she deserves every indulgence.

Being well acquainted with the psychology of castes, and also with the psychology of other categories of crowds, I do not perceive a single case in which, wrongly accused of a crime, I should not prefer to have to deal with a jury rather than with magistrates. I should have some chance that my innocence would be recognised by the former and not the slightest chance that it would be admitted by the latter. The power of crowds is to be dreaded, but the power of certain castes is to be dreaded even more. Crowds are open to conviction; castes never are.

CHAPTER IV

ELECTORAL CROWDS

General characteristics of electoral crowds.

The manner of persuading them.

The qualities a candidate should possess.

Necessity of prestige.

Why the working-class and peasants rarely choose candidates from their own class.

The influence of words and formulae on the elector.

The general aspect of election oratory.

How the opinions of the elector are formed.

The power of political committees.

They represent the most redoubtable form of tyranny.

The committees of the Revolution.

Universal suffrage cannot be replaced in spite of its slight psychological value.

Why it is that the votes recorded would remain the same even if the right of voting were restricted to a limited class of citizens.

What universal suffrage expresses in all countries.

Electoral crowds (that is to say, collectivities invested with the power of electing the holders of certain functions) constitute heterogeneous crowds, but as their action is confined to a single clearly determined matter, namely, to choosing between

different candidates, they present only a few of the characteristics previously described. Of the characteristics peculiar to crowds, they display in particular only a slight aptitude for reasoning, the absence of a critical spirit, irritability, credulity, and simplicity. In their decision, moreover, is to be traced the influence of the leaders of crowds and the part played by the factors we have enumerated: affirmation, repetition, prestige and contagion.

Let us examine by what methods electoral crowds are to be persuaded. It will be easy to deduce their psychology from the methods that are most successful.

It is of primary importance that the candidate should possess prestige. Personal prestige can only be replaced by that resulting from wealth. Talent and even genius are not serious elements of success.

Of capital importance, on the other hand, is the necessity for the candidates to possess prestige, of being able, that is, to force themselves upon the electorate without discussion. The reason why the electors, of whom a majority are working class or peasants, so rarely choose someone from their own ranks to represent them is that such a person enjoys no prestige among them. When, by chance, they do elect their equals, as a rule, it is for other reasons. For instance, it could be to spite an eminent politician or an influential employer on whom the elector may depend for subsistence. In this case, the dependant has the illusion of becoming the master, if only for a moment.

Possessing prestige is not enough, however, to ensure a candidate's success. Electors are persuaded in particular for the flattery of their vanity and their greed. They must be overwhelmed with the most extravagant blandishments, and there must be no hesitation in making them the most fantastic promises. If the electors are working class, it is impossible to go too far in insulting and stigmatising employers of labour. As for

the rival candidates, an effort must be made to destroy their chance by establishing by dint of affirmation, repetition, and contagion that they are arrant scoundrels, and that it is a matter of common knowledge that they have been guilty of several crimes. It is, of course, useless to trouble about any semblance of proof. Should the opposition be ill-acquainted with the psychology of crowds, they will try to justify themselves by arguments instead of confining themselves to replying to one set of affirmations by another; and they will have no chance whatever of being successful.

The candidates' written programme should not be too categorical, since later on adversaries might bring it up against them; in their verbal programme, however, there cannot be too much exaggeration. The most important reforms may be fearlessly promised. At the moment they are made, these exaggerations produce a great effect, and they are not binding for the future. It is consistently true that electors hardly trouble themselves to follow how far the candidates they vote for have delivered the promises made during their electoral programme which the electors had applauded, and in virtue of which the election was supposed to have been secured. In what precedes, all the factors of persuasion, which we have described, are to be recognised. We shall come across them again in the action exerted by words and formulae, whose magical sway we have already insisted upon. Orators, who know how to make use of these means of persuasion, can do what they wish with a crowd. Expressions such as infamous capital, vile exploiters, the admirable working man, the socialisation of wealth, etc., always produce the same effect, although already somewhat worn by use. But the candidate who hits on a new formula as devoid as possible of precise meaning, and apt in consequence to flatter the most varied aspirations, infallibly obtains success. The bloody Spanish revolution of 1873 was brought about by one of these magical phrases of complex meaning on which anybody could put their own interpretation. A contemporary writer has

described the launching of this phrase in terms that deserve to be quoted:

“The radicals have made the discovery that a centralised republic is a monarchy in disguise, and to humour them the Cortes had unanimously proclaimed a Federal Republic, though none of the voters could have explained what it was they had just voted for. This formula, however, delighted everybody; the joy was intoxicating, delirious. The reign of virtue and happiness had just been inaugurated on earth. A republican whose opponent refused him the title of federalist considered himself to be mortally insulted. People addressed each other in the streets with the words: ‘Long live the federal republic!’ After which the praises were sung of the mystic virtue of the absence of discipline in the army, and of the autonomy of the soldiers.

“What was understood by the ‘federal republic’? There were those who took it to mean the emancipation of the provinces, institutions akin to those of the United States and administrative decentralisation; others had in view the abolition of all authority and the speedy commencement of the great social liquidation. The socialists of Barcelona and Andalusia stood out for the absolute sovereignty of the communes; they proposed to endow Spain with ten thousand independent municipalities, to legislate on their own account, and their creation to be accompanied by the suppression of the police and the army. In the southern provinces, the insurrection was soon seen to spread from town to town and village to village. As soon as a village had stated its manifesto, its first step was to destroy the telegraph wires and the railway lines so as to cut off all communication with its neighbours and Madrid. The sorriest hamlet was determined to stand on its own two feet. Federation had given place to secession, marked by massacres, incendiarism, and every description of brutality, and bloody saturnalia were celebrated throughout the length and breadth of the land.”

With respect to the influence that may be exerted by reasoning on the minds of electors, to harbour the least doubt on this subject can only be the result of never having read the reports of an electioneering meeting. In such a gathering affirmations, invectives, and sometimes blows are exchanged, but never arguments. Should silence be established for a moment, it is because someone present, who has the reputation of a “tough customer,” has announced that he is about to heckle the candidate by putting to him one of those embarrassing questions which are always the joy of the audience. The satisfaction, however, of the opposition party is short-lived, for the voice of the questioner is soon drowned in the uproar made by adversaries. The following reports of public meetings, chosen from hundreds of similar examples, and taken from the daily papers, may be considered as typical:

“One of the organisers of the meeting having asked the assembly to elect a president, the anarchists leap on to the platform to take the committee table by storm. The socialists make an energetic defence; blows are exchanged, and each party accuses the other of being spies in the pay of the Government, etc. ... A citizen leaves the hall with a black eye.

“The committee is at length installed as best it may be in the midst of the tumult, and the right to speak devolves upon ‘Comrade’ X...

“The orator starts a vigorous attack on the socialists, who interrupt him with shouts of ‘Idiot, scoundrel, blackguard!’ etc., epithets to which Comrade X... replies by setting forth a theory according to which the socialists are ‘idiots’ or ‘jokers.’

“The Allemanist party had organised yesterday evening, in the Hall of Commerce, in the Rue du Faubourg-du-Temple, a great meeting, preliminary to the workers’ fête of the 1st of May. The watchword of the meeting was ‘Calm and Tranquillity!’

“Comrade G... alludes to the socialists as ‘idiots’ and ‘humbugs.’

“At these words there is an exchange of invectives and orators and audience come to blows. Chairs, tables, and benches are converted into weapons, etc.”

It is not to be imagined for a moment that this description of discussion is peculiar to a determined class of electors and dependent on their social position. In every anonymous assembly whatever, though it is composed exclusively of highly educated persons, discussion always assumes the same shape. I have shown that when individuals are collected in a crowd there is a tendency towards their mental levelling at work, and proof of this is to be found at every turn. Take, for example, the following extract from a report of a meeting composed exclusively of students, which I quote from a newspaper:

“The tumult only increased as the evening went on; I do not believe that a single orator succeeded in uttering two sentences without being interrupted. At every instant there came shouts from this and that direction, or from every direction at once. Applause was intermingled with hissing, violent discussions were in progress between individual members of the audience, sticks were brandished threateningly, others beat a tattoo on the floor, and the interrupters were greeted with yells of ‘Put him out!’ or ‘Let him speak!’

“M. C... lavished such epithets as odious and cowardly, monstrous, vile, venal and vindictive, on the Association, which he declared he wanted to destroy, etc.”

How, it may be asked, can an elector form an opinion under such conditions? To put such a question is to harbour a strange delusion as to the measure of liberty that may be enjoyed by a collectivity. Crowds have opinions that have been imposed upon them, but they never boast reasoned opinions. In the case under consideration, the opinions and votes of the electors are

in the hands of the election committees, whose leading spirits are, as a rule, publicans, their influence over the working class, to whom they allow credit, being great. “Do you know what an election committee is?” writes M. Scherer, one of the most valiant champions of present-day democracy. “It is neither more nor less than the cornerstone of our institutions, the masterpiece of the political machine. France is governed today by the election committees.” [31]

To exert an influence over them is not difficult, provided the candidate is acceptable and possesses adequate financial resources. According to the admissions of the donors, three million francs sufficed to secure the repeated elections of General Boulanger.

Such is the psychology of electoral crowds. It is identical with that of other crowds: neither better nor worse.

In consequence, I draw no conclusion against universal suffrage from the above. Had I to settle its fate, I would preserve it as it is for practical reasons, which are to be deduced from our investigation of the psychology of crowds. On this account, I shall proceed to set them forth.

No doubt the weak side of universal suffrage is too obvious to be overlooked. It cannot be said that civilisation has been the work of a small minority of superior intelligences constituting the culminating point of a pyramid, whose stages, widening in proportion to the decrease of mental power, represent the masses of a nation. The greatness of a civilisation cannot assuredly depend upon the votes given by inferior elements boasting solely numerical strength. Doubtless, too, the votes recorded by crowds are often very dangerous. They have already cost us several invasions, and in view of the triumph of socialism, for which they are preparing the way, it is probable that the vagaries of popular sovereignty will cost us still more dearly.

Excellent, however, as these objections are in theory, in practice they lose all force, as will be admitted if the invincible strength is remembered for ideas transformed into dogmas. The dogma of the sovereignty of crowds is as little defensible, from the philosophical point of view, as the religious dogmas of the Middle Ages, but at present it enjoys the same absolute power they formerly enjoyed. In consequence, it is as unassailable as our religious ideas were in the past. Imagine modern free-thinkers miraculously transported into the midst of the Middle Ages. Do you suppose that, after having ascertained the sovereign power of the religious ideas that were then in force, they would have been tempted to attack those ideas? Having fallen into the hands of a judge disposed to send them to the stake, under the imputation of having concluded a pact with the devil, or of having been present at the witches' sabbath, would it have occurred to them to call in question the existence of the devil or of the sabbath? It would be as wise to oppose cyclones with discussion as the beliefs of crowds. Nowadays, the dogma of universal suffrage possesses the power that Christian dogmas once possessed. Orators and writers allude to it with a respect and adulation that never fell to the share of Louis XIV. In consequence, the same position must be taken up with regard to it as with regard to all religious dogmas. Time alone can act upon them.

Besides, it would be useless to attempt to undermine this dogma given that it has the appearance of reason in its favour. "In an era of equality," Tocqueville justly remarks, "men have no faith in each other on account of their being all alike; yet this same similitude gives them an almost limitless confidence in the judgment of the public, the reason being that it does not appear probable that, all men being equally enlightened, truth and numerical superiority should not go hand in hand."

Must it be believed that with a restricted suffrage (a suffrage restricted to those intellectually capable) an improvement

would be effected in the votes of crowds? I cannot admit for a moment that this would be the case, and that for the reasons I have already given touching the mental inferiority of all collectivities, whatever their composition. In a crowd people always tend to the same level, and, on general questions, a vote, recorded by forty academicians is no better than that of forty water-carriers. I do not in the least believe that any of the votes for which universal suffrage is blamed (the re-establishment of the Empire, for instance) would have fallen out differently had the voters been exclusively recruited among the learned and the liberally educated. It does not follow that the outcome will be any better because an individual knows Greek or mathematics, is an architect, a veterinary surgeon, a doctor, or a barrister, or that the individual is endowed with a special intelligence of social questions. All our political economists are highly educated, being for the most part professors or academicians, yet is there a single general question – protection, bimetallism, etc. – on which they have succeeded in agreeing? The explanation is that their science is only a very attenuated form of our universal ignorance. With regard to social problems, owing to the number of unknown quantities they offer, people are substantially, equally ignorant.

In consequence, were the electorate solely composed of persons stuffed with sciences, their votes would be no better than those cast at present. They would be guided in the main by their sentiments and by party spirit. We should be spared none of the difficulties we now have to contend with, and we should certainly be subjected to the oppressive tyranny of castes.

Whether the suffrage of crowds is restricted or general, whether it is exercised under a republic or a monarchy, in France, in Belgium, in Greece, in Portugal, or in Spain, it is identical everywhere; and, when all is said and done, it is the expression of the unconscious aspirations and needs of the nation. In each country, the average opinions of those elected

represent the genius of the nation, and they will be found not to alter sensibly from one generation to another.

It is seen, then, that we are confronted once more by the fundamental notion of race, which we have come across so often, and on this other notion, which is the outcome of the first, that institutions and governments play but a small part in the life of a people. Peoples are guided in the main by the genius of their race, that is, by that inherited residue of qualities of which the genius is the sum total. Race and the slavery of our daily necessities are the mysterious master-causes that rule our destiny.

CHAPTER V

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES

Parliamentary crowds present most of the characteristics common to heterogeneous crowds that are not anonymous.

The simplicity of their opinions.

Their suggestibility and its limits.

Their indestructible, fixed opinions, and their changed opinions.

The reason for the predominance of indecision.

The role of the leaders.

The reason for their prestige.

They are the true masters of an assembly whose votes, on that account, are merely those of a small minority.

The absolute power they exercise.

The elements of their oratorical art.

Phrases and images.

Psychologically, leaders need to hold stubborn convictions and be narrow-minded.

It is impossible for a speaker without prestige to obtain recognition for his arguments.

The exaggeration of the sentiments, whether good or bad, of assemblies. Sometimes they become automatic.

The sittings of the Convention.

Cases in which an assembly loses the characteristics of crowds.

The influence of specialists when technical questions arise.

The advantages and dangers of a parliamentary system in all countries. It is adapted to modern needs; but it involves financial waste and the progressive curtailment of all liberty.

In parliamentary assemblies, we have an example of heterogeneous crowds that are not anonymous. Although the mode of election of their members varies from epoch to epoch, and from nation to nation, they present very similar characteristics. In this case, the influence of the race makes itself felt to weaken or exaggerate the characteristics common to crowds, but not to prevent their manifestation. The parliamentary assemblies of the most widely different countries, of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, and America present great analogies in their debates and votes, and leave the respective governments face to face with identical difficulties.

Moreover, the parliamentary system represents the ideal of all modern civilised peoples. The system is the expression of the idea, psychologically erroneous, but generally admitted, that a large gathering of people is much more capable than a small number of coming to a wise and independent decision on a given subject.

Parliamentary assemblies show the general characteristics of crowds: intellectual simplicity, irritability, suggestibility, the exaggeration of the sentiments, and the strong influence of a few leaders. In consequence, however, of their special composition parliamentary crowds offer some distinctive features, which we shall point out shortly.

Simplicity in their opinions is one of their most important characteristics. In the case of all parties, and more especially so far as the Latin peoples are concerned, an invariable tendency is met with in crowds of this kind to solve the most complicated social problems by the simplest abstract principles and general

laws applicable to all cases. Naturally, the principles vary with the party; but owing to the mere fact that the individual members are a part of a crowd, they are always inclined to exaggerate the worth of their principles, and to push them to their extreme consequences. In consequence, parliaments are more especially representative of extreme opinions.

The most perfect example of the simplistic opinions peculiar to assemblies is offered by the Jacobins of the French Revolution. Dogmatic and logical to a man, and their brains full of vague generalities, they busied themselves with the application of fixed-principles without concerning themselves with events. It has been said of them, with reason, that they went through the Revolution without witnessing it. With the aid of the very simple dogmas that served them as guide, they imagined they could recast society from top to bottom, and cause a highly refined civilisation to return to a very anterior phase of social evolution. The methods they resorted to, in order to realise their dream, wore the same stamp of utter naïvety. They confined themselves, in reality, to destroying what stood in their way. All of them, moreover – Girondists, the Men of the Mountain, the Thermidorians, [32] etc. – were likewise driven by the same motivation.

Parliamentary crowds are very open to suggestion; and, as in the case of all crowds, the suggestion comes from leaders possessing prestige; but the suggestibility of parliamentary assemblies has very clearly defined limits, which it is important to point out.

On all questions of local or regional interest every member of an assembly has fixed, unalterable opinions, which no amount of argument can shake. The talent of a Demosthenes would be powerless to change the vote of a Deputy on such questions such as protection or the privilege of distilling alcohol, questions in which the interests of influential electors are

involved. The suggestion emanating from these electors, and undergone before the time to vote arrives, sufficiently outweighs suggestions from any other source to annul them and to maintain an absolute fixity of opinion. [33]

On general questions – the overthrow of a Cabinet, the imposition of a tax, etc. – there is no longer any fixity of opinion, and the suggestions of leaders can exert an influence, though not in quite the same way as in an ordinary crowd. Every party has its leaders, who possess occasionally an equal influence. The result is that the Deputy finds himself placed between two opposing demands and is inevitably made to hesitate. This explains how it is that he is often seen to vote in contrary fashion in an interval of a quarter of an hour or to add an article to a law which nullifies it; for instance, to withdraw from employers of labour the right of choosing and dismissing their workers, and then to very nearly annul this measure by an amendment.

It is for the same reason that every Chamber that is returned has some very stable opinions, and other opinions that are very shifting. On the whole, the general questions being the more numerous, indecision is predominant in the Chamber, the indecision which results from the ever-present fear of the elector, the suggestion received from whom is always latent, and tends to counterbalance the influence of the leaders.

Still, it is the leaders who are definitely the masters in those numerous discussions, with regard to the subject-matter of which the members of an assembly are without strong preconceived opinions.

The necessity for these leaders is evident, since, under the name of heads of groups, they are met with in the assemblies of every country. They are the real rulers of an assembly. Individuals forming a crowd cannot lack a leader and, as a

result, the votes of an assembly only represent, as a rule, the opinions of a small minority.

The influence of the leaders is due in very small measure to the arguments they employ, but in a large degree to their prestige. The best proof of this is that, should they by any circumstance lose their prestige, their influence disappears.

The prestige of these political leaders is individual, and independent of name or celebrity: a fact of which M. Jules Simon gives us some very curious examples in his remarks on the prominent men of the Assembly of 1848, of which he was a member:

“Two months before he was all-powerful, Louis Napoleon was entirely without the least importance.

“Victor Hugo mounted the tribune. He failed to achieve success. He was listened to as Felix Pyat was listened to, but he did not obtain as much applause. ‘I don’t like his ideas,’ Vaulabelle said to me, speaking of Felix Pyat, ‘but he is one of the greatest writers and the greatest orator of France.’ Edgar Quinet, in spite of his exceptional and powerful intelligence, was held in no esteem whatever. He had been popular for a while before the opening of the Assembly; in the Assembly he had no popularity.

“The splendour of genius makes itself less felt in political assemblies than anywhere else. They only give heed to eloquence appropriate to the time, and place, and to party services; not to services rendered the country. To pay tribute to Lamartine in 1848 and Thiers in 1871, urgent, relentless, interest was needed. As soon as the danger passed, the parliamentary world immediately forgot its gratitude and its fright.”

I have quoted the preceding passage for the sake of the facts it contains, not of the explanations it offers, their psychology

being somewhat poor. A crowd would at once lose its character of a crowd were it to credit its leaders with their services, whether of a party nature or rendered to their country. The crowd that obeys a leader is under the influence of his prestige, and its submission is not dictated by any sentiment of interest or gratitude.

In consequence, the leader endowed with sufficient prestige wields almost absolute power. The immense influence exerted during a long series of years, thanks to his prestige, by a celebrated Deputy, [34] beaten at the last general election in consequence of certain financial events, is well known. He had only to give the signal and Cabinets were overthrown. A writer has clearly indicated the scope of his action in the following lines:

“It is due, in the main, to M. X... that we paid three times as dearly as we should have done for Tonkin, that we remained so long on a precarious footing in Madagascar, that we were defrauded of an empire in the region of the Lower Niger, and that we have lost the commanding position we used to occupy in Egypt. The theories of M. X... have cost us more territories than the disasters of Napoleon I.”

We must not harbour too bitter a grudge against the leader in question. It is plain that he has cost us very dear; but a great part of his influence was due to the fact that he followed public opinion, which, in colonial matters, was far from being then what it has since become. A leader is seldom in advance of public opinion; almost always all that leaders do is to follow public opinion and to espouse all its errors.

The means of persuasion of the leaders we are dealing with, apart from their prestige, consist in the factors we have already enumerated several times. To make a skilful use of these resources a leader must have arrived at a comprehension, at least in an unconscious manner, of the psychology of crowds,

and must know how to address them. He should be aware, in particular, of the fascinating influence of words, phrases, and images. He should possess a special description of eloquence, composed of energetic affirmations – unburdened with proofs – and impressive images, accompanied by very summary arguments. This is a kind of eloquence that is met with in all assemblies, the English Parliament included, the most serious though it is of all.

“Debates in the House of Commons,” says the English philosopher Maine, “may be constantly read in which the entire discussion is confined to an exchange of rather weak generalities and rather violent personalities. General formulae of this description exercise a prodigious influence on the imagination of a pure democracy. It will always be easy to make a crowd accept general assertions, presented in striking terms, although they have never been verified, and are perhaps not capable of verification.”

Too much importance cannot be attached to the “striking terms” alluded to in the above quotation. We have already insisted, on several occasions, on the special power of words and formulae. They must be chosen in such a way as to evoke very vivid images. The following phrase, taken from a speech by one of the leaders of our assemblies, provides an excellent example:

“When the same vessel shall bear away to the fever-haunted lands of our penitentiary settlements the politician of shady reputation and the anarchist guilty of murder, the pair will be able to converse together, and they will appear to each other as the two complementary aspects of one and the same state of society.”

The image thus evoked is very vivid, and all the adversaries of the speaker felt themselves threatened by it. They conjured up a double vision of the fever-haunted country and the vessel

that may carry them away; for is it not possible that they are included in the somewhat ill-defined category of the politicians menaced? They experienced the lurking fear that the men of the Convention must have felt whom the vague speeches of Robespierre threatened with the guillotine, and who, under the influence of this fear, invariably yielded to him.

It is all to the interest of the leaders to indulge in the most improbable exaggerations. The speaker, whose words I have just cited, was able to affirm, without arousing violent protests, that bankers and priests had subsidised the throwers of bombs, and that the directors of the great financial companies deserve the same punishment as anarchists. Affirmations of this kind are always effective with crowds. The affirmation is never too violent, the declamation never too threatening. Nothing intimidates the audience more than this sort of eloquence. Those present are afraid that if they protest, they will be put down as traitors or accomplices.

As I have said, this peculiar style of eloquence has always been of a sovereign effect in all assemblies. In times of crisis, its power is still further accentuated. The speeches of the great orators of the assemblies of the French Revolution are very interesting reading from this point of view. At every instant they thought themselves obliged to pause in order to denounce crime and exalt virtue, after which they would burst forth into imprecations against tyrants, and swear to live free men or perish. Those present rose to their feet, applauded furiously, and then calmed down and took their seats again.

On occasion, the leader may be intelligent and highly educated, but the possession of these qualities does, as a rule, more harm than good. By showing how complex things are, by permitting explanation and promoting comprehension, intelligence always renders its owner indulgent, and blunts in a large measure, that intensity and violence of conviction needful for apostles. Most great leaders of crowds of all ages, and those

of the Revolution in particular, have been of lamentably narrow intellect; while it is precisely those whose intelligence has been the most restricted who have exercised the greatest influence.

The speeches of the most celebrated of them all, of Robespierre, frequently astound one by their incoherence: by merely reading them no plausible explanation is to be found of the great part played by the powerful dictator:

“The platitudes and redundancies of pedagogic eloquence and Latin culture at the service of a mind, childish rather than undistinguished, and limited in its notions of attack and defence to the defiant attitude of schoolboys. Not an idea, not a happy turn of phrase, or a telling hit: a storm of declamation that leaves us bored. After a dose of this anything but exhilarating reading, one is attempted to exclaim ‘Oh!’ with the amiable Camille Desmoulins.”

It is terrible at times to think of the power that strong conviction combined with extreme narrowness of mind gives a person possessing prestige. It is none the less necessary that these conditions should be satisfied for a person to ignore obstacles and display strength of will in a high measure. Crowds instinctively recognise in individuals of energy and conviction the rulers they are always in need of.

In parliamentary assemblies, the success of speeches depends almost solely on the prestige possessed by the speakers, and not at all on the arguments brought forward. The best proof of this is that when for one cause or another speakers lose their prestige, they simultaneously lose all their influence, that is, their power of influencing votes at will.

When unknown speakers come forward with a speech containing good arguments, but only arguments, the chances are that they will obtain no further hearings. A Deputy who is a

psychologist of insight, M. Desaubes, has recently traced in the following lines the portrait of the Deputy who lacks prestige:

“When he takes his place in the tribune he draws a document from his portfolio, spreads it out methodically before him, and makes a start with assurance.

“He flatters himself that he will implant in the minds of his audience the conviction by which he is himself animated. He has weighed and reweighed his arguments; he is well primed with figures and proofs; he is certain he will convince his hearers. In the face of the evidence he is to adduce all resistance would be futile. He begins, confident in the justice of his cause, and relying upon the attention of his colleagues, whose only anxiety, of course, is to subscribe to the truth.

“He speaks and is at once surprised at the restlessness of the House and a little annoyed by the noise that is being made.

“How is it silence is not kept? Why this general inattention? What are those Deputies thinking about who are engaged in conversation? What urgent motive has induced this or that Deputy to quit his seat?

“An expression of uneasiness crosses his face; he frowns and stops. Encouraged by the President, he begins again, raising his voice. He is only listened to even less. He lends emphasis to his words, and gesticulates: the noise around him increases. He can no longer hear himself, and again stops; finally, afraid that his silence may provoke the dreaded cry, ‘The Closure!’ he starts off again. The clamour becomes unbearable.”

When parliamentary assemblies reach a certain pitch of excitement they become identical with ordinary heterogeneous crowds and their sentiments, in consequence, present the peculiarity of always being extreme. They will be seen to commit acts of the greatest heroism or the worst excesses. Individuals are no longer themselves, and, so entirely is this the

case, that they will vote measures most adverse to their own personal interests.

The history of the French Revolution shows to what extent assemblies are capable of losing their self-consciousness, and of obeying suggestions most contrary to their interests. It was an enormous sacrifice for the nobility to renounce its privileges, yet it did so without hesitation on a famous night during the sittings of the Constituent Assembly. By renouncing their inviolability the men of the Convention placed themselves under a perpetual menace of death and yet they took this step, and were not afraid to decimate their own ranks, though perfectly aware that the scaffold to which they were sending their colleagues today might be their own fate tomorrow. The truth is they had attained to that completely automatic state which I have described elsewhere, and no consideration would hinder them from yielding to the suggestions by which they were hypnotised. The following passage from the memoirs of one of them, Billaud-Varennnes, is absolutely typical on this score: "The decisions with which we have been so reproached," he says, "were not desired by us two days, a single day before they were taken: it was the crisis and nothing else that gave rise to them." Nothing can be more accurate.

The same phenomena of unconsciousness were to be witnessed during all the stormy sittings of the Convention. "They approved and decreed measures," says Taine, "which they held in horror. Measures which were not only stupid and foolish, but measures which were crimes such as the murder of innocent people, the murder of their friends. The Left, supported by the Right, unanimously and amid loud applause, sent to the scaffold Danton, its natural chief, and the great promoter and leader of the Revolution. Unanimously, and amid the greatest applause, the Right, supported by the Left, votes the worst decrees of the revolutionary government. Unanimously and amid cries of admiration and enthusiasm, amid

demonstrations of passionate sympathy for Collot d'Herbois, Couthon, and Robespierre, the Convention by spontaneous and repeated re-elections keeps in office the homicidal government which the Plain detests because it is homicidal, and the Mountain detests because it is decimated by it. The Plain and the Mountain, the majority and the minority, finish by consenting to help in their own suicide. For the 22 Prairial the entire Convention offered itself to the executioner; with the 8 Thermidor, during the first quarter of an hour that followed Robespierre's speech, it did the same thing again."

This picture may appear sombre. Yet it is accurate. Parliamentary assemblies, sufficiently excited and hypnotised, offer the same characteristics. They become an unstable flock, obedient to every impulse. The following description of the Assembly of 1848 is due to M. Spuller, a parliamentarian whose faith in democracy is above suspicion. I reproduce it from the *Revue Litteraire*, and it is thoroughly typical. It offers an example of all the exaggerated sentiments which I have described as characteristic of crowds, and of that excessive volatility which allows assemblies to pass, from one moment to another, from one set of sentiments to another entirely opposite set.

"The Republican party was brought to its knees by its divisions, its jealousies, its suspicions, and, in turn, its blind confidence and its limitless hopes. Its simple-mindedness and candour were only equalled by its universal mistrust. An absence of all sense of legality, of all comprehension of discipline, together with boundless terrors and illusions; the peasant and the child are on a level in these respects. Their calm is as great as their impatience; their ferocity is equal to their docility. This condition is the natural consequence of a temperament that is not formed and of the lack of education. Nothing astonishes such persons, and everything disconcerts

them. Trembling with fear or brave to the point of heroism, they would go through fire and water or fly from a shadow.

“They are ignorant of cause and effect and of the connecting links between events. They are as promptly discouraged as they are exalted, they are subject to every description of panic, they are always either too highly strung or too downcast, but never in the mood or the measure the situation would require. More fluid than water, they reflect every line and assume every shape. What sort of a foundation for a government can they be expected to supply?”

Fortunately, all the characteristics of parliamentary assemblies that we have noted, appear only intermittently. Such assemblies only constitute crowds at certain moments. The individuals composing them retain their individuality in a great number of cases, which explains how it is that an assembly is able to turn out excellent technical laws. It is true that the authors of these laws are specialists who prepare them in the quiet of their studies, and that in reality the law voted is the work of individuals and not of an assembly. These laws are naturally the best. They are only liable to have disastrous results when a series of amendments converts them into the outcome of a collective effort. The work of a crowd is always inferior, whatever its nature, to that of an isolated individual. It is specialists who safeguard assemblies from passing ill-advised or unworkable measures. A specialist in this case is a temporary leader of crowds. An assembly is without influence on a specialist, but the latter has influence over an assembly.

In spite of all the difficulties attending their work, parliamentary assemblies are the best form of government humanity has discovered as yet, and more especially the best means it has found to escape the yoke of personal tyrannies. They constitute assuredly the ideal government at any rate for philosophers, thinkers, writers, artists, and learned people – in a word, for all those who form the cream of a civilisation.

Moreover, in reality they only present two serious dangers, one being inevitable financial waste, and the other the progressive restriction of the liberty of the individual.

The first of these dangers is the necessary consequence of the exigencies and want of foresight of electoral crowds. Should members of an assembly propose a measure giving apparent satisfaction to democratic ideas, should these members bring in a Bill, for instance, to assure old-age pensions to all workers, and to increase the wages of every class of State employees, the other Deputies, victims of suggestion in their dread of their electors, will not venture to seem to disregard the interests of the pensioners and workers by rejecting the proposed measure, although well aware they are imposing a fresh strain on the Budget by creating new taxes. It is quite impossible for the Deputies to hesitate to give their votes. The consequences of the increase of expenditure are remote and will not entail disagreeable consequences for anyone on a personal level, while the consequences of a negative vote might clearly come to light only in the distant future when these politicians next present themselves for re-election.

In addition to this first cause of an exaggerated expenditure, there is another not less imperative: the necessity of voting all grants for local purposes. Deputies are unable to oppose grants of this kind because they represent once more the exigencies of the electors, and because Deputies can only obtain what they each individually require for their own constituency on the condition of acceding to similar demands on the part of colleagues. [35]

The second of the dangers referred to above, the inevitable restrictions on liberty consummated by parliamentary assemblies, is apparently less obvious, but is, nevertheless, very real. It is the result of the innumerable laws, which always have a restrictive action, that parliaments consider themselves

obliged to vote for and to whose consequences, owing to their short-sightedness, they are in a great measure blind.

The danger of restricting liberty must indeed be most inevitable, since even England itself, which assuredly offers the most popular type of the parliamentary régime, the type in which representatives are most independent of their electors, has been unable to escape it. Herbert Spencer has shown, in a work already old, that the increase of apparent liberty must be followed by the decrease of real liberty. Returning to this contention in his recent book, *The Individual versus the State*, this is how he expresses himself with regard to the English Parliament: "Legislation since this period has followed the course that I pointed out. Rapidly multiplying dictatorial measures have continually tended to restrict individual liberties, and this in two ways. Regulations have been established every year in greater number, imposing a constraint on the citizens in matters in which their acts were formerly completely free, and forcing them to accomplish acts which they were formerly at liberty to accomplish or not to accomplish at will. At the same time heavier and heavier public, and especially local, burdens have still further restricted their liberty by diminishing the portion of the profits they can spend as they choose, and by augmenting the portion which is taken from them to be spent according to the good pleasure of the public authorities."

This progressive restriction of liberties shows itself in every country in a special shape which Herbert Spencer has omitted; it is that the passing of these innumerable series of legislative measures, all of them in a general way of a restrictive order, causes an increase in the number, power, and influence of the bureaucrats charged with their application. These bureaucrats tend in this way to become the veritable masters of civilised countries. Their power is all the greater owing to the fact that, amidst the incessant transfer of authority, the administrative

caste is alone in being untouched by these changes, is alone in possessing irresponsibility, impersonality, and perpetuity. There is no more oppressive despotism than that which presents itself under this triple form.

This incessant creation of restrictive laws and regulations, surrounding the pettiest actions of existence with the most complicated formalities, inevitably has as its result the confining within narrower and narrower limits of the sphere in which the citizen may move freely. Victims of the delusion that equality and liberty are better assured by the multiplication of laws, nations daily consent to putting up with trammels which prove increasingly burdensome. They do not accept this legislation with impunity. Accustomed to putting up with every yoke, they soon end up by desiring servitude, and lose all spontaneity and energy. They are then no more than vain shadows, passive, unresisting and powerless automata.

Having arrived at this point, individuals are bound to seek outside themselves the forces they can no longer find within themselves. The functions of governments necessarily increase in proportion as the indifference and helplessness of the citizens grow. It is governments who must necessarily exhibit the initiative, enterprising, and guiding spirit in which private persons are lacking. It falls on governments to undertake everything, direct everything, and take everything under their protection. The State becomes an all-powerful god. However, experience shows that the power of such gods is never either very durable or very strong.

This progressive restriction of all liberties in the case of certain peoples, in spite of an outward license that gives them the illusion that these liberties are still in their possession, seems at least as much a consequence of their old age as of any particular system. It constitutes one of the preliminary symptoms of that decadent phase which up to now no civilisation has escaped.

Judging by the lessons of the past, and by the symptoms that strike the attention on every side, several of our modern civilisations have reached that phase of extreme old age which precedes decadence. It seems inevitable that all peoples should pass through identical phases of existence, since history is so often seen to repeat its course.

It is easy to note briefly these common phases of the evolution of civilisations, and I shall conclude this work with a summary of them.

If we examine in their main lines the source of the greatness and of the fall of the civilisations that preceded our own, what do we see?

At the dawn of civilisation a swarm of people of various origin brought together by the chances of migration, invasions, and conquests. Of different blood, and of equally different languages and beliefs, the only common bond of union between these people is the half-recognised law of a chief. The psychological characteristics of crowds are present in an eminent degree in these confused agglomerations. They have the transient cohesion of crowds, their heroism, their weaknesses, their impulsiveness and their violence. Nothing is stable in connection with them. They are barbarians.

At length time accomplishes its work. The identity of surroundings, the repeated intermingling of races and the necessities of life in common exert their influence. The assemblage of dissimilar units begins to blend into a whole, to form a race; that is, an aggregate possessing common characteristics and sentiments to which heredity will give greater and greater stability. The crowd has become a people, and this people is able to emerge from its barbarous state. However, it will only entirely emerge from this when, after long efforts, struggles necessarily repeated, and innumerable fresh starts, it will have acquired an ideal. The nature of this ideal is

of slight importance; whether it is the cult of Rome, the might of Athens, or the triumph of Allah, it will suffice to endow all the individuals of the nation that it is forming with perfect unity of sentiment and thought.

At this stage a new civilisation, with its institutions, its beliefs, and its arts, can be born. In pursuit of its ideal, the race will acquire in succession the qualities necessary to give it splendour, vigour, and grandeur. At times, no doubt, it will still be a crowd but subsequently, beneath the mobile and changing characteristics of crowds, is found a solid substratum, the genius of the race which confines within narrow limits the transformations of a nation and overrules the play of chance.

After having exerted its creative action, time begins that work of destruction from which neither gods nor mortals escape. Having reached a certain level of strength and complexity a civilisation ceases to grow, and having ceased to grow it is condemned to a speedy decline. The hour of its old age has struck.

This inevitable hour is always marked by the weakening of the ideal that was the mainstay of the race. In proportion as this ideal pales, all the religious, political, and social structures inspired by it begin disintegrating.

With its ideal steadily perishing, the nation loses more and more of the qualities that lent it its cohesion, its unity, and its strength. The personality and intelligence of the individual may increase but, at the same time, this collective personality of the nation is replaced by an excessive development of the self-centred individual, accompanied by a weakening of character and a lessening of the capacity for action. What constituted a people, a unity, a whole, becomes in the end an agglomeration of individualities lacking cohesion, and artificially held together for a time by its traditions and institutions. It is at this stage that people, divided by their interests and aspirations, and incapable

any longer of self-government, require direction in their pettiest acts, and that the State exerts an absorbing influence.

With the definite loss of its old ideal, the genius of the nation entirely disappears; it is a mere swarm of isolated individuals which returns to its original state: that of a crowd. Without consistency and without a future, it has all the transient characteristics of crowds. Its civilisation is now unstable and at the mercy of every chance. The populace is sovereign, and the tide of barbarism mounts. The civilisation may still seem brilliant because it possesses an outward front, the work of a long past, but it is in reality an edifice crumbling to ruin, which nothing supports, and destined to tumble down at the first storm.

To pass in pursuit of an ideal, from the barbarous to the civilised state, and then, when this ideal has lost its virtue, to decline and die. Such is the life cycle of a people.

FOOTNOTES

Footnotes 7, 13, 17, 22, 25 and 32 have been added or amended for clarity and are marked with #. Footnotes 27 and 34 are taken from the original translation. All other footnotes are taken either from Le Bon's original text or from the 1905 Alcan edition.

[1] Napoleon's most subtle advisers, moreover, did not understand this psychology any better. Talleyrand wrote to him that "Spain would welcome his soldiers as liberators." It received them as beasts of prey. A psychologist acquainted with the hereditary instincts of the Spanish race would have easily foreseen this reception.

[2] Those few authors who have engaged in the study of the psychology of crowds have done so by studying them, as I said above, from the viewpoint of criminality. Having dedicated only a short chapter in this work to the latter subject, for further reading I recommend the studies of M. Tarde and *Les foules criminelles* by M. Sighele.

The latter work does not contain any of the author's personal opinions but is a compilation of facts that can be used by psychologists. My conclusions on the criminality and morality of crowds are moreover completely different from those of the two authors I have cited.

Some of the consequences of laws regulating the psychology of crowds are found in my work *La Psychologie du Socialisme*. These laws can also find application in the most diverse subjects. One of the most outstanding applications we mentioned is that of M. A. Gevaert, director of the Conservatoire Royal de Bruxelles, who recently applied them to music, defined by him, quite rightly, as "the art of crowds." In a letter to me, this eminent professor writes: "Two of your works have given me the solution to a problem which I formerly thought insoluble: the astonishing reaction of all crowds listening to a

piece of music whether it is modern or old, native or foreign, simple or complicated, providing it is beautifully executed and directed by an enthusiastic conductor.”

M. Gevaert admirably demonstrates how “a work not understood by eminent musicians, who read musical scores in the solitude of their rooms, can be instantly understood by listeners without any knowledge of the technicalities behind it.” He also proves why these aesthetic impressions do not leave any trace.

[3] People who went through the siege of Paris saw numerous examples of this credulity of crowds. A candle alight on an upper floor was immediately looked upon as a signal given to the besiegers, although it was evident, after a moment of reflection, that it was utterly impossible to catch sight of the light of the candle at a distance of several miles.

[4] *Éclair*, April 21, 1895.

[5] Do we know in the case of one single battle exactly how it took place? I don’t believe it at all. We know who were the conquerors and the conquered, but this is probably all. What M. D’Harcourt said with respect to the battle of Solferino, which he witnessed and in which he was personally engaged, may be applied to all battles: “The generals (informed, of course, by the evidence of hundreds of witnesses) forward their official reports; the orderly officers modify these documents and draw up a definite narrative; the chief of the staff raises objections and re-writes the whole on a fresh basis. It is carried to the Marshal, who exclaims: ‘You are entirely in error,’ and he substitutes a fresh edition. Scarcely anything remains of the original report.” M. D’Harcourt relates this fact as proof of the impossibility of establishing the truth in connection with the most striking and the best observed events.

[6] For this reason, it is understandable why it sometimes happens that pieces refused by all theatrical managers obtain a

prodigious success when by a stroke of chance they are put on the stage. The recent success of François Coppée's play *Pour la Couronne* is well known, and yet, in spite of the name of its author, it was refused for ten years by the managers of the principal Parisian theatres. *Charley's Aunt*, was refused at every theatre, and finally staged at the expense of a stockbroker. The play has had two hundred performances in France, and more than a thousand in London. Without the explanation given above of the impossibility for theatrical managers to mentally substitute themselves for a crowd, such mistakes in judgment on behalf of competent individuals, who are very interested in not committing such grave blunders, would be inexplicable. This is a subject that I cannot expand here, meriting further study.

[7] # The Ultramontane were a French papist sect, literally 'Over the Mountains' (i.e. Alps).

[8] The novelty of this proposition being still considerable and history being quite unintelligible without it, I devoted four chapters to its demonstration in my last book (*The Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples*). From it, readers will see that, in spite of fallacious appearances, neither language, religion, arts, nor, in a word, any element of civilisation, can pass intact from one people to another.

[9] The connection with the former traditionalist, Fourcroy, quoted by Taine, is very clear on this point:

"What is seen everywhere with respect to the keeping of Sundays and attendance at churches proves that the majority of the French desire to return to their old usages and that it is no longer opportune to resist this natural tendency. ... The great majority of people stand in need of religion, public worship, and priests. It is an error of some modern philosophers, by which I myself have been led astray, to believe in the possibility of instruction being so general as to destroy religious prejudices, which for a great number of unfortunate people are

a source of consolation. ... The masses, then, must be allowed its priests, its altars and its public worship.”

[10] The most advanced republicans, even of the United States, recognise this fact. The American magazine, *The Forum*, recently gave categorical expression to the opinion in terms which I reproduce here from the *Review of Reviews* for December, 1894:

“It should never be forgotten, even by the most ardent enemies of an aristocracy, that England is today the most democratic country of the universe, the country in which the rights of the individual are most respected, and in which the individual possesses the most liberty.”

[11] If a comparison is made between the profound religious and political dissensions which separate the various parties in France, and are more especially the result of social questions, and the separatist tendencies which were manifested at the time of the Revolution, and again appeared towards the close of the Franco-German war, it will be seen that the different peoples represented in France are still far from being a single nation. Vigorous centralisation of the Revolution and creation of artificial departments destined to bring about the fusion of the ancient provinces was useful. Such an achievement would today cause bloody disorder. To overlook this is to ignore the entire history of France.

[12] see *Psychologie du Socialisme et Psychologie de l'éducation*.

[13] # Independent regions of France in the 6th to 8th centuries.

[14] This phenomenon, moreover, is not peculiar to the Latin peoples. It is also to be observed in China, which is also a country in the hands of a solid hierarchy of mandarins or bureaucrats, and where a position is obtained, as in France, by competitive examination, in which the only test is the imperturbable recitation of bulky manuals. The army of

educated persons without employment is considered in China at the present day as a veritable national calamity. It is the same in India where, since the English have opened schools, not for educational purposes, as in England itself, but simply to furnish the indigenous inhabitants with instruction, there has been formed a special class of educated persons, the Baboos, who, when they do not obtain employment, become the irreconcilable enemies of English rule. In the case of all the Baboos, whether provided with employment or not, the first effect of their instruction has been to lower their standard of morality. This is a fact on which I have insisted at length in my book, *The Civilisations of India*, a fact, too, which has been observed by all authors who have visited the great peninsula.

[15] Taine, *Le Régime moderne*, vol. ii., 1894. These pages are almost the last that Taine wrote. They resume admirably the results of the great philosopher's long experience. Unfortunately they are in my opinion totally incomprehensible for those of our university professors who have not lived abroad. Education is the only means at our disposal of influencing the mind of a nation to some extent. It is profoundly saddening to have to think that there is scarcely anyone in France who can arrive at understanding that our present system of teaching is a grave cause of rapid decline, which instead of elevating our youth, lowers and perverts it.

[16] In my book, *The Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples*, I have insisted at length on the differences which distinguish the Latin democratic ideal from the Anglo-Saxon democratic ideal.

[17] # Attributed to Daniel Lesueur in the original edition. This footnote was removed from the Alcan edition.

[18] The opinion of the crowd was formed in this case by those rough-and-ready associations of dissimilar things, the mechanism which I have previously explained. The French national guard of that period, being composed of peaceable

shopkeepers, utterly lacking in discipline, and quite incapable of being taken seriously, whatever bore a similar name, evoked the same conception and was considered in consequence as harmless. The error of the crowd was shared at the time by its leaders, as happens so often in connection with opinions dealing with generalisations. In a speech made in the Chamber on the 31st of December, 1867, and quoted in a book by M. E. Ollivier that has appeared recently, a statesman called M. Thiers, who often followed the opinion of the crowd, but was never in advance of it, declared that Prussia only possessed a national guard analogous to that of France and, as a consequence, without importance, in addition to a regular army, about equal to the French regular army; assertions about as accurate as the predictions of the same statesman regarding the insignificant future reserved to railways.

[19] My first observations with regard to the art of impressing crowds and touching the slight assistance to be derived in this connection from the rules of logic date back to the siege of Paris, to the day when I saw conducted to the Louvre, where the Government was then sitting, Marshal V---, whom a furious crowd asserted they had surprised in the act of taking the plans of the fortifications to sell them to the Prussians. A member of the Government (G. P---), a very celebrated orator, came out to harangue the crowd, which was demanding the immediate execution of the prisoner. I had expected that the speaker would have pointed out the absurdity of the accusation by remarking that the accused Marshal was positively one of those who had constructed the fortifications, the plan of which, moreover, was on sale at every bookseller. To my immense stupefaction (I was very young then) the speech was on quite different lines. "Justice shall be done," exclaimed the orator, advancing towards the prisoner, "and pitiless justice. Let the Government of the National Defence conclude your inquiry. In the meantime, we will keep the prisoner in custody." At once calmed by this apparent concession, the crowd broke up, and a quarter of an

hour later the Marshal was able to return home. He would infallibly have been torn to pieces had the speaker treated the infuriated crowd to the logical arguments that my extreme youth induced me to consider as very convincing.

[20] Gustave le Bon, *L'Homme et les Sociétés*, vol. ii. p. 116. 1881.

[21] The influence on crowds of titles, decorations, and uniforms can be traced in all countries, even in those in which the sentiment of personal independence is the most strongly developed. I quote in this connection a curious passage from a recent book on travel about the prestige enjoyed in England by great persons.

“I had observed, under various circumstances, the peculiar sort of intoxication produced in the most reasonable Englishmen by the contact or sight of an English peer.

“Provided his fortune enables him to keep up his rank, he is sure of their affection in advance, and brought into contact with him they are so enchanted as to put up with anything at his hands. They may be seen to redden with pleasure at his approach, and if he speaks to them their suppressed joy increases their redness, and causes their eyes to gleam with unusual brilliance. Respect for nobility is in their blood, so to speak, as with Spaniards the love of dancing, with Germans that of music, and with Frenchmen the liking for revolutions. Their passion for horses and Shakespeare is less violent, the satisfaction and pride they derive from these sources a less integral part of their being. There is a considerable sale for books dealing with the peerage and, go where one will, they are to be found, like the Bible, in all hands.”

[22] # The Directory was appointed by the 1795 French constitution, in turn overthrown by Napoleon in 1799.

[23] Thoroughly conscious of his prestige, Napoleon was aware that he added to it by treating the great personages

around him rather worse than stable lads, and among whom figured some of those celebrated men of the Convention of whom Europe had stood in dread. The gossip of the period abounds in illustrations of this fact. One day, in the midst of a Council of State, Napoleon grossly insults Beugnot, treating him as one might an unmannerly valet. The effect produced, he goes up to him and says, "Well, stupid, have you found your head again?" Whereupon Beugnot, tall as a drum-major, bows very low, and the little man raising his hand, takes the tall one by the ear, "an intoxicating sign of favour," writes Beugnot, "the familiar gesture of the master who waxes gracious." Such examples give a clear idea of the degree of base platitude that prestige can provoke. They enable us to understand the immense contempt of the great despot for the men surrounding him, men who he merely looked upon as "cannon-fodder."

[24] An Austrian paper, the *Neue Freie Presse*, of Vienna, indulged on the subject of the destiny of de Lesseps in reflections marked by a most judicious psychological insight. I therefore reproduce them here:

"After the condemnation of Ferdinand de Lesseps one has no longer the right to be astonished at the sad end of Christopher Columbus. If Ferdinand de Lesseps were a rogue every noble illusion is a crime. Antiquity would have crowned the memory of de Lesseps with a halo of glory, and would have made him drink from the bowl of nectar in the midst of Olympus, for he has altered the face of the earth and accomplished works which make the creation more perfect. The President of the Court of Appeal has immortalised himself by condemning Ferdinand de Lesseps, for the nations will always demand the name of the man who was not afraid to debase his century by investing with the convict's cap an aged man, whose life redounded to the glory of his contemporaries.

"Let there be no more talk in the future of inflexible justice, there where reigns a bureaucratic hatred of audacious feats.

The nations have need of audacious men who believe in themselves and overcome every obstacle without concern for their personal safety. Genius cannot be prudent; through prudence it could never enlarge the sphere of human activity.

“. . . Ferdinand de Lesseps has known the intoxication of triumph and the bitterness of disappointment – Suez and Panama. At this point, the heart revolts at the morality of success. When de Lesseps had succeeded in joining two oceans, princes and nations rendered him their homage; today, when he meets with failure among the rocks of the Cordilleras, he is nothing but a vulgar rogue... In this result we see a war between the classes of society, the discontent of bureaucrats and employees, who take their revenge with the aid of the criminal code on those who would raise themselves above their fellows... Modern legislators are filled with embarrassment when confronted by the lofty ideas due to human genius; the public comprehends such ideas still less, and it is easy for an advocate-general to prove that Stanley is a murderer and de Lesseps a deceiver.”

[25] # The French original uses the phrase “geological ages.”

[26] Barbarous, philosophically speaking, I mean. In practice they have created an entirely new civilisation, and for fifteen centuries have given people a glimpse of those enchanted realms of generous dreams and of hope which will be known no more.

[27] These remarks refer to the French newspaper press. [Original translator’s note.]

[28] There are pages in the books of the French official professors of history that are very curious from this point of view. They prove too, how little the critical spirit is developed by the system of university education in vogue in France. I cite as an example the following extracts from the *French Revolution* of M. Rambaud, professor of history at the Sorbonne:

“The taking of the Bastille was a culminating event in the history not only of France, but of all Europe; and inaugurated a new epoch in the history of the world!”

With respect to Robespierre, we learn with stupefaction that “his dictatorship was based more especially on opinion, persuasion, and moral authority; it was a sort of pontificate in the hands of a virtuous man!” (pp. 91 and 220.)

[29] It is to be remarked, in passing, that this division of crimes into those dangerous, and those not dangerous for society, which is well and instinctively made by juries is far from being unjust. The object of criminal laws is evidently to protect society against dangerous criminals and not to avenge it. On the other hand, the French code, and above all the minds of the French magistrates, are still deeply imbued with the spirit of vengeance characteristic of the old primitive law, and the term “vindicta” (prosecution, from the Latin *vindicta*, vengeance) is still in daily use. Proof of this tendency on behalf of magistrates is found in the refusal by many of them to apply Berenger’s law. This law allows that condemned people do not undergo their sentence unless the crime is repeated. Yet no magistrate can be ignorant, for the fact is proved by statistics, that the application of a punishment inflicted for the first time infallibly leads to further crime on the part of the person punished. When judges set free a sentenced person it always seems to them that society has not been avenged. Rather than not avenge it, they prefer to create a dangerous, confirmed criminal.

[30] The magistracy is, in point of fact, the only administration whose acts are under no control. In spite of all its revolutions, democratic France does not possess that right of habeas corpus of which England is so proud. We have banished all the tyrants, but have set up a magistrate in each city who disposes at will of the honour and liberty of the citizens. An insignificant examining magistrate, fresh from university,

possesses the revolting power of sending to prison at will persons of the most considerable standing, on a simple supposition on his part of their guilt, and without being obliged to justify his act to anyone. Under the pretext of pursuing his investigation he can keep these persons in prison for six months or even a year, and free them at last without owing them either an indemnity or excuses. The warrant in France is the exact equivalent of the *lettre de cachet*, with this difference, that the latter, with the use of which the monarchy was so justly reproached, could only be resorted to by persons occupying a very high position, while the warrant is an instrument in the hands of a whole class of citizens which is far from passing for being very enlightened or very independent.

[31] Committees under whatever name, clubs, syndicates, etc., constitute perhaps the most redoubtable danger resulting from the power of crowds. They represent in reality the most impersonal and, in consequence, the most oppressive form of tyranny. The leaders who direct the committees being supposed to speak and act in the name of a collectivity, are freed from all responsibility, and are in a position to do just what they choose. The most savage tyrant has never ventured even to dream of such proscriptions as those ordained by the committees of the Revolution. Barras has declared that they decimated the convention, picking off its members at their pleasure. So long as he was able to speak in their name, Robespierre wielded absolute power. The moment this frightful dictator separated himself from them, for reasons of personal pride, he was lost. The reign of crowds is the reign of committees, that is, of the leaders of crowds. A severer despotism cannot be imagined.

[32] # These were groups formed during the French Revolution.

[33] The following reflection of an English parliamentarian of long experience doubtless applies to these opinions, fixed beforehand, and rendered unalterable by electioneering

necessities: “During the fifty years that I have sat at Westminster, I have listened to thousands of speeches; but few of them have changed my opinion, not one of them has changed my vote.”

[34] M. Clemenceau. [Original translator’s note.]

[35] In its issue of April 6, 1895, *The Economist* published a curious review of the figures that may be reached by expenditure caused solely by electoral considerations, and notably of the outlay on railways. To put Langayes (a town of 3,000 inhabitants, situated on a mountain) in communication with Puy, a railway is voted that will cost 15 million francs. Seven million are to be spent to put Beaumont (3,500 inhabitants) in communication with Castel-Sarrazin; 7 million to put Oust (a village of 523 inhabitants) in communication with Seix (1,200 inhabitants); 6 millions to put Prade in communication with the hamlet of Olette (747 inhabitants), etc. In 1895 alone, 90 million francs were voted for railways of only local utility. There is other expenditure of no lesser importance needed also by electioneering considerations. The law instituting workers’ pensions will soon involve a minimum annual outlay of 165 million, according to the Minister of Finance, and of 800 million according to the academician M. Leroy-Beaulieu. It is evident that the continued growth of expenditure of this kind must end in bankruptcy. Many European countries – Portugal, Greece, Spain, Turkey – have reached this stage, and others, such as Italy, will soon be reduced to the same extremity. Still, too much alarm need not be felt at this state of things, since the public has successively consented to put up with the reduction of four-fifths in the payment of their coupons by these different countries. Bankruptcy under these ingenious conditions allows the equilibrium of Budgets which are difficult to balance to be instantly restored. Moreover, wars, socialism, and economic conflicts hold in store for us a profusion of other catastrophes in the period of universal disintegration we are traversing, and

it is necessary to be resigned to living from hand to mouth without too much concern for a future we cannot control.


For further reading on Gustave Le Bon:

Benoît Marpeau, *Gustave Le Bon: parcours d'un intellectuel*, Paris, 2000

Raymond Queneau, *Gustave Le Bon*, Limoges, 1990

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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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